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Abstract 
The sharing of power and responsibilities between the individual states and the federal 
government is detailed in the US Constitution and is called federalism. Research has indicated 
that the shift of power between the states and federal government has waxed and waned over the 
last 236 years. This qualitative study is based upon literature review of the relationships of local, 
state, and federal governments in responding to catastrophes. Each level of government brings 
unique capabilities to the response to catastrophic events. There is no need to usurp federalism in 
order to survive the next catastrophe; it is going to take all levels of government working 
together in a collaborative fashion. The aim of this study is to influence policy makers to take a 
more balanced approach to the roles of local, state, and federal governments in emergency 
management.  
In the past two decades, the United States and its citizens have experienced several 
natural and man-made (terrorist) disasters.  Devastating in their own right, each disaster has led 
members of society to question the capability of local, state, and federal officials.  The economic 
climate in the United States has placed emergency management efforts and the progress made 
over the past few years in jeopardy. Significant budget cuts and limited funding provide many 
challenges to continue the progress in making communities safe, less vulnerable, and resilient in 
regards to disasters and catastrophic emergencies.  This thesis proposes the use of increased 
collaborative arrangements, greater accountability, and the use of performance measures as ways 
to achieve greater efficiency to maximize emergency management efforts under budget 
constraints.   
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A better understanding of emergency plans and the effect it has had on varying levels of 
society will enable civic leaders an opportunity to improve existing emergency plans and reduce 
the potential for loss of life. Preparing civilians has more impact on the psychological well-being 
of the nation than being rescued by emergency services; and preparing civilian‘s increases 
community resiliency at a faster rate than preparing response personnel. 
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Chapter 1 
Strategy: Continuity of Operations 
“But I just think we've got such continuity with what we're doing that most people come 
in and fill in the blanks. And sometimes we leave a lot of blanks to be filled.”  
                                                                                                        Charlie Hunter 
Purpose 
This Strategy Memorandum proposal provides a general overview of the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) Continuity of Operations.  It provides an examination of planning, 
ensuring mission stability and continuation of essential functions and services across a wide 
range of potential events. These are required for emergency preparedness and response policies 
in regards to needs and populations, by allowing reduced interruptions of key enterprise services 
or command and control capabilities. This memorandum proposal details essential capabilities 
required to support functional areas, addresses circumstances that may cause a loss of essential 
capabilities, and assists leaders and staffs to plan for contingencies to maintain recovery mission 
essential functions and capabilities.  An alternative for disconnected or interrupted services 
begins with an effective Continuity of Operations (COOP) plan to include provisions for Disaster 
Recovery. 
This memorandum proposes a two-phased process for developing a Continuity of 
Operations plan.  The process includes a near term and a longer term step: 
Near term:  review the planning to establish the foundation for a Continuity of Operations 
planning format and provide clear short term guidance to staff by clarifying government 
priorities.  
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Long term:  design a process to test assumptions, create a comprehensive community 
vision and translate the Council‘s Continuity of Operations goals into an implementation plan to 
guide the course for the future.   
The Department of Homeland Security, according to its assigned response mission, is to 
lead, manage and coordinate the national response to acts of terrorism, natural disasters, or other 
emergencies (DHS).  The challenge for national preparedness is that the current system for 
homeland security does not provide the framework to manage the challenges posed by 21st 
century catastrophic threats.  Under the current framework, the federal government merely 
coordinates resources to meet the needs of local and state governments based on their requests 
for assistance.  The challenge for public safety and security is that the federal government 
provides assistance only when local agencies are overwhelmed or are depleted. The fundamental 
responsibility of public safety falls with local and state governments. 
In February 2008 the former Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff signed the 
Federal Continuity Directive 2 (FCD 2) Federal Executive Branch Mission Essential Function 
and Primary Mission Essential Function Identification and Submission Process. The last sentence 
of his directive states: ―the provisions are applicable to all levels of federal executive branch 
organizations regardless of their location, and are also useful for state, local, territorial, and tribal 
governments and the private sector‖  (Chertoff).    
COOP  
An effective Continuity of Operations planning process has the potential to strengthen the 
shared understanding and commitment of any sized government, elected officials, and 
employees, and the community at large to the vision and goals for the community.  The Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has provided a template and process for preparing for 
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Continuity of Operations; however, there is no clear guidance and direction to implement these 
plans (FEMA 1). 
Modern COOP legislation is rooted in the November 1988, Executive Order 12656, Nov 
88: ―Our national security is dependent upon our ability to assure continuity of government at 
every level, in any national security emergency situation that might confront the Nation. . .‖ to 
include the survival of key leaders and order of succession; Continuity of Operations and of 
Mission Essential Functions; Relocation site(s); Protection of vital records/operating files; and 
the Ability to recover & reconstitute (executive Order).  In addition, Presidential Decision 
Directive (PDD) 67, Oct. 98, further delineates COOP:  the policy of the United States to have in 
place a comprehensive and effective program to ensure continuity of essential federal functions 
under all circumstances…‖ (PDD-NSC-67 ). 
The terrorist events of September 11, 2001 have impacted the Homeland Defense and 
Security Policy. Domestic and national security emergencies include: fires, earthquakes, winter 
storms and ice, flooding, hurricanes, epidemics, highly contagious animal disease, drought, 
energy and fuel loss, hazardous material release, radiological accident, dam failures, explosion, 
volcanic eruption, sabotage, nuclear, chemical and biological terrorism, and weapons of mass 
destruction (1 DHS). 
Continuity of Operations Program (COOP) is the ability of organizations to continue their 
mission essential functions with minimum operational interruption; this includes establishing 
responsibilities, policies, and planning guidance to ensure the effective execution of critical 
missions and continuation of mission essential functions (MEF) under all circumstances(1 DHS). 
Mission Essential Functions (MEFs) are those functions of importance that must be 
performed during, and in the immediate aftermath of an emergency and cannot be postponed 
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longer than 24 hours.  MEFs that cannot be executed may be transferred to another organization. 
There are a total of fifteen FEMA Emergency Support Functions (ESF) which provide the 
structure for coordinating federal interagency support for a federal response to an incident (1 
DHS). 
Although Continuity of Operations plans will vary in size and scope, they commonly 
include: a vision statement for the community and a corresponding set of goals and strategies for 
achieving that vision (1 DHS). The primary assumptions, based upon observed trends and 
conditions, may be highlighted to help explain and support the selected goals, and measurable 
indicators are central to determining if the desired vision is achieved (1 DHS).  
  The ability of local governments to continue their mission essential functions with 
minimum operational interruption include: planning, preparatory measures, responsive actions, 
and restoration to ensure the continuity of functions.  
With the enhanced level of understanding provided by a Continuity of Operations plan, 
staff from all departments can be better equipped to achieve the government‘s prioritized near 
term and longer term goals.   Because planning tends to relate work output to broader goals, 
employees have an opportunity to understand how their specific roles and levels of responsibility 
contribute to fulfilling the organization‘s vision. The plan can also become the basis for a 
performance management system throughout government organizations to strengthen 
responsibility (1 DHS).  
Objectives of Strategy 
 It is impossible to properly plan for a disaster if the possibility impacts of various 
disruptions on an organization or agency are unknown. Assessing the impact of an event not only 
includes estimating the quantitative or economic losses but also the collective impact on the 
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organization‘s ability to operate, i.e. effects on personnel and the effect on the reputation of the 
organization. 
Identify all functions: to begin the process of identifying functions within an 
organization, first identify the areas of responsibility. e the mission statement, values, goals and 
objectives, the organization chart, and a brief review of operating procedures, rulebooks and 
legal authorities (Federal Register). 
A multi-year plan to enhance and refine the COOP plan and emergency readiness will 
need to be developed.  This plan must include: short term and long term objectives, COOP 
needs, individual staff and unit roles, and timelines. The plan will be based upon objective 
information from testing, training exercises and implementation of COOP elements (FEMA1). 
Market the requirement to continue to employ COOP Planners by suggesting that a COOP Plan 
is an all hazards plan that must be a "living" document that is in a constant state of flux because 
of, among other things, changes in mission, personnel, IT capabilities, and regulatory 
requirements.  An effective COOP Plan must be as current as possible, which means someone 
needs to keep up with those changes as they occur. To maintain viable COOP capabilities, state 
and local governments need to be continually engaged in a process to designate essential 
functions and resources, define short- and long-term COOP goals and objectives, anticipate and 
address issues and potential obstacles, and establish planning milestones, coupled with the 
exercise requirements state and local governments should be required to either create or assign a 
full time COOP planner/administrator.   
Establish the Baseline 
COOP plans can be activated in part or whole depending upon the disruption or threat. 
An event may demand that employees evacuate a single facility for a day or two, in which case 
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execution of the communications component of the COOP plan and IT recovery of data and 
systems only may be necessary.  On the other hand, an organization‘s headquarters could be 
destroyed at the height of the business day, which will necessitate full execution of a COOP plan, 
including the deliberate and pre-planned movement of key personnel to an alternate work site 
that is capable of staining MEFs for a minimum of 30 days (MEF). 
COOP plans outline an executive decision process for the quick and accurate assessment 
of the situation and determination of the best course of action for response and recovery in that 
case. Below is a sample of a decision matrix organizations can e in their COOP plan.  For each 
area of responsibility identified, list the functions performed and provide a brief description of 
the activities typically completed in the identified function. COOP planners should collaborate 
with individuals from each division or branch of the organization and ask about the functions 
they and their coworkers perform on a daily basis. 
Near Term Activity   
 Review the planning to establish the foundation for a Continuity of Operations Mission 
Essential Functions (MEFs).  Senior management and the organization‘s COOP planner should 
determine the criteria for selecting MEFs. For example, if other organizations are dependent on a 
particular function to continue their operations, then the function is probably an essential 
function. Based on the pre-determined criteria, the COOP planner should go back to the previous 
list and for each of the functions listed under the various areas of responsibility indicate which 
ones are considered essential (MEF). 
To determine Mission Essential Function Resource Requirements, examine the processes 
and services that support them. Each MEF has unique characteristics and resource requirements 
without which the function could not be stained. Those processes and services described for each 
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function that are necessary to assure continuance of an essential function are considered critical. 
Often critical processes and services vary depending upon the emergency or if they have a time 
or calendar component.  For example, a wind storm would make debris removal a critical 
service, while a local power outage would possibly require generators, service crews, mutual Aid 
Agreements and Memoranda of Agreement/Understanding (MOA/MOU‘s).  Likewise, debris 
removal may be a critical service in the spring or fall, but not in winter or summer (MEF). 
Prioritize Essential Functions. Once all MEFs and their supporting critical processes and 
services have been identified, prioritize the functions according to those activities that are critical 
to resuming operations when a catastrophic event occurs.  A MEF‘s time criticality is related to 
the amount of time that function can be suspended before it adversely affects the organization‘s 
core mission (MEF).  Deciding which MEF should be restored first in a crisis would be 
impossible without also considering related critical processes and services, primarily those that 
mt be resumed soon after a disruption, generally within 24 hours.  In addition, those functions 
upon which others depend should also receive a high priority in the sequence of recovery.  
For each hazard, emergency managers should have a pre-established checklist that 
provides answers to the following questions, including such things as: vendor and partner agency 
agreements or relationships; software and supplies/equipment issues; workstation needs; vital 
records and documents required; and communications with organizations and critical customers.  
Long Term Activity 
Long term plan maintenance should be undertaken carefully, planned for in advance and 
completed according to an established schedule. Changes to organization structure, mission or 
essential functions should be made to the plan as they occur.  Don‘t wait until you have an 
incident. Organizations should establish a review team designated to oversee plan review and 
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revision. Personnel selected for the review team need to have knowledge of overall organization 
operations; expertise in specific essential functions; expertise in specific advisory areas.  The 
review team should meet on a regular basis throughout the year and after each exercise with each 
meeting structured to review all aspects of the COOP plan and should include action items for 
review and revision as necessary (FEMA 1). 
Most major issues affecting COOP plans will result from lessons learned from exercises. 
Other sources of information may come from, depending on the level of government, 
Presidential Directives and/or state Emergency Management Offices or even corporate 
headquarters in the private sector, as appropriate, such as direction from organization leadership; 
policy or mission changes; changes in technology or office systems. 
COOP plans and procedures should be coordinated, updated, validated and re-issued at 
least every 2 years, and a copy submitted to the organization‘s next level in their hierarchy. 
Additional reviews should be undertaken following each exercise and the testing of major 
systems.  Issues raised in training may also trigger plan review (1 DHS). 
Training  
For the organization COOP program to be effective each element must know how to 
execute its portion of the COOP plan and how it relates to the other elements of the organization. 
Training and testing phases of the planning process are extremely important in regards to 
personnel awareness and readiness. They ensure that the organization‘s COOP program and all 
personnel are capable of supporting the continued execution of its MEFs throughout the duration 
of emergency situations. The objectives of the COOP training and testing program should 
include: assessing and validating COOP plans, policies and procedures; ensuring that personnel 
are familiar with COOP procedures; ensuring that COOP personnel are sufficiently trained to 
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carry out MEFs in a COOP situation; and testing and validating equipment to ensure both 
internal and external interoperability. 
Before the COOP plan is exercised, personnel must be trained so that they know what 
their responsibilities are and have the skills and knowledge necessary to carry out their tasks.  
Training encompasses a range of activities, each intended to provide information and refine 
skills.  Orientations are usually the first type of training conducted. They are typically presented 
as briefings. Orientations are a good way of introducing the general concepts of the COOP plan 
as well as announcing staff assignments, roles and responsibilities and describing how the COOP 
plan will be tested and exercised. 
COOP training will be conducted annually. Training will consist of two sections: first, all 
staff with COOP specific roles will be trained in the roles and responsibilities contained in the 
plan; second, staff members who may be asked to assume roles not typically performed will 
receive an orientation on their other duties.   
The Emergency Management Institute (EMI), located at the National Emergency 
Training Center in Emmitsburg, MD offers a broad range of on-line NIMS-related trainings.  
COOP Action Officers would need to complete the FEMA IS 546 COOP Awareness course that 
takes approximately 1 hour to complete, and the 4-hour FEMA IS 547 Introduction to COOP 
course.  There is no cost for these courses, just time and the desire to learn and be prepared. The 
web site that can be provided to an organization‘s employees‘ is http://training.fema.gov/.  Once 
at the site the new enrollees need only follow the instructions. Some of the courses do have 
prerequisites, normally they are the IS 100, 200, 700, and 800.  All of those courses are on-line at 
no cost to the organization.  
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After familiarizing personnel with basic policies and procedures, hands-on training can 
provide practice in specialized skills, allow for practice of newly acquired skills, and help 
maintain proficiency for infrequently used skills (MEF). 
Testing and Exercises 
 Tests are conducted to evaluate capabilities, not personnel. By testing, organizations can  
tell if the policies and procedures work as they should, when they should. Testing results should 
be published, and any identified gaps should be actively tracked and managed. Testing is critical 
for:  alerts, notification and activation procedures; communications systems; vital records and 
databases; information technology systems; and reconstitution procedures (COOP Training). 
The primary purpose of an exercise is to identify areas that require additional training, 
planning or other resources. Exercise results should be published and any gaps should be actively 
tracked and managed. The goals of a COOP exercise are to discover planning weaknesses; reveal 
resource gaps; improve coordination; practice using the communication network; clarify roles 
and responsibilities; improve individual performance; improve readiness for a real incident. After 
personnel are trained, the COOP plan can be tested through one of three types of exercises: 
Tabletop, Functional and Full-scale (COOP Training). 
Tabletop exercises are simulation activities in which a scenario is presented and 
participants in the exercise respond as if the scenario was actually occurring. New information is 
presented as the situation unfolds, making the participants reconsider their previous decisions 
and plan their next actions based on the new information. Typically, a tabletop exercise takes 
about 2 hours, including the post exercise debriefing (Unit 5).  
Functional exercises test a part of COOP activation independent of other responders. This 
includes testing communications capabilities and equipment; primary and backup infrastructure 
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systems and services (i.e. emergency power generators); and Recovery of records, critical 
information systems, services, and data (Unit 6). 
Full-scale exercises are as close to reality as possible, testing the organization‘s 
total response capability for COOP situations, with personnel deployed and systems and 
equipment tested (Unit 7). Making the COOP Program an externally inspected program will help 
convey its importance to commanders/leadership.  The best way to highlight the importance of a 
program/project is to make it one that is inspected and REPORTED by an external agency to the 
organization‘s leaders.  From that perspective, senior leadership needs to make it an inspection 
type program with a formal grading system (GO/NO GO, Pass/Fail, etc.) with a similar 
methodology through subordinate organizational structure. 
Considerations  
Organizations must be prepared to activate their COOP plans for all emergencies, 
regardless of warning period, both during regular office hours and non-office hours, including 
holidays. Activation requires notification of an Emergency Operations Center (EOC), other 
organizations, as appropriate, and COOP and Non-COOP personnel.  Relocation involves the 
actual movement of MEFs, personnel, records and equipment to the Emergency Relocation 
Facility (ERF). Relocation also involves transferring communication capability, purchasing 
supplies and equipment that are not at the ERF, and other planned activities, such as providing 
network access. 
Organizations should plan on having ―Go-Kits‖ to ensure the transition to the ERF occurs 
smoothly and quickly. These ―Go-Kits‖ are packages of records, information, communication 
and computer equipment, and other items related to emergency operations. The kits should 
contain all items that are essential to supporting COOP operations at the ERF (Ready). 
CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS          17 
 
While organizations are responsible for the safety and security of their personnel, these 
personnel are also responsible for the safety and security of their families. Personnel should be 
encouraged to develop a family disaster plan and to prepare disaster supply kits for their homes, 
cars, and workplaces. When preparing for emergency situations it‘s best to think first about the 
basics of survival; fresh water, food, safety, and warmth (Ready). 
Implementation   
Implementing COOP plans will be a difficult task that will require that all levels of 
government accept the understanding that something catastrophic may and will happen again.  
The federal government has already begun to implement COOP plans for all government 
agencies.  The next step is for all state and local governments to begin preparing their own plans. 
The federal government should, in the strongest possible way, convince all state and local 
government agencies to prepare and implement COOP Plans.  COOP plans will provide a 
stronger awareness and preparedness for major issues that will face their communities.  The 
federal government cannot necessarily demand that all levels of government prepare plans; 
however, they can utilize other methods to persuade them to do so. For instance the federal 
government should provide grant funding only to COOP - compliant governments. 
This may seem to be a harsh method and the tax payers may be the real victims.  If state 
and local governments understand the importance of these plans, everyone will benefit from 
them.  State and local governments should begin with the short term goals which should be 
accomplished by a set date.  This would require manpower and time to begin the goals of short 
term.  Once plans are in place then and only then should state and local governments move 
forward to the long term goals.   
Observation  
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COOP Plans do not attempt to deal with incidents which are handled routinely by staff 
and emergency responders.  They establish a basis upon which further plans, procedures, 
guidelines, and agreements can be elaborated.  Plans cannot be formulaic or scripted; they cannot 
anticipate every scenario or foresee every outcome.  Therefore, while COOP plans provide 
guidance, it is understood that it is not intended to replace sound judgment expected to be 
exercised by those individuals implementing the plan given the circumstances and uncertainties 
of an emergency. 
Conclusion 
Homeland security is an ongoing and shared responsibility across the nation. There is an 
overwhelming number of public and private sector stakeholders that influence the direction of 
homeland security; all must work together to develop and implement the homeland security 
strategy by building and maintaining necessary capabilities. 
Too many think of COOP as a single operation, such as responding to a hurricane or a 
flood, and it can be that.  For example, the Department of Public Works should have an alternate 
location for its Emergency Calls Desk so that if the primary location goes out, it can still do the 
required coordination. Similarly the local police department should have an alternate location 
should they not be able to e their primary building.  That is why the Mission Essential Functions 
(MEF‘s) are so important.  That is why the primary organization, in order to accomplish its 
required command and control responsibilities during crisis circumstances, has an alternate 
Emergency Operations Center.  
Should Mary, John and Pete not be available to do X, Y and Z, how would state and local 
governments continue to operate?  If those personnel were assigned to the Work Order Desk and 
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they weren't available, who else knows how to do those critical coordinating functions?  
Organizations will need to incorporate a training standard to train three levels down.  At times in 
a hazardous situation a facility is still available and functioning but the people to operate the 
facility aren't (e.g. sick or taking care of sick family members). State and local governments need 
to plan for these unforeseen situations. The COOP Plan will identify replacements of key and 
critical functions.    
There are some facilities that can't be duplicated, but then other plans have to be made.  If 
part of the hospital is not available, can the local civilian hospitals support the required tasks?  If 
the fire station is gone, can other surrounding area local fire services support the mission?  Can 
they identify the communications, facilities, and people required (by name).  They must be able 
to identify alternate locations with required communications support and develop cross training 
three levels down.  And for some like me the COOP site is at home with a computer and cell 
phone.  
Each organization should formulate a COOP plan immediately, starting with defining 
their near term goals of establishing the foundation for a Continuity of Operations planning 
format and providing clear short term guidance to staff  by government priorities.  Once the short 
term goals are completed, they need to move forward with their long term goals of designing a 
process to test assumptions, create a comprehensive community vision, and translate the   
Continuity of Operations goals into an implementation plan to guide the course for the future.   
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Chapter 2 
COOP Management Concerns 
"Surround yourself with the best people you can find, delegate authority, and don't 
interfere as long as the policy you've decided upon is being carried out." 
Ronald Reagan 
"Good management is the art of making problems so interesting and their solutions so 
constructive that everyone wants to get to work and deal with them." 
Paul Hawken, Natural Capitalism 
In preparing the Management chapter of my Master‘s project, I had a hard time deciding 
how to begin this assignment since the homeland security strategy I chose didn‘t necessarily 
address a particular organization but addressed Continuity of Operations: planning to ensure 
mission stability and continuation of essential functions and services across a wide range of 
potential events.  This strategy addresses all governmental organizations large and small.  This 
paper will discuss the six components consistent with the learning outcomes from the (CRJ 602) 
Management course.  The components that will be discussed are management principles; my 
chosen management model, Core Functions, understanding the essence of individual and group 
dynamics; Effective Communications; and the Challenges to Management. 
I am a retired Marine Corps Gunnery Sergeant with a broad background covering 20 
years as a leader, inspector, advisor and trainer in Force Protection, Security and Operations 
Management.  During my career I have interacted on a daily basis with many people, providing 
information and ensuring my audience had a clear understanding of organizational rules, 
regulations and guidelines, and ensuring compliance with all applicable regulations. I have 
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served in positions ranging from front line supervisor to mid-level management.  I don‘t consider 
myself an expert by any sense of the word, just a well rounded individual.  I offer this 
information as a multiplier for the next phase of my life and as the basis of this chapter of my 
Master‘s Project.   
Management Principles 
The three levels for being a superior manager are human, technical, and conceptual skills; 
the necessary functions of a manager are planning, organizing, delegating and controlling an 
organization (The Personal MBA).  
Human skill is the power to communicate to fellow co-workers, a skill that 99% of all 
companies look for in a manager because if you do not possess the ability to correspond with 
other employees, then you will not succeed in a manager position. You must be a "people 
person" in order to hold a job as a manager because on a daily basis you will be working with 
various associates and will need to know how to hold conversations and help your employees. 
Learning how to communicate effectively with people is a key principle of management that you 
will need in order to be successful in your position. 
Technical skill is the ability to process the technical side of work. Proficiency in the 
technical knowledge of your job and company is critical if your job requires you to be more 
"hands on."  Many managers find themselves less educated on the technical side of the job than 
their employees so if they lose their managerial position, they are forced to come to the reality 
that there are far more people educated in technical work than they are and so may slowly fall 
down the ladder. In order to not let this happen, you must stay up to date with the technical 
aspects of your job in order to assure your bosses and your company that you are the right person 
for the position (Posner, R). 
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 Conceptual skills involve the formulation of ideas and concepts. Managers that have 
great conceptual skills generally possess the power to create innovative ideas and deliver abstract 
theories. This form of management will give your company the edge it needs against its 
competitors if you can formulate groundbreaking concepts for your company that will push them 
ahead of the competition (WiseGeek). 
Managers also have duties no matter what their skill level is; these responsibilities 
include planning, organizing, directing and controlling. These functions are necessary when 
working as a manager at any level. You might view your principles of management as the 
separate skills or the basic duties of a manager. Whichever you hold as the most important, you 
must also keep in mind that great managers will possess all of these skills and be a vital asset to 
their companies.  A good leader has the ability to get people to follow. It means more than just 
telling or getting people to do what is asked; a good leader motivates people to want to do what 
is asked. A good leader must provide a clear vision and a direction. 
 There are many philosophies of leadership, and advocates of each of them declare their 
―style‖ as the most effective: authoritarian, dictatorial, autocratic, and democratic. The list goes 
on and on. However, in my opinion none of them is right. In order for leadership to be effective 
it needs to be dynamic. Active leadership is a dual-focused form that is able to be adjusted for 
use in different conditions and allows leaders to be proactive (Performance).  A leader must 
utilize a fluid style of leadership that he adjusts based on the people he/she is leading and on the 
circumstances in which they find themselves.  A great example of this is in recruit training: 
recruit and Drill Instructor are different and the method for correcting them is also different as 
well.  Yelling, screaming, and at times, threatening to either drop or recycle them may work well 
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with one recruit but not with all.  In other instances you may have to pull individuals aside and 
talk to them as if they were your son or daughter.  What works for some doesn‘t work for all.    
 Leadership in the simplest form is being the one person who leads from the front, makes 
critical decisions, and ensures that the people who work for you are taken care of. Personally, 
leadership means responsibility and taking initiative to do the right things. The leader is someone 
who cares about the means to the end while having the ability to complete a task under any 
circumstances. 
 Henri Fayol described management as being a composition of five functions: namely 
planning, organizing, leading, coordinating and controlling.  
Planning involves identification of your business goal and the way to reach it.  Leaders 
use planning to ensure that an approach for reaching goals will be practical. Planning reduces 
confusion, builds subordinates‘ confidence in themselves and their organization, and allows 
flexibility to adjust to changing situations.  Smart planning presents a shared understanding and 
ensures that a mission is accomplished with a minimum of wasted effort. You need to 
communicate your plan to your employees and accept their feedback (Fayol, H). 
Organizing involves the assignment of tasks and allocation of resources throughout the 
organization.  Responsibility and accountability for using available resources effectively and for 
planning the organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling of subordinates to accomplish 
assigned tasks (Fayol). Whether you are starting a new company or improving an existing one, it 
is important to have a business mission, concept, and vision. Finally, in order to improve, you 
must have a vision or goal of where you want to end up (Kurtis, R). 
Leadership is a management skill in itself; the process involves influencing people by 
providing purpose, direction, and motivation, while operating to accomplish the mission and 
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improve the organization.  Employees of any organization deserve competent, professional, and 
ethical leadership.  They expect their leaders to respect them as valued members of effective and 
cohesive organizations. A leader has strong intellect, physical presence, professional 
competence, high moral character, and serves as a role model. A leader not only dreams but also 
provides the employees with a framework for the fulfillment of his dreams (Fayol, H).   
Coordination and control are important for the success of a business. In all cases, 
preparation includes detailed coordination with other organizations involved or affected by the 
operation or project. In any case preparation may include ensuring the necessary facilities and 
other resources are available to support the assignment. Coordination allows leaders to 
constantly interact and share thoughts, ideas, and priorities through multiple channels, creating a 
more complete pictures. Dominating the counseling by talking too much, giving unnecessary or 
inappropriate advice, not truly listening, and projecting personal likes, dislikes, biases, and 
prejudices all interfere with effective counseling. Competent leaders avoid rash judgments, 
stereotyping, losing emotional control, inflexible counseling methods, or improper follow-up 
(Fayol, H).   
Management Model 
The Department of Homeland Security‘s (DHS) main goal is to provide the unifying core 
for the vast national network of organizations and institutions involved in efforts to secure our 
nation. This is accomplished by bringing together 22 departments covering a wide array of areas 
under one leadership structure. This department includes everything from the Coast Guard, 
Transportation Security Administration, Customs and Border Patrol, Immigration, FEMA, and 
the Secret Service, among others (DHS).  
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The Department of Homeland Security was instituted to correct the coordination 
problems that surfaced in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Even after 5 years of efforts 
at building new coordination mechanisms and new organizational priorities, DHS and FEMA 
were faulted for their response to Hurricane Katrina. Again, there were issues of jurisdiction, 
inability to communicate across agencies and level of government, and lack of quick response 
(Volkomer, ).  A new agency with unchallenged jurisdiction was created by the Congress and 
signed into law by President Bush.  
The management model I chose is the Divisionalized Form. Each model presents various 
challenges; however I do believe this one would work best. One key issue or challenge with this 
model is that ―Headquarters wants tighter oversight while divisional managers try to evade 
corporate controls.‖  Another example identified as an issue is that ―headquarters may lose touch 
with operations.‖  A simple solution is getting out and visiting your divisions. Set up a 
disciplined approach that gets you out from behind your desk. It is amazing the effect you can 
make walking around, asking questions, and correcting deficiencies when required. This is the 
obvious leadership approach everyone talks about but rarely does.  
Every organization requires the making of decisions, the coordinating of activities, the 
handling of people, and the evaluation of performance directed toward group objectives. There 
are many different ways to gather information for assessment purposes. The Myers-Briggs Type 
Indicator (MBTI) assessment uses four dimensions of personality to identify 16 different 
personality types. Although I agree this tool could be helpful to managers, I don‘t think it is the 
end-all tool. The document mentions ―gut feeling‖ and this to me is just as important as a chart 
that someone has come up with (Huitt, W).  
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The ability to assess a situation accurately and reliably against desired outcomes, 
established values, and ethical standards is a critical tool for leaders to achieve consistent results 
and success. Assessment occurs continually during planning, preparation, and execution; it is not 
solely an after the fact evaluation. Accurate assessments require instinct and intuition based on 
experience and learning. It also demands a feel for the dependability and soundness of 
information and its sources.  Periodic assessment is necessary to determine organizational 
weaknesses and prevent mishaps. Determining causes, developing subordinate leadership, and 
initiating improvements are essential to management (Robbins, S). 
A manager who participates in normal functions, but not micromanaging,  is able to 
identify each member's strengths and work out a plan in which he is able to capitalize on each 
one's strengths without making any single member feel less productive or left out. Working with 
teams will ensure that each team understands its objectives and aims to ensure it fulfills its 
requirements. 
Core Functions 
Core Functions will vary from organization to organization whether large or small.  The 
Department of Homeland Security has published numerous documents referring to Mission 
Essential Functions (MEF‘s).  Although these MEF‘s are in official Homeland Security 
documents, they can be tailored to meet the Core Functions of any sized organizations.  
In July 2005, then Secretary Chertoff presented a six-point agenda for the Department of 
Homeland Security ―to deal with the potential threats, both present and future that face our 
nation‖ : increase overall preparedness, particularly for catastrophic events; create better 
transportation security systems to move people and cargo more securely and efficiently; 
strengthen border security and interior enforcement and reform immigration processes; enhance 
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information sharing with our partners; improve DHS financial management, human resource 
development, procurement and information technology; realign the DHS organization to 
maximize mission performance (Six Point). 
You cannot teach someone to adapt in a chaotic situation.  The military calls this ―Fog of 
War,‖ a term used to describe the level of uncertainty in situational awareness experienced by 
participants in operations.  Many leaders have tried to replicate a chaotic situation during training 
but one thing is certain, you are going home at the end of the exercise.  Training exercises 
whether military or civilian can be a good starting point especially when you add stress and 
realism to them.  If they are just doing a paper drill subordinates will be lackadaisical.  The 
realism will test their will power, judgment, and loyalty. 
As an infantry platoon sergeant I have been in situations where we didn‘t know what we 
were facing.  Landing somewhere on potential enemy soil places doubt in your mind.  However 
if you have trained and exercised to your utmost capability, this eases the tension slightly.  Also 
as the leader you cannot show fear; you must present yourself as very confident.  If it appears 
you are not confident or you show fear, everyone else will do the same.  If you ever ask service 
members why they did well in combat, it‘s not because they were superstars, rather it was the 
fear of letting their buddies and unit down.        
Purpose provides what the leader wants done, while motivation and inspiration provide 
the energizing force to see that the purpose is addressed and has the strength to mobilize and 
sustain effort to get the job done. Motivation and inspiration address the needs of the individual 
and team. Indirect needs like job satisfaction, sense of accomplishment, group belonging, and 
pride typically have broader reaching effects than formal rewards and punishment.  
Individual and Group Dynamics 
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Most leaders are also subordinates within the framework of organizations or institutions. 
All members of the organization are part of a larger team. A technical supervisor leading several 
specialists is not just the leader of that group. That team chief also works for someone else and 
that team has a place in a larger organization.  Part of being a responsible subordinate implies 
supporting the chain of command and making sure that the team supports the larger organization 
and its purpose.  The team chief knows that when the team makes a mistake or falls behind in its 
work, there is an obligation to try making it succeed, even if the chief initially has doubts that it 
will.  If everyone in the organization understands their requirements and roles, it shouldn‘t matter 
if it‘s normal day-to-day routines or a major event.  
 When considering Individual Differences we need to remember that people in general 
have a strong desire to be accepted by a group throughout life. This acceptance gives the 
assurance of support and comfort from others who are alike. People in such groups have set 
beliefs which cause them to ignore differences in their surroundings. The strength in 
organizations provokes fear in those who want to express their individual differences. Those 
wanting to be different are afraid of the judgmental ridicule they will face from their fellow 
group members. Affiliation in a group gives people encouragement, friendship, and comfort as 
long as the affiliation continues to have the same general understanding as the rest of the group. 
Leaders are here for a reason. Good leader will teach you everything they have learned 
from their experiences.  There is truly no knowledge that is not power. Sometimes we miss the 
most important lessons when we do not know when to close our mouths and open our ears. 
Learning how to be a good follower means being open minded and knowing how to take 
direction from supervisors. Learning how to follow orders is like fitting gloves on a future 
leader. Honing your listening skills is a key factor in the makings of a good follower. Then by 
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understanding how to hear and comprehend the tasks placed on you by your leaders, you will 
know how to communicate with your own employees when the time comes. 
 Duty extends beyond everything required by law, regulation, and orders. Professionals 
work not just to meet the minimum standard, but consistently strive to do their very best.  
Leaders commit to excellence in all aspects of their professional responsibility. 
Employees may feel they have no voice within their organization, especially if they do 
not hold a management position.  But every action you make is a reflection of your managers‘ 
and your own leadership skills.  Being able to carry out any responsibility given to you, no 
matter how simple or daunting, shows a great deal about your dedication and also shows what 
you have learned from your leaders. 
Effective Communications 
Leadership that gets results depends on good communication. Although communication 
is usually viewed as a process of providing information, communication as a skill must ensure 
that there is more than the simple transmission of information. Communication needs to achieve 
an understanding and must create new or better awareness. Communicating critical information 
in a clear manner is an important skill to reach a collective understanding of issues and solutions. 
It is passing on thoughts, presenting recommendations, bridging sensitivities and reaching a 
general consensus. Simply put, leaders cannot lead, supervise, build teams, counsel, or mentor 
without the ability to communicate clearly. 
An important form of two-way communication to reach a shared understanding is active 
listening.  Although the most important purpose of listening is to understand the thoughts of 
whoever is speaking, listeners should provide an occasional signal to the speaker that they are 
still attentive. Active listening involves avoiding interruption and keeping mental or written 
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notes of important points or items for clarification. Good listeners will be aware of the content of 
the message, but also the importance and emotion of how it is spoken.  It is important to remain 
aware of barriers to listening. Do not formulate a response while it prevents hearing what the 
other person is saying. Do not allow distraction by anger, disagreement with the speaker, or other 
things that can hold up the process (The Art).   
Frequently, leaders communicate more effectively with informal networks than directly 
with superiors. Sometimes that produces the desired results but can lead to misunderstandings 
and false judgments. To run an effective organization and achieve mission accomplishment 
without excessive conflict, leaders must figure out how to reach their superiors when necessary 
and to build a relationship of mutual trust. First, leaders must assess how the boss communicates 
and how information is received. Some use direct and personal contact while others may be more 
comfortable with weekly meetings, electronic mail, or memoranda. Knowing the boss‘s intent, 
priorities, and thought processes enhance organizational effectiveness and success. A leader who 
communicates well with superiors minimizes friction and improves the overall organizational 
climate. 
To prepare organizations for unavoidable communication challenges, leaders need to 
create training situations in which they are forced to act with minimum guidance or only the 
leader‘s intent or vision. Leaders provide formal or informal feedback to highlight the things 
subordinates did well, what they could have done better, and what they should do differently 
next time to improve information sharing and processing. Open communication does more than 
share information. It shows that leaders care about those they work with. Competent and 
confident leaders encourage open dialogue, listen actively to all perspectives, and ensure that 
others can voice up-front and honest opinions, without fear of negative consequences. 
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The first step in problem solving is recognizing and defining the problem. This step is 
crucial, as the actual problem may not be obvious up front. As a result, leaders determine what 
the problem is by clearly defining its scope and limitations. Leaders should allow sufficient time 
and energy to define the problem clearly before moving on to other steps of the problem-solving 
process. A problem exists when there is a difference between the current state or condition and a 
desired state or condition. Leaders identify problems from a variety of sources. These include: 
directives or guidance, decision maker guidance, subordinates, and personal observations. 
There are numerous problem-solving techniques; creative problem solving which 
involves everyone concerned with the problem can encourage many types of creative thinking 
such as brainstorming, group solutions, and other techniques that might not have been 
considered. One key to creative problem solving is thinking "outside the box," which means 
thinking outside the confines of what is normal or accepted. Some would say that problem 
solving commonly means thinking in innovative ways without the usual structure; this is how 
most creative problem solving is truly accomplished. 
The Challenges to Management 
A major concern for those managing any organization as it should be managed will 
always be to motivate their employees in an effort to reach their goal as cost effective and as 
quickly as possible. Motivation is difficult to explain as well as practice. However, motivation is 
still the one thing that makes people productive in their jobs. The motivated employee learns 
fast, deals with customers courteously and efficiently, is cooperative with other employees, and 
is committed to helping achieve the kind of results your organization needs. Unfortunately, these 
types of employees do not grow on trees, and must be assisted to become truly motivated 
towards an organization's goals. 
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If some are not performing as they should, don‘t discipline or counsel them in public, but 
take them aside and tell them their performance is lacking and they need to correct their 
deficiency. Public reprimand is unprofessional, and the negativity lowers the morale of the 
workforce. On the other hand if an employee performs above expectations, recognize them 
publicly. This recognition could be in the form of a simple "job well done,‖ some sort of 
certificate, or maybe even a day off. Recognition in forms other than monetary compensation 
provides employees a sense of satisfaction and belonging. Creating a culture of encouraged 
initiative will create greater results than an environment of competition between employees. 
Currently times are hard and one thing that many Americans haven‘t experienced yet is not 
having a job. The mere possibility of losing your livelihood is all the motivation you should need 
to be the best employee and keep your job.  
Some of the factors that were discussed include the concept of employees as partners, 
motivating employees, what makes people tick, and harmony in the workplace. Employees who 
participate in their organization's decision-making processes and who feel that they have a voice 
in the company have a higher job satisfaction.  Employees who work for any organization may 
have the ideas to take an organization to its limits, so all they need is a good way to open up the 
communications channel. Senior leadership and managers need to link the communications gap 
between those who make decisions and those who execute them, so a stronger and more effective 
team environment will result throughout the organization.  
Being a good manager is taking care of your people.  Being a good manager is having 
strong moral and physical courage (Perry, J).  Being a good manager is standing up for your 
employees and supporting them, even if it‘s not a popular decision with your superiors. 
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Sometimes you have to punish, praise, and maybe provide a shoulder to cry on.  But if you take 
care of your employees, they will take care of doing the mission at hand.   
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United States Military Academy at West Point, Senior Commander Executive Summary 
EVENT:  Brief of West Point Antiterrorism Strategic Plan to the Senior Commander 
Date:  TBD 
Time: TBD 
Location: Senior Commander‘s Conference Room  
Purpose of Event: To brief the Senior Commander on the West Point Antiterrorism Strategic  
Plan (Draft) in order to outline the goals and objectives to improve the Antiterrorism program 
services for all personnel of the United States Military Academy at West Point over the next four 
years. 
Parties Involved:   
       Mr. Peddy    Director, DPTMS   
       Mr. Cassidy    Installation ATO 
       Col. Tarsa    Garrison Commander  
       Lt. Col. Hawes   Provost Marshal  
       Col. Stafford    Chief of Staff 
       Brig. Gen. Rapp  Commandant of Cadets   
       Brig. Gen. Trainor    Dean of the Academic Board   
Goals and Objectives: 
Strategic Goal #1:  Implement effective AT risk management processes and ensure the  
   timely and pertinent dissemination of AT threat information and    
   intelligence. 
Strategic Goal #2:   Develop and execute proactive, relevant and viable AT plans and  
   AT Program management. 
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Strategic goal #3:   Conduct effective AT training and execute realistic AT exercises.  
Strategic goal #4:   Optimize the planning, programming and execution of resources,  
   including  research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) in support  
   of AT  programs.  
Strategic goal #5:   Execute holistic, comprehensive reviews of AT programs to ensure  
                               compliance with ARNORTH AT Program standards. 
 Conclusion.  This is the first iteration of the West Point Antiterrorism Strategic Plan and builds 
directly on the ARNORTH AT Strategic Plan. It reflects an increased understanding of the 
terrorist threat, progress of previous strategic initiatives and complements Army and DoD intent 
in the larger scope. It implements goals and objectives to refine and energize continued 
improvement of the Army Antiterrorism program. It delineates areas of emphasis and by so 
doing sets priorities designed to close ―gaps and seams‖ and provoke further progress. Moreover, 
the goals and objectives give direction for distribution of resources and address risks while 
sustaining progress. 
Related Materials:  Draft of West Point Antiterrorism Strategic Plan                            
6.  POC:  Matt Cassidy, installation Antiterrorism Officer, X3650 
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This strategy represents a course of action to direct our improvements over the next few 
years. It governs the application of resources and balances risk against necessity by providing 
enduring goals and objectives that encourage initiative at all levels. Through continual evaluation 
this plan must remain ahead of the threat evolution and retain the flexibility necessary to react to 
unforeseen circumstances.   
Building a formidable antiterrorism program takes time; nevertheless, time must be 
balanced with a sense of urgency. We need to close our remaining gaps. The West Point 
Antiterrorism Strategic Plan charts the path for the next phase of actions. It calls for substantial 
improvement in antiterrorism in every facet of operations. We cannot prepare for long-term 
success unless we have embedded antiterrorism in training, leader development and education. 
We must educate and train leaders, from strategic to tactical, for their role in preventing terrorist 
attacks. That level of awareness and vigilance is our most certain defense.  Building an effective 
evaluation and reporting system is the next priority. We know our missions, our operations, and 
our responsibilities. Are we prepared for terrorists focused on disruption and destruction? An 
effective system of assessments, reporting and continuous improvement will provide the 
feedback loop we need so Commanders can manage risk appropriately. 
There are four reasons for this Antiterrorism Strategic Plan: It guides all West Point 
elements toward improved antiterrorism; it supports Army Title 10 missions and Transformation; 
it sets priorities for the Army Antiterrorism Program; it supports National and DOD strategic 
goals. This Strategic Plan will be explained through the overview and the West Point plan for the 
goals, performance objectives, and milestones.   
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CHAPTER 1 – STRATEGIC PLAN OVERVIEW 
1.  PURPOSE.  This Strategic Plan, issued in compliance with reference (j), will guide the West 
Point Antiterrorism (AT) Program by articulating ARNORTH AT strategic goals and 
performance objectives, and by providing a construct to implement, measure, and report on their 
accomplishment. This plan serves as guidance for all West Point activities. 
 2.  BACKGROUND.   The West Point AT program is a collective, proactive effort focused on 
the prevention and detection of terrorist attacks against Army personnel and their families, 
selected Army contractors, facilities, units, installations, and infrastructure critical to mission 
accomplishment.  It focuses on the planning and preparation required defending against, and 
responding to, terrorist incidents.  The West Point AT program supports the ARNORTH and 
DoD goals of deterring threats and coercion against U.S. interests, defeating global terrorism, 
and transforming the DoD to meet the challenges and requirements of the 21
st
 Century. 
3.  AT VISION.  West Point accepts as reality the intent of those that would use terrorism as a 
tool to destroy people, disrupt our mission, and distract us from our responsibilities.  West Point 
acknowledges that it is a symbolic representation of both the nation and the United States Army.  
As such, the installation, and the Corps of Cadets in particular, present a lucrative target for 
terrorists who wish to strike against the United States.  West Point will protect the Corps of 
Cadets and its staff and faculty, and train the cadets as future Army leaders to think and operate 
in an environment where the potential for terrorism exists.  In addition to training future Army 
leaders, West Point will host a center of excellence, dedicated to the study of combating 
terrorism, which serves as a source of knowledge for current and future Army leaders. 
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4.  AT MISSION.  West Point conducts force protection and law enforcement operations to 
protect the Corps of Cadets, the West Point Community, and visitors by deterring, denying and 
defending against enemy attacks.  On order, implements contingency plans to mitigate or 
respond to criminal or terrorist activities directed against personnel or property on West Point. 
5.  INTENT.  The intent of the West Point AT Strategic Plan is as follows: 
Integrate actions designed to prevent terrorist attacks 
Support ARNORTH AT Strategic Plans 
Embed AT concepts throughout the Academy and West Point military reservation. 
Host a Center for Combating Terrorism  
Incorporate a terrorist environment in cadet military training 
Add academic courses related to the study of insurgency and terrorism 
Demand active leader participation in the AT program 
Prioritize AT efforts over the long term 
Endeavor to anticipate the future environment 
Establish a system to review and adjust the West Point AT Strategic Plan over time 
 6.  CONCEPT.  The West Point AT program focuses on supporting the ARNORTH Strategic 
Plan and Goals.  The ARNORTH AT Program has seven (7) strategic goals, listed below, and 
thirty-nine (39) supporting performance objectives to facilitate progress toward achieving the 
stated vision and satisfying the intent of reducing vulnerabilities to terrorist acts.  Since the West 
Point AT strategy supports the Army AT strategy, some goals and performance objectives listed 
in this plan will maintain a numbering convention consistent with ref (a).  The goals are desired 
outcomes with expected attainment ranging from one to four years.  The performance objectives 
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listed for each strategic goal are intended to contribute to achieving the AT strategic goals by 
stating in clear, measurable terms the target level of performance expected for each objective. 
STRATEGIC GOAL #1:  Implement effective AT risk management processes and ensure the 
timely and pertinent dissemination of AT threat information and intelligence. 
STRATEGIC GOAL #2:  Develop and execute proactive, relevant, and viable AT plans and AT 
Program management. 
STRATEGIC GOAL #3:  Conduct effective AT training and execute realistic AT exercises.  
STRATEGIC GOAL #4:  Optimize the planning, programming, and execution of resources, 
including Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) in support of AT programs.  
STRATEGIC GOAL #5:  Execute holistic, comprehensive reviews of AT programs to ensure 
compliance with ARNORTH AT Program standards. 
STRATEGIC GOAL #6:  Develop a reporting and evaluation system that provides effective and 
timely data sufficient to apply resources and adjust the program to fit a changing environment.   
STRATEGIC GOAL #7:  Embed AT concepts throughout the IMA by developing, 
implementing, and sustaining AT training and doctrine for Army military and civilians. 
The AT Branch, ARNORTH provided an estimate of each of the performance objectives to 
establish the Army baseline (current attainment in terms of percentages), so that appropriate 
milestones (attainment in terms of percentages over the years ahead) could be developed in order 
to meet the DoD timeline mandates.   The Army baselines are estimates only, generated to 
provide a start point for evaluating the progressive nature of the Strategic Plan.  Substantial 
measures of success are included in each performance objective.  In all cases, the most effective 
evaluation of our AT posture will become apparent over the course of the Strategic Plan rather 
than a single year.    
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7.  RESPONSIBILITIES.    
 
      a. Installation Commander.  
          (1)  Serve as the West Point Force Protection Officer. 
          (2)  Establish an Antiterrorism Executive Committee (ATEC).  The membership include  
the Superintendent, the West Point Chief of Staff, G3, the Garrison Commander, the West Point 
counterintelligence Coordinating Authority, the Commandant,  the Dean of the Academic Board, 
and the Director of Plans, Training, Mobilization and Security (DPTMS). 
          (3)  Establish an Antiterrorism Working Group (ATWG).  The membership will consist of 
a representative from each of the major activities and tenant military units. 
          (4)  Ensure force protection is aggressively managed in compliance with DoD, 
NORTHCOM and ARNORTH regulations and guidance. 
           (5) Provide guidance and oversight concerning force protection matters. 
      b. Commandant 
          (1) Embed antiterrorism concepts into realistic cadet field training. 
          (2) Leverage the operational experiences of your staff and faculty to provide cadets with a 
field training and academic environment for the study of terrorism and counter-terrorism. 
          (3) Support the annual West Point antiterrorism exercise. 
          (4) Serve as a member of the Antiterrorism Executive Committee. 
      c. Dean of the Academic Board.  
          (1) Support the global war on terror through education, research and policy analysis. 
          (2) Leverage the operational and academic expertise of our staff and faculty to provide 
cadets with experiential opportunities for studying terrorism and counter-terrorism. 
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          (3) Develop and sustain a Center for Combating Terrorism that will develop, teach, and 
support academic courses related to the study of insurgency and terrorism. 
          (4) Conduct research and policy analysis so that the Academy and the Army can endeavor 
to anticipate the future environment with respect to terrorism. 
          (5) Support the annual West Point antiterrorism exercise. 
          (6) Serve as a member of the Antiterrorism Executive Committee. 
      d. Garrison Commander.    
          (1) Serve as a member on the Antiterrorism Executive Committee. 
(2) Chair the Antiterrorism Working Group. 
(3) Execute the West Point antiterrorism plan 
          (4) Support the West Point antiterrorism exercise. 
 e. Director, Plans, Training, Mobilization and Security. 
      (1)  Provide operational oversight, coordination and technical guidance for the West 
Point antiterrorism plan. 
     (2)  Chair the Antiterrorism working group meeting at least quarterly to review and assess 
West Point‘s progress in achieving the stated performance objectives of this Strategic Plan.  
     (3)  Host the semi-annual Antiterrorism executive committee. 
     (4)  Report status of all AT strategic goals and performance objectives of this plan to 
ARNORTH annually, as directed. 
     (5) Plan, coordinate and execute the annual West Point antiterrorism exercise. 
     (6) Serve as a member of the Antiterrorism Executive Committee. 
 f. G-3.   
     (1) Provide intelligence input to the quarterly West Point threat working group. 
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     (2)  Develop and publish the annual West Point terrorist threat assessment. 
     (3) Direct the annual West Point Antiterrorism exercise. 
     (4) Serve as a member of the Antiterrorism Executive Committee. 
 g. Directors of Major Activity Directorates & Commanders of tenant units.  
     (1) Review the strategic goals, performance objectives, and expected levels of 
performance contained in Chapter 2.   
     (2) Increase awareness and develop procedures as appropriate. 
     (3) Implement sound training and exercise programs to increase awareness and proficiency 
and to reduce the potential for a terrorist attack in areas of responsibility. 
         (4) Provide a representative to the West Point ATWG and report on progress towards 
achieving the stated AT strategic goals and performance objectives of this plan.   
8.  EVALUATION.   The primary method to determine attainment of AT strategic goals, 
performance objectives, and milestones of this plan will be via internal West Point AT Program 
assessments, the Joint Service Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (JSIVA), Higher 
Headquarters Assessments (HHA), Organizational Inspection Program (OIP), and Army 
Inspector General Audits.  Additionally, the monthly ATWG meetings, chaired by the DPTMS, 
will serve as a venue to review attainment of AT strategic goals and performance objectives. 
The Core Vulnerability Assessment Management Program (CVAMP) will be the database used 
to store and retrieve these performance objectives parameters.  At this time, ref (d) at Appendix 
A requires all VA results be recorded in CVAMP within 120 days of the assessment.  When 
appropriately modified, CVAMP will also record the annual compliance with ref (a), and 
therefore, generate required annual reports. 
 
9.  IMPLEMENTATION.  This AT Strategic Plan is effective immediately.   
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CHAPTER 2 – WEST POINT PLAN FOR IMPLEMENTING ARNORTH AT 
STRATEGIC GOALS, PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES, AND MILESTONES 
 
1.  This chapter describes the strategic goals and performance objectives and each table includes 
the following: 
 
 a.  Performance Objective:  Description of performance objective. 
 
 b.  Applies to:  Depicts level of command oversight for performance objective. 
 
 c.  Army Baseline:  The baseline performance indicator serves to establish the frame of 
reference by which actual achievement shall be compared.   
 d.  Acceptable Performance:  Depicts performance goals, in terms of percentages, over a 
range of future years. 
 e.  Measure of Performance:  How the performance will be measured. 
 
 f.  Discussion:  Amplifications/Reference. 
 
Performance Objectives and Performance Milestones.  The performance indicators listed below 
contribute to achieving the AT strategic goals by stating specific objectives, measurable terms 
and target level of performance expected for each performance objective.  Although the baseline 
and subsequent targets are both estimates and subjective evaluations, they serve to guide efforts 
toward the end goal.  Through assessments and reporting, West Point activities can track the 
progress to the assigned performance objectives. 
2.  Strategic Goal #1:  Implement effective AT risk management processes and ensure the timely 
and pertinent dissemination of AT threat information and intelligence.  This goal contains seven 
West Point supporting performance objectives. 
a. Performance Objective 1A:  Threat/Local Observation Notice (GUARDIAN) Reporting. 
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Performance 
Objective  
- Ensure West Point garrison implements Threat and Local Observation Notice  
  (GUARDIAN Reports) reporting. 
- Ensure s West Point AT Plan incorporates GUARDIAN reporting procedures. 
Applies to Directorate of Emergency Services (DES), Directorate of Plans, Training, 
Mobilization and Security (DPTMS) 
Army Baseline 50%. 
ARNORTH 
Acceptable 
Performance  
100% by the end of FY11. 
West Point 
Acceptable 
performance 
100% by end of FY11. 
Measure of 
Performance  
AT plan incorporates GUARDIAN Reporting.   
Discussion Reference:  Dep. Sec. Def Memo dated 13 Sep 2007, DoD and ARNORTH plans 
Budget/ Resources 1. There is no additional cost to implement this goal; it is calculated in the ATO salary. 
  
b. Performance Objective 1B: Threat Working Groups (TWG). 
Performance 
Objective  
- Ensure West Point activities participate in a TWG at the installation level.  
- Meets at least quarterly.  Increase frequency as required. 
- Develop and refine terrorism threat assessments. Coordinate and disseminate threat 
warnings, reports, and summaries to optimize regional situational awareness. 
 
- Ensure TWG membership includes, at a minimum, the ATO; the Garrison 
Commander (or a designated representative); the Directorate of Operations, Plans 
and Security (G-3) intelligence officer; DES; DPTMS; United States Corps of 
Cadets (USCC); office of the Dean (Dean); Directorate of Intercollegiate Athletics 
(ODIA); Keller Army Community Hospital (KACH); Criminal Investigation 
Command (CID).  
 
- Ensure AT plans contain the TWG charter to include: the organization that is 
hosting if not a Garrison, membership composition, defined responsibilities, and 
frequency of meetings. 
 
- Ensure DPTMS maintains TWG meeting minutes (properly classified) for a 
minimum of one year. 
Applies to G-3, DPTMS, DES, USCC, Dean, CID, ODIA, KACH 
Army Baseline 50-60%. 
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ARNORTH 
Acceptable 
Performance  
100% by the end of FY12. 
 
West Point 
Acceptable 
Performance 
100% by the end of FY12 
Measure of 
Performance  
TWG charter incorporated in West Point AT Plan; TWG meeting quarterly as 
scheduled. 
Discussion Reference:  AR 525-13 dated Sept 11. 2008, Critical Task 2; DODI 2000.16 Stnd 8. 
Budget/Resources There is no additional cost to implement this goal, the strategy costs are calculated in 
the salaries of the member‘s assigned.  The resource impact however is removing 
some members from their primary responsibilities to perform their TWG functions.   
 
      c. Performance Objective 1C: Does not pertain to West Point.  
      d. Performance Objective 1D: High Risk Personnel (HRP) does not pertain to West Point. 
      e. Performance Objective 1E. Threat Assessments (TA). 
Performance 
Objective  
- Ensure West Point has a comprehensive Threat Assessment (TA) process. 
- Ensure TAs are conducted annually or more frequently as the terrorist threat  
  environment dictates. 
- Identify the full range of known or estimated terrorist threat capabilities. 
- Prepare specific TAs to support operational planning and risk decisions for unique 
mission requirements or special events. 
- Ensure reference TA procedures is in our AT plan. 
Applies to G-3, DPTMS 
Army Baseline 50-60%. 
ARNORTH 
acceptable 
performance 
95-100% by end of FY11. 
West Point  
Acceptable 
Performance  
G-3 prepares comprehensive annual TA; Intelligence annex to OPORD‘s prepared 
prior to special events such as graduation, home football season, Army-Navy Game; 
specific updates 30 days prior to special events.  
Measure of 
Performance  
TA procedures in West Point AT Plan; annual TA prepared and issued by G-3; 
specific updates 30 days prior to special events.  
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Discussion Reference:   AR 525-13, Critical Task 2; DODI 2000.16 Stnd 8. 
Budget/Resources The MEVA is not stationary, when the MEVA moves in mass from West Point to 
various venues in the United States (Philadelphia, Baltimore, College Station, Texas, 
and Cleveland OH) assessments are required in accordance with DoD standard 6.  
Standard #6 states; any event or activity determined to be a special security event or 
other activity involving a mass gathering of >300 DoD personnel The Army/Navy 
football game is a very high visibility target of national interest, and likewise related 
events have the potential to be targets for terrorist attacks. The ATO serves as the 
primary point of contact/liaison between Federal, State, local law enforcement, and 
emergency services, with officials, and senior leadership. This requirement is to 
ensure that a Pre-deployment Assessment, Vulnerability Assessment, and Special 
Event Assessment are conducted as well as route, hotel, Food and Water VA, as well 
as the venue vulnerability assessment. Additionally coordinating and liaising with a 
multitude of law enforcement both state and federal as well as civil support agencies. 
These assessments identify areas of improvement to with stand, mitigate, or deter 
acts of violence or terrorism.   
FY11-  $3.7K 
FY12 - $4K 
FY13 - $4.5K 
FY14 - $4.6K 
Max per diem rate for Alexandria, Virginia, Lodging 209, M&IE 49 ($258.00) 
multiplied by 7 days = Per Diem x days x personnel x trips = $1806.00, Per Diem 7 
days @ $258 a day x 2 personnel = $3612.00 is total Travel cost.  
 
 f. Performance Objective 1F: Criticality Assessments (CA). 
Performance 
Objective  
- Ensure West Point activities implement and conduct at all levels programmatic  
and procedural actions to protect critical assets (personnel, property, equipment, 
activities, operations, information, facilities, services, and resources) essential to 
Army operations.  
- Ensure DPTMS conducts comprehensive annual Terrorism Criticality  
  Assessments (CA). 
- Require DPTMS to address and reference CA procedures in the AT plan.  
Applies to DPTMS, DES, DPW, ATWG 
Army Baseline 40-60%. by end of FY11 
ARNORTH 
acceptable 
performance 
95-100% by end of FY12. 
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West Point  
Acceptable 
Performance  
100% by the end of FY12. 
Measure of 
Performance  
West Point AT Plan incorporates CA procedures; ATWG conducts annual CA; CA 
results briefed to Antiterrorism Executive Committee (ATEC). 
Discussion Reference:  AR 525-13, Critical Task 3; DOD I 2000.16 Stnd 5; DODO 2000.12H  
Budget/Resources 1. There is no additional cost to implement this goal; it is calculated in the ATO salary 
 
      g. Performance Objective 1G: Vulnerability Assessments (VA). 
Performance 
Objective  
- Ensure West Point activities implement, enhance, and conduct at all levels 
programmatic and procedural actions to determine susceptibility of personnel, assets, 
and infrastructure to terrorist acts. 
- Conduct comprehensive annual Vulnerability Assessments. 
- Require DPTMS to address and reference VA procedures in the AT plan.  
Applies to West Point activities 
Army Baseline 10-20%. 
ARNORTH 
acceptable 
performance 
95-100% by end of FY12. 
West Point 
Acceptable 
Performance  
1. 80% VA of critical facilities by the end of FY11, 90-100% of the installation by the 
end of FY12. 
Measure of 
Performance  
2010 AT plan incorporates VA procedures; trained VA team comprised of DPTMS 
and DES, DPW, DOIM, and DOL members; VA‘s scheduled for special events. 
Discussion Reference:  AR 525-13, Critical Task 3;  DOD I 2000.16 Stnd 6 and 16,  DOD O 
2000.12-H 
Budget/Resources 2. There is no additional cost to implement this goal; it is calculated in the ATO salary 
 
       h. Performance Objective 1H: Risk Assessments (RA). 
Performance 
Objective  
- Ensure West Point activities implement and/or enhance programmatic and 
procedural actions to assess and incorporate TA, CA, and VA to attain a 
comprehensive Risk Assessment. 
 
- Ensure DPTMS conducts comprehensive annual RA, and RA for special events. 
- Reference RA procedures in the AT plan.  
CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS          53 
 
Applies to West Point activities  
Army Baseline 10-20%. 
ARNORTH 
acceptable 
performance 
90% by end of FY12 
West Point 
Acceptable 
Performance  
100% by the end of FY13. 
Measure of 
Performance  
West Point AT plan incorporates risk assessment; DPTMS conducts comprehensive 
annual risk assessment for special events. 
Discussion Reference:  525-13, Critical Task 3;  DOD I 2000.16 Stnds 15 and 16, DOD O 
2000.12-H 
Budget/Resources 3. There is no additional cost to implement this goal; it is calculated in the ATO salary 
      
i. Performance Objective 1I:  ATO SIPRNET Access. 
 
Performance 
Objective  
- Ensure designated ATO‘s assigned or attached have dedicated SIPRNET  
  access.  (note: IMCOM objective is dedicated access at the ATO‘s desk) 
Applies to West Point and Installation ATO 
Army Baseline 30-40%. 
ARNORTH 
acceptable 
performance 
90-100% by end of FY10. 
West Point 
Acceptable 
Performance  
Installation ATO with SIPRNET access by end of FY10; dedicated SIPRNET 
access to ATO‘s by end of FY12. 
Measure of 
Performance  
Percentage of designated ATO assigned or attached that have dedicated access to 
SIPRNET. 
Discussion Reference:  DoD O-2000.12-P, Performance Objective 1I; DOD I 2000.12-H.  
ATOs require SIPRNET access in order to receive the latest threat information 
and reference material.   
Budget/Resources 1. Installation of SIPERNET capability and SIPERNET computer lifecycle  
 
FY12-  $14K 
FY13 - $4K 
FY14 - $4K 
FY15 - $4K    
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3.   Strategic Goal #2:  Develop and execute proactive, relevant, and viable AT plans and AT 
Program Management practices.  This goal contains eight West Point supporting performance 
objectives listed below: 
      a. Performance Objective 2A: Antiterrorism Working Groups (ATWG). 
 
Performance 
Objective  
- Ensure West Point establishes a standardized Antiterrorism Working Group  
  (ATWG) that meets at least quarterly. 
- Require DPTMS to develop ATWG charter. 
- Require DPTMS to reference ATWG charter in the AT plan. 
Applies to West Point and USAG representatives  
Army Baseline 60-70%. 
ARNORTH 
acceptable 
performance 
100% by end of FY09. 
Acceptable 
Performance  
100% by the end of FY10              (*note, AT Operation Plan was signed Dec ’09)  
Measure of 
Performance  
ATWG comprised of West Point and Garrison activity representatives meeting at 
least quarterly; charter approved and incorporated in 2010 AT Plan. 
Discussion Reference:  AR 525-13, Critical Task 1; DOD I 2000.16 Stnd 10 
Budget/Resources There is no additional cost to implement this goal; the strategy costs are calculated in 
the salaries of the member‘s assigned.  The resource impact however is removing 
some members from their primary responsibilities to perform their ATWG functions.   
 
b. Performance Objective 2B: Antiterrorism Executive Committees (ATEC). 
 
Performance 
Objective  
- Ensure West Point establishes an Antiterrorism Executive Committee (ATEC). 
- Ensure ATEC meets at least semi-annually. 
- Define ATEC Charter. 
- Act upon recommendations of the ATWG and TWG to determine resource 
allocation priorities to mitigate or eliminate terrorism-related vulnerabilities. 
- Require DPTMS to maintain committee-meeting documentation (action items).  
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Applies to West Point  
Army Baseline 70-80% 
ARNORTH 
acceptable 
performance 
100% by end of FY05. 
West Point 
Acceptable 
Performance  
100% by the end of FY05. 
Measure of 
Performance  
Charter approved, incorporated in 2010 AT plan; ATEC meets semi-annually, 
DPTMS maintains minutes of sessions. 
Discussion Reference:   , Critical Task 1; DOD I 2000.16 Stnd 12 
Budget/Resources There is no additional cost to implement this goal; the strategy costs are calculated in 
the salaries of the member‘s assigned.  The resource impact however is removing 
some members from their primary responsibilities to perform their ATWG functions.   
    
c. Performance Objective 2C: Random Antiterrorism Measure (RAMs). 
Performance 
Objective  
- Ensure West Point activities develop and implement RAM as an integral 
component of the overall AT program guided by the principles outlined in reference 
(b) DoD O-2000.12H 
 
- Ensure West Point activities employ RAM, in conjunction with site-specific  
  FPCON measures, in a manner that portrays a robust security posture from which 
terrorists cannot easily discern security force patterns or routines. 
- Ensure Garrison includes tenant commands in RAM planning and execution.  
Applies to West Point activities 
Army Baseline 60-70% 
ARNORTH 
acceptable 
performance 
95-100% by end of FY10. 
West Point 
Acceptable 
Performance  
100% by the end of FY11. 
 
Measure of 
Performance  
Activities conducting RAM in conduct of daily duties and cadet training. 
Discussion Reference:  AR 525-13, Critical Task 5; DOD I 2000.16 Stnd 14. RAM, at a 
minimum shall consist of the random implementation of higher FPCON measures in 
consideration of the local terrorist capabilities.  
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Budget/Resources 1. Provide necessary (RAMP) Random Antiterrorism Measures for West Point. 
Funding is required for training in the use of explosive detection equipment and 
RAMP Kits for tenant organizations.  Signage 1k, Channelize Cones $45 x 50 = 
2250, Barrier Tape $90, shipping $210.00 total  $2550 Annual training for use of 
Explosive Detection Equipment $2,450.00 total = $5000.00 with 2.3% inflation 
 
FY11-  $5K 
FY12 - $5.2K 
FY13 - $5.4K 
FY14 - $5.6K 
   
 d. Performance Objective 2D: Comprehensive AT Plans. 
 
Performance 
Objective  
- Ensure West Point develops comprehensive AT Plan that covers at a minimum: 
 
- Threat Assessment, Criticality Assessment, Vulnerability Assessment, Risk  
  Assessment, Risk mitigation measures (including RAM), Physical Security 
measures, Off-installation DoD facilities AT measures (housing and activities), HRP 
measures, construction and building considerations, Logistics contracting measures, 
Critical asset security, Incident Response, Consequence Management (including 
CBRNE and WMD mitigation planning), Site specific FPCON measures  
Applies to West Point   
Army Baseline 50-60%.   
ARNORTH 
acceptable 
performance 
100% by the end of FY10. 
1.  
West Point  
Acceptable 
Performance  
2. By end of 3QTR 09, AT plan approved, and reviewed.  Plan exercised by end of 
FY10. 
 
Measure of 
Performance  
By end of 3QTR 09, AT plan approved, and reviewed.  Plan exercised by end of 
FY09. 
Discussion Reference:  AR 525-13, Critical Task 7; DOD I 2000.16 Stnd 7.  Many Garrisons 
have AT plans, but they are not comprehensive or are fragmented.   
Budget/Resources 4. There is no additional cost to implement this goal; it is calculated in the ATO salary 
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            e. Performance Objective 2E: Pertains only to RCC‘s.  By the end of 2010 trends will 
reflect that RCC and US Defense Representatives and Department of State Chiefs of Mission 
have completed 100% of the required Memorandums of Understanding to clarify AT 
responsibility for geographic combatant command assigned and non-assigned DoD Elements and 
Personnel.  
f. Performance Objective 2F: West Point FPCON action sets. 
Performance 
Objective  
- Ensure West Point has established site-specific actions for each FPCON level.  
Applies to West Point   
Army Baseline 60-70%. 
ARNORTH 
acceptable 
performance 
90% by end of 2d QTR FY11. 
West Point 
Acceptable 
Performance  
100% by end of FY11. 
Measure of 
Performance  
Site specific actions developed and approved for each FPCON measure; actions 
incorporated into AT plan; West Point activities briefed and trained on actions. 
Discussion Reference:  AR 525-13, Critical Task 5,  DOD I 2000.16 Stnd 14 
Budget/Resources 5. There is no additional cost to implement this goal; it is calculated in the ATO 
salary 
 
g. Performance Objective 2G: Installation Preparedness Measures. 
 
Performance 
Objective  
- Establish Installation Preparedness Measures that address mass warning systems, 
CBRNE detectors and monitors, collective protection and individual protective 
equipment.  
Applies to West Point Garrison 
Army Baseline 20-30%. 
ARNORTH 
acceptable 
performance 
90% by end of 2d QTR FY10. 
West Point 
Acceptable 
Performance  
Mass warning system purchased FY09 and in place by end of 2d qtr FY11; DES 
HAZMAT team equipped and trained by end of FY09, CBRNE detectors and 
monitors purchased and installed by the end of FY10. 
Measure of 
Performance  
Mass warning system purchased and in place by end of FY09; DES HAZMAT team 
equipped and trained by end of FY09, CBRNE detectors and monitors purchased, 
personnel trained, and installed by the end of FY11. 
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Discussion Reference:  AR 525-13, Critical Task 7;  DOD I 2000.16 Stnd 21 
Budget/Resources 1. One year warranty for Dialogic telephone Mass Notification System. Baseline cost 
of $30000.00 used, and 10% inflation used for out years.  One year warranty for 
Giant Voice Mass Notification System. Baseline cost of $14000.00 used, and 10% 
inflation used for out years.  
 
FY11-  $41.2K 
FY12 - $49.4K 
FY13 - $54.2K 
FY14 - $59.5K 
 
h. Performance Objective 2H: Mutual Aid Agreements (MAAs), Memorandum of                          
Agreement (MOA), and Memorandum of Understanding (MOU‘s). 
 
Performance 
Objective  
- Ensure Garrison and tenant units develop MAAs, MOAs or MOUs with off-
installation/facility civilian authorities to support AT Plan.  
Applies to DES, KACH, DPTMS 
Army Baseline 30-40%. 
ARNORTH 
acceptable 
performance 
95-100% by end of FY 2010. 
West Point  
Acceptable 
Performance  
MOAs updated by end of FY11.  
Measure of 
Performance  
DES - MOAs updated with local, county and state law enforcement/first responder 
agencies; KACH – MOAs with local hospitals; DPTMS–MOA with Stewart Airport 
security regarding 2
nd
 Aviation‘s security. 
Discussion Reference:  AR 525-13, Critical Task 6;  DOD I 2000.16 Stnd 21 
Budget/Resources 1. There is no initial cost implement this goal, the strategy costs are calculated in the 
salaries of the member‘s assigned (ATO, DES, SJA, etc…).  During certain times 
when the MOA/MOU has to be initiated there may be costs associated with the level 
of support received from the various agencies.  Those costs are captured in the 
installations emergency funds as required. 
 
i. Performance Objective 2I: AT Building Construction Standards. 
 
Performance 
Objective  
- Ensure West Point implements AT construction and mass notification systems 
standards to new constructions and major renovation, repair, and restoration projects.  
Applies to DPTMS, DPW, Corps of  Engineers 
Army Baseline 70-80%. 
ARNORTH 
acceptable 
performance 
95-100% by end of FY10. 
Acceptable 100% by the end of FY11.  
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Performance  
Measure of 
Performance  
Percentage of construction projects that have adhered to DoD AT Building 
construction standards. (UFC 4-010-01). 
Discussion Reference:  AR 525-13, Critical Task 7 and paragraphs 2-7 and 2-15; DOD I 
2000.16 Stnd 17 and 28. 
Budget/Resources 1. There is no additional cost to implement this goal, the strategy is calculated in the 
ATO salary; however, after the review there are additional costs that will be 
absorbed in the construction costs.  Those costs are funded through military 
construction projects through congress.  
 
4.  Strategic Goal #3:  Conduct effective AT training and execute realistic AT exercises.  This 
goal contains five West Point supporting performance objectives listed below: 
      a. Performance Objective 3A: IAW Army and USNORTHCOM Strategic Plans incorporate 
AT and CBRNE exercises simultaneously into all operations, training, including exercises with 
local civilian agencies.  By the end of 2011 will reflect that Commanders have incorporated AT 
training into all (100%) operations and exercises. 
 
      b. Performance Objective 3B: AT Awareness (Level I). 
 
Performance 
Objective  
- West Point activities shall establish and sustain policies and procedures to  
  ensure that Soldiers, civilian employees, contractors, and DoD Family members 
ascertain the appropriate AT awareness training and document annual completion. 
Applies to West Point activities  
Army Baseline 50-60%  by end of FY09 
ARNORTH 
acceptable 
performance 
90% by end of FY10 
West Point  
Acceptable 
Performance  
 100% By end of FY11. 
 
Measure of 
Performance  
Activities and tenant units ensure employees, contractors, soldiers and cadets 
receive AT level I training annually, receive AT level I retraining within 6 months 
of traveling OCONUS; employees, cadets, soldiers and family members over the 
age of 14 receive a AOR specific briefing prior to traveling OCONUS.  
DPTMS tracks status of AT level I training; tracks travel information for those 
traveling OCONUS. 
Discussion Reference:  AR 525-13, Critical Task 4; DOD I 2000.16 Stnd 25 
Budget/Resources 1. There is no additional cost to implement this goal; the strategy is calculated in the 
ATO salary.   
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      c. Performance Objective 3C: Antiterrorism Officer Training (Level II). 
 
Performance 
Objective  
- Ensure West Point designates the ATO in writing, and ensures that the ATO  
  attends a Level II Certified course of instruction.  
Applies to DPTMS and West Point activities  
Army Baseline 70-80%.  
ARNORTH 
acceptable 
performance 
95-100% by end of FY07. 
West Point  
Acceptable 
Performance  
100% by the end of FY05.  
Measure of 
Performance  
Level II certified ATO on orders under direction of DPTMS. 
Discussion Reference:  AR 525-13, Critical Task 1; DOD I 2000.16 Stnd 26 
Budget/Resources 1. Provides Temporary Duty (TDY) for one full time ATO; travel funds to attend 
Level II AT training course to certify ATO to serve as the commanders AT advisor 
and AT instruction. Max per diem rate for Fort Leonard Wood, MO ($109) 
multiplied by 15 days = Per Diem x days x personnel x trips = $1635.00, Per Diem 
7 days @ $109 a day x 1 personnel = $1635.00, Travel cost for 1 air line tickets at 
$800.00 each = $800.00, Rental car @ $150 per week X 1 trips = $150 Total = $ 
2585.00. This is for Level II Certification 
    
   d. Performance Objective 3D:  High Risk Personnel (HRP) Training.  Does not pertain to West 
Point; pertains only to MACOMs and RCC‘s.  By the end of 2007, trends will reflect that 
MACOMs and Combatant Commanders have incorporated AT training into all (100%) 
operations and exercises. 
  e. Performance Objective 3E: Commanders Training (Level III). 
 
Performance 
Objective  
- Ensure Garrison Commander receives Level III Commanders training.  
Applies to USAG Commander  
Army Baseline 60-70%.  
ARNORTH 
acceptable 
performance 
95-100 by end of FY09 
West Point 
Acceptable 
100% by the end of FY10,  
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Performance  
Measure of 
Performance  
Garrison Commander completes the Army Level III Commanders training. 
Discussion Reference:  AR 525-13, Critical Task 4; DOD I 2000.16 Stnd 29 
Budget/Resources 2. There is no additional cost to West Point to implement this goal, the costs 
associated with this strategy is absorbed by higher headquarters.  
 
        f. Performance Objective 3F: Comprehensive Training Exercises. 
 
Performance 
Objective  
- Ensure West Point develops and executes comprehensive training exercises that 
test: CBRNE, WMD, and FPCON capabilities measures.  
Applies to West Point activities 
Army Baseline 40-50%. by end of FY09 
ARNORTH 
acceptable 
performance 
95-100% by end of FY10 
West Point 
Acceptable 
Performance  
Training exercise that assesses capability of installation activities to respond to 
chemical and explosive threat by end of FY10; training exercise assessing 
capability of installation activities to respond to biological and radiological threat 
by end of FY11;  
Measure of 
Performance  
Number of installation activities participating and responsive to specific CBRNE 
threat  
Discussion Reference:  AR 525-13, Critical Task 8;  DOD I 2000.16 Stnd 23 
Budget/Resources 1. To enhance exercise program support the WMD and MASCAL AT plans and 
procedures and to participate and conduct exercise with our local committees along 
with Orange County and NY State Office of Emergency Management. Funds will 
allow for support to the installations Exercise program to bring evaluators to West 
Point to allow the Senior Commander‘s staff to train, participate, and be tested 
rather than observe and critique.  Cost driver also supports the purchase of 
vehicles/airplane to add realism. Additionally funds will also to support joint 
exercises with local government emergency agencies and exercise designer and 
evaluators. 
FY11-  $10.3K 
FY12 - $10.5K 
FY13 - $10.8K 
FY14 - $11.1K 
 
g. Performance Objective 3G: Primary Duty ATOs. 
 
Performance 
Objective  
- Ensure antiterrorism is the primary duty of installation ATO.  
Applies to DPTMS, West Point activities  
Army Baseline 95-100%. 
ARNORTH 95-100% by end of FY09. 
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acceptable 
performance 
West Point  
Acceptable 
Performance  
100% by the end of FY05.  
Measure of 
Performance  
Trained individual with antiterrorism as assigned primary duty 
Discussion Reference:  AR 525-13, paragraph 2-9; DOD I 2000.16 Stnd 5. 
Budget/Resources Salary - AT Program Management (Personnel, ATO) 1 FTE, existing ATO, 
Funding is required for one AT Program Manager (GS-12) required to run and 
support AT programs.  These values reflect; annual West Point salary plus locality 
pay for New York, The ATO civilian pay is based on a base line salary of 83.2K 
with a 2.3% inflation rate.  Using the payroll estimator the cost driver was 
calculated using the Annual Salary for Locality @ Step 5 + Employee Benefits @ 
30% + Awards @ 1.5% with a 2.3% inflation rate. 
    
FY11-  $115.5K 
FY12 - $118K 
FY13 - $121K 
FY14 - $123.5K 
 
5.  Strategic Goal #4:  Optimize the planning, programming, and execution of resources, 
including Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) in support of AT programs.  
This goal contains six West Point supporting performance objectives listed below: 
 
a. Performance Objective 4A: AT Program Analysis. 
 
Performance Objective  - Implement and enhance policy and procedures to meet ARNORTH AT 
requirement documentation and prioritization methodology 
Applies to West Point activities 
Army Baseline 70-80%. 
ARNORTH acceptable 
performance 
100% by end of FY06. 
West Point  Acceptable 
Performance  
 100% by the end of FY06. 
Measure of 
Performance  
Activities provide input to Garrison; Garrison develops Schedule 75 funding 
requirements and prioritization; ATWG reviews; ATEC approves. 
Discussion Reference: DoD I 2000.16, Stnd 26.  
Budget/Resources 1. There is no additional cost to implement this goal; the strategy is calculated in 
the ATO salary.  
 
     b. Performance Objective 4B: Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiative Fund (CbT RIF). 
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Performance Objective  - Ensure West Point complies with CbT RIF requirements and POM submissions  
  for emergent and emerging AT requirements.  
Applies to DPTMS, G-3 
Army Baseline 90-100%. 
ARNORTH acceptable 
performance 
100% by end of FY10 
West Point Acceptable 
Performance  
100% by the end of 2011. 
 
Measure of 
Performance  
CbT RIF submissions submitted through CVAMP; FP/AT requirements 
prioritized and properly documented on Schedule 75 
Discussion Reference: DoDO 2000-P, strategic goal 4 
 
Budget/Resources 2. There is no additional cost to implement this goal; the strategy is calculated in 
the ATO salary.  
 
      c. Performance Objective 4C:   Budget Execution for AT-Related Expenditures 
 
Performance 
Objective  
- AT budget execution will reflect execution for intended purpose of AT-related  
  expenditure  
Applies to USAG 
Army Baseline 75%. 
ARNORTH 
acceptable 
performance 
1. 85% by the end of FY09.  95% by the end of FY10, 100% by the end of FY11 
2.  
West Point 
Acceptable 
Performance  
Providing quarterly execution reports to NERO by the end of 2010 
 
Measure of 
Performance  
Quarterly execution reports from  West Point garrison to IMCOM-NE  
Discussion Reference:   DoD O-2000-12-P, Strategic Goal 4 
 
Budget/Resources 3. There is no additional cost to implement this goal; the strategy is calculated in the 
ATO salary.  
     
 d. Performance Objective 4D: Core Vulnerability Assessment Management Program (CVAMP). 
 
Performance 
Objective  
- Ensure West Point utilizes and implements fully the Core Vulnerability  
  Assessment Management Program (CVAMP).  
Applies to West Point  
Army Baseline 40-50%. 
ARNORTH 95-100% by end of FY10. 
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acceptable 
performance 
West Point 
Acceptable 
Performance  
100% by the end of FY10.  
Measure of 
Performance  
AT vulnerabilities and AT protective measure shortfalls fully documented through 
CVAMP. 
Discussion Reference:  AR 525-13, paragraph 2-9; DOD I 2000.16 Stnd 6 and 30 
Budget/Resources 4.  There is no additional cost to implement this goal; the strategy is calculated in the 
ATO salary. 
 
 e. Performance Objective 4E: Technologies, Equipment, and Process. 
 
Performance 
Objective  
- Research and field innovative technologies, equipment, and processes that 
enhance AT readiness 
Applies to West Point 
Army Baseline 60-70%.  (Trends based on action required) 
ARNORTH 
Acceptable 
Performance  
TBD-By ARNORTH 
Measure of 
Performance  
Subjective analysis of new or improved technologies, equipment, and process 
identified to improve AT shortfalls. 
Discussion Reference:  TBD 
Budget/Resources 1. Initially there is no additional cost to implement this goal, however, AT resource 
requirements using the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process 
needs to be completed prior to providing an actual dollar sign to a goal.  Also the 
process must use the Department of the Army approved methodology for 
documenting and prioritizing AT resource requirements. This process takes an 
average of two years.  Budget request for FY13 – FY15 
 
FY11-  $0K 
FY12 - $0K 
FY13 - $200K 
FY14 - $215K 
FY15 - $230K 
 
     f. Performance Objective 4F: Mitigated Vulnerabilities or Assume Risk. 
 
Performance 
Objective  
- Ensure West Point activities have mitigated vulnerabilities by funding decisions, 
improved security TTPs, risk reassessed at a lower acceptable level, or risk assessed 
and assumed in writing  
Applies to West Point activities  
Army Baseline 40-50%. 
ARNORTH 
acceptable 
71-74% by end FY 2009 
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performance 
West Point 
Acceptable 
Performance  
75-85% by end of FY10. 100% by the end of FY11    
Measure of 
Performance  
Number high-risk vulnerabilities for critical assets/special events mitigated or 
vulnerability assumed in writing. 
Discussion Reference:  525-13, Critical Task 3; DOD I 2000.16 Stnd 3 
Budget/Resources 5. There is no additional cost to implement this goal; the strategy is calculated in the 
ATO salary.  
 
6.  Strategic Goal #5:  Execute holistic, comprehensive reviews of AT programs to ensure 
compliance with ARNORTH AT Program standards.  This goal contains two West Point 
supporting performance objectives listed below: 
 
     a.  Performance Objective 5A: Pre-Deployment AT program review.  Does not pertain to 
West Point; pertains only to MACOMs and RCC‘s.  By the end of 2006, 95-100% of all Army 
commands with deploying units shall have conducted pre-deployment AT program review. 
 
     b. Performance Objective 5B:  Does not pertain to West Point; pertains only to RCC‘s.  By 
the end of 2007, all Combatant Commands, Defense Agencies, and DoD Field Agencies shall 
have undergone at least one Joint Staff-led HHA within three years to assess command-wide 
compliance with references (c) and (d). 
 
     c. Performance Objective 5C: Annual Review of AT Program. 
 
Performance 
Objective  
- Ensure West Point conducts an annual review of the AT program.  
Applies to West Point activities, DPTMS 
Army Baseline 60-70%. 
ARNORTH 
acceptable 
performance 
95-100% by end of FY09. 
Acceptable 
Performance  
100% by the end of FY06.  
Measure of 
Performance  
ATWG conducts annual review of AT program.  Results briefed and approved by 
ATEC 
Discussion Reference:  AR 525-13, paragraph 2-9; Critical Task 3, DOD I 2000.16 Stnd 31 
Budget/Resources 6. There is no additional cost to implement this goal; the strategy is calculated in the 
ATO salary.  
 
    d. Performance Objective 5D: Joint Service Integrated Vulnerability Assessment (JSIVA)/ 
Higher Headquarters Assessment (HHA). 
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Performance 
Objective  
- Ensure that West Point undergoes a JSIVA/HHA within past three years.    
Applies to West Point 
Army Baseline 90-100%. 
ARNORTH 
acceptable 
performance 
90-94% by end o FY08. 
West Point 
Acceptable 
Performance  
100% by the end of FY05.   
Measure of 
Performance  
Ensure that either JSIVA or IMCOM HHA is scheduled within a three years of 
previous assessment.   
Discussion Reference:  525-13, Critical Task 3; DOD I 2000.16 Stnd 31 
Budget/Resources 3. There is no additional cost to West Point to implement this goal, the costs 
associated with this strategy is absorbed by higher headquarters.  
 
7.  STRATEGIC GOAL #6:  Develop a reporting and evaluation system that provides effective 
and timely data sufficient to apply resources to adjust the program for a changing environment. 
This goal contains no West Point supporting performance objectives listed below: 
     a. Performance Objective 6A:  Army AT policy.  Pertains to ARNORTH revising the Army 
AT policy in AR 525-13 by 2007. 
     b.  Performance Objective 6B:  Army AT reporting system.  Pertains to ARNORTH 
developing a reporting system to evaluate the Army AT program by 2010. 
    c.  Performance Objective 6C:  Assessments of major Army subordinate headquarters.  
Pertains to ARNORTH revising the Force Protection Assessment Team by 2010. 
    d. Performance Objective 6D:  Resources guidance and priorities. Pertains to ARNORTH 
providing guidance and assistance to subordinate headquarters in planning for AT improvements. 
8.  STRATEGIC GOAL #7:  Embed AT concepts throughout the Army by developing, 
implementing, and sustaining AT training and doctrine for Army military and civilians. This goal 
contains one West Point supporting performance objective as indicated below: 
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      a.  Performance Objective 7A:  Army AT doctrine.  Does not pertain to West Point.   By 
2009 there will be a draft Army AT field manual draft and final publication in 2011. 
      b.  Performance Objective 7B:  Army AT training in professional military education (PME) 
for military and civilian 
 
Performance 
Objective  
Integration of AT into all officer, NCO PME and civilian training to ensure 
long term development of knowledge and skills. 
Applies to Dean, Commandant 
Army Baseline 20-30% of Officer, NCO and civilian courses integrate AT into their 
curricula 
ARNORTH 
Acceptable 
Performance  
30-40% by 2008, 50-60% by 2009, 80-90% by 2010, 100% by 2011 
 
West Point 
acceptable 
performance  
By end of FY10 
Measure of 
Performance  
Commandant:  Incorporate AT into realistic cadet field training exercises.  
Use the experiences and lessons learned by staff and faculty in combat 
operations to enhance cadet experience with AT as it applies to tactics, 
techniques and procedures; provide academic courses in low intensity 
conflict, insurgency and counter-insurgency operations; 
Dean: establish a Center for Combating Terrorism that supports the war 
against terrorism through education, research and policy analysis; host 
conferences to promote the study of insurgency and terrorism.  Leverage the 
operational and academic expertise of the staff and faculty to provide the 
cadets and officers with the opportunity to study terrorism.   
Discussion Reference:  AR 525-13, paragraph 2-14. a. (2).  Not fully implemented as of 
this Plan.   Long term improvement and implementation of effective AT 
program depends upon a solid training base for all grades, skills, and 
functional areas.  
Budget/Resources 4. There is no additional cost to West Point to implement this goal, the costs 
associated with this strategy is absorbed by higher headquarters.  
       
 c.  Performance Objective 7C:  Improvement of Army Level III Training for prospective 
commanders; does not pertain to West Point.  By 2009 there will be a directive issued with full 
implementation by 2010 in all pre-command courses. 
 d. Performance Objective 7D:  Train senior executives and key leaders.  This does not pertain 
to West Point.  Instruction provided for all key leaders (other than battalion/brigade 
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commanders) who are responsible for programs or involved in AT policy, planning, and 
execution. 
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Chapter 4 
U.S. Constitution and Ethical Issues: Homeland Security Management  
 
“I would rather be exposed to the inconveniences of too much liberty than to those 
attending too small a degree of it.” 
                                                                                                         Thomas Jefferson  
"The Constitution is the bedrock of all our freedoms; guard and cherish it; keep honor 
and order in your own house; and the republic will endure."   
                                                             President Gerald R. Ford   
Homeland Security: A Threat to Civil Liberties or an Instrument of National Security 
Terrorists have wreaked havoc on civilizations throughout time, but for many Americans 
the tragedy that happened on September 11, 2001 has been on all of our minds.   It was an act of 
hate that we are not going to forget anytime soon.  But through all the tragedy, we still stand 
strong as a nation. We are here to fight for what we believe in.  The acts on September 11th may 
have destroyed our buildings, but it did not destroy our spirit.  History has shown that American 
people, organizations, and facilities make lucrative targets for a terrorist or criminal attack.  The 
future predicts  little change.  Attacks on personnel and facilities by individuals and 
organizations operating outside the formal command and control structure of national 
governments have claimed many lives; the cost to the U.S. Government and private industry is 
measured in billions of dollars.   
A citizen of the United States has a reasonable belief that security will be provided for 
her or him by law enforcement officials.  Some of the laws enacted by the government are 
because of a certain threat or because there is reasonable belief that law enforcement officials are 
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in need of certain tools to maintain a particular level of security.  As new laws will be voted in to 
thwart activities in the ever-changing environment that the war on terrorism brings, a potential 
exists for some to feel that civil liberties will be infringed or taken away.  Others, after educating 
themselves about the new laws, will understand and support the government for the good of the 
country.  The people who occupy this great country are from the four corners of the earth and all 
points in between.  At what point should a government by the people decide that civil liberties 
are more important than the security of its people? 
The purpose of this Masters Project paper is to provide an overview of the constitutional 
amendments that apply to securing our nation.  There are a total of twenty-seven amendments to 
the Constitution.  In my opinion not all of the amendments are pertinent to the defense of the 
homeland. Amendments I through X are the Bill of rights.  This paper will address the 
amendments that I believe are relevant to the defense of our nation and could possibly be 
endangering our constitutional rights.  Additionally this paper will discuss the Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism, better known as the PATRIOT Act.  
The U.S. Constitution demonstrates that the founders were extremely concerned about  
the  government's ability to abuse its power and violate the liberties of the people  contained in 
the Bill of Rights, including the rights of an accused in criminal procedures.  Under what specific 
circumstances should terrorist suspects have the same constitutional rights that criminal suspects 
have in the criminal justice system?  
The Bill of Rights 
The Bill of Rights has become an extremely controversial topic since 9/11. The 
government‘s techniques of investigation, detainments, and prosecution in the name of national 
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security have been challenged and will continue to be, as America continues its attempt to find a 
balance between liberty and security.  Today America is faced with a challenging question: what 
is to be done about terrorism? There are no easy answers to this question. Specifically should 
terrorist suspects have the same constitutional rights that criminal suspects have in our  criminal 
justice system?  First and foremost, let us dispense with the notion that these terrorists deserve 
the rights that are protected by the Constitution.  As stated in the Preamble to the Constitution, 
said document was drawn up for the purpose of protecting the liberties of the citizens of the 
United States.  Nowhere do you see a clause protecting those who wish to do harm to our 
government or private citizens:  
We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union,  
establish  justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense,  
promote  the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and  
our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.  
                                                                      (Preamble to the Constitution) 
None of the subsequent articles or amendments makes any provisions for enemies of the 
United States except possibly for the Fifth Amendment which states the following: "No person 
shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or 
indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, 
when in actual service in time of war or public danger…" (Constitution) 
This paper will discuss each of the constitutional amendments that I believe are 
applicable to defending our great nation.  After 9/11 there was increased concern about the First 
Amendment and burning the flag or protesting.  Amendment I concerns the freedom of 
religion, speech, the press, and right of petition. I believe that in these times, the freedom of 
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speech needs to be viewed as an issue for defending our homeland.  On November 5, 2009 U.S. 
Army Major Nidal Malik Hasan killed 13 people and wounded 30 others at the Army base in 
Fort Hood, Texas. Soon after the attack, on his website Anwar al-Awlaki praised Hasan for the 
shooting, declared him a hero, and encouraged other Muslims serving in the military to "follow 
in the footsteps of men like Nidal‖ as well as "fighting against the U.S. army is an Islamic 
duty".  This is just one example where I don‘t believe the freedom of speech should be allowed.  
The U.S. government is currently working on a bill entitled the Cyber Security Act of 2009 
which would give the President unprecedented powers over the internet, including the ability to 
―shut down‖ portions of it when a cyber security emergency is declared.‖  The issue at hand is 
how we determine a cyber emergency and who should make that determination.  The president is 
elected by the people, for the people.  The president then makes choices to fill key positions 
within the federal government.  In this particular case the Director of National Security with 
various other agencies should determine what establishes a cyber emergency and make a strong 
recommendation to the president to shut down the internet.  Some would say this is totally 
against our constitutional rights; I would have to agree to an extent but the government does need 
a tool to curb the actions of individuals such as Julian Paul Assange of WikiLeaks.  Assange is 
nothing more than a web-type reporter looking for fame.  The individuals who provide the 
information are criminals acting against the United States (McDougall, P). Another issue is that 
the U.S. doesn‘t know the extent of the damage that has been caused by WikiLeaks, so the 
government should use extreme caution with this extraordinary power and not have an automatic 
reaction every time something is posted to the internet.  The bottom line in regards to the 
WikiLeaks issue is that the individuals who released the documents should be prosecuted to the 
fullest extent of the law.  The specialist, if convicted will be crucified; the military justice system 
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is much tougher than the civilian courts.  Unfortunately the civilian who leaked the documents 
from the State Department will only be prosecuted in federal court. 
The one area that I feel the government overstepped its boundaries was during the BP Oil 
crisis in the Gulf region.  They pledged to allow footage of the entire incident but would not 
allow cameras or reporters to film the actual devastation (Nimmo, K).  This is one instance 
where at the public has the right to know what‘s going on.  I am a true believer in the 
Constitution and upholding it, but there are some things that the citizens do not need to know 
about security. For example, in a Washington Post news story titled ―Electric Utilities May Be 
Vulnerable to Cyber Attack‖ by Ellen Nakashima and R. Jeffrey Smith in April 2009 discusses 
the vulnerabilities of the United States.  Numerous television news shows also feel obligated to 
announce to the world that we have vulnerabilities and often explain in detail how to exploit 
them.  In these cases the First Amendment should not be used as an excuse.  This type of 
reporting should not be allowed until such time as the issues were reported and addressed; if not 
addressed, then they can be reported.  The media is essential but should not be allowed to report 
or possibly be informed of an investigation until it is completed or an arrest has been made.  
Originally I would have said ―until tried and convicted or acquitted,‖ since reporting should be 
done after the arrest and investigation.  This does two things: first, it doesn‘t interfere with or 
follow the investigation and second, it provides some comfort to the citizens knowing we have 
the capability to capture the suspects.  
 The Fourth and Fifth Amendments are designed to protect citizens from unlawful 
practices from both law enforcement agencies and government harassment. Additionally, there 
have been recommendations for changes to the Constitution because the main concerns will 
always be generated over individual freedoms versus individual security.  But at the same time 
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we as Americans have and enjoy our freedoms and even if rules or laws are changed, how much 
will it truly affect our freedoms.  When the rest of the world sees free individuals, but mostly 
Americans, they already have pre-conceived images as the ones living up to the old Cold War 
stereotypes and so-called propaganda from the communist countries. Freedom has this affect of 
making you proud.  The American display of freedom can sometimes present an atmosphere that 
leaves something to be desired. The perception of others is that we are arrogant and are always 
right; we want to impose our will and opinions on others.  When you have freedom, you feel that 
this is your right and you can act this way, and if members of society do not like it, they can 
leave because I am free to do as I please.  However, sometimes these freedoms we hold so close 
are misinterpreted and twisted by certain individuals and end up working against us. These refer 
to the threatening individuals like Ted Kazinsky, Tim McVeigh, and Lee Malvo who are 
examples of irresponsible, insensitive behavior.  
 The Fourth Amendment states: ―The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized‖ (Cornell). 
The United States Government is working to prevent terrorist attacks from ever again 
recurring on American soil.  Airline security for the most part has tightened up 
tremendously.  There are new screening technologies that are making their way to airports, and 
security screeners question all suspicious people.   Most recently the use of full body scanners 
has been an issue of contention.  The executive director of the Association for Airline Passenger 
Rights (AAPR) states ―the enhanced full-body scanners and aggressive pat-downs, among other 
things, violate privacy rights protected by the U.S. Constitution‘s Fourth Amendment.‖  Macsata 
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further states the various civil liberties groups also feel this way. He also complains that the TSA 
chose to introduce the scanners during the busy holiday season.   What Macsata fails to mention 
is that past events have happened during the holiday season, for example the underwear bomber, 
Umar Farouk Abdul, and the attempt at the Portland holiday tree lighting by Mohamed Osman 
Mohamud to name a couple.  Additionally Mascara doesn‘t mention that flying on commercial 
aircrafts isn‘t necessarily a right afforded by the Constitution. It‘s a privilege and safety and 
security does matter for all those that are travelling on those aircraft.  
 The Fifth Amendment provides for due process under the law. It states that ―No person 
shall be held to answer for any capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or 
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, 
when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the 
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation‖  
(Cornell).  
On September 9, 2005, the Forth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the federal 
government‘s authority to detain an American citizen arrested within the United States 
indefinitely without charging him with a crime. All the president has to do is call a citizen an 
―enemy combatant‖ and the person‘s due process rights disappear.  Judge J. Michael Luttig 
wrote the Court‘s unanimous decision which contends that a post-9/11 Congressional resolution 
gave the president ―the power to detain identified and committed enemies such as Padilla, who 
associated with al Qaeda and the Taliban regime, who took up arms against this nation in its war 
against these enemies, and who entered the United States for the avowed purpose of further 
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prosecuting that war by attacking American citizens and targets on our own soil‖ (Gregory, A).  
Another example is the case of Hady Hassan Omar who was held without trial and placed in 
solitary confinement for 73 days.  For a long period after his arrest, he was not allowed access to 
an attorney. One of prison guards told him, "The Attorney General just signed a new law today. 
We can keep you here as long as we like." He was subjected to repeated interrogations. He 
threatened hunger strikes but was told by prison officials that they would just strap him to a 
gurney and force-feed him through a tube up his nose. After 73 days, he threatened suicide and 
finally officials decided that he was innocent and released him.   If an American citizen, whether 
born or naturalized, is suspected of terrorism, there should be a maximum amount of time that 
such a person can be held without having the representation of a lawyer; 30 days is long enough 
for the federal government to make a case, after such time a lawyer must be allowed. 
One of the reasons we are fighting the terrorists is to protect our way of life. This way of 
life includes our protection from our government and our rights to fair trials given to us by the 
Constitution.  In a way it is hypocritical of us to fight, so we maintain our freedoms while 
depriving other of those same freedoms.  Our country has not given many of our captured 
suspected terrorists a status to define how to deal with them.  By this I mean they are not 
prisoners of war because the Congressional Resolution after 9/11 was not a declaration of war. 
Therefore they are not given protection by the normal conventions and laws of war.  The laws 
governing due process do not apply to enemy combatants so they are not afforded Constitutional 
protections either (Gregory, A).  
 The Sixth Amendment concerns civil rights in trials for crimes enumerated. ―In all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury… and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted 
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with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor 
and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense‖ (Cornell).  
The reasons for holding these persons are the possibility they may have access to 
information to prevent attacks or may have been involved in an attack themselves. It is vital to 
our national security to obtain this information. The big issue in my opinion is how far we are 
willing to go to get it. The balance between liberty and security has to be maintained somehow. 
Our court system is not made to handle the issue of foreign terrorists and enemy combatants. A 
system independent of our court system, perhaps an international court, should be established to 
handle this issue.  For example, if a case involves people from different states, it is normally 
handled at a federal level. To apply this concept to this situation, an international court could 
handle the case between people from different nations.  
  Military tribunals or commissions have a unique process that most American citizens do 
not understand. They aren‘t military courts-martial nor are they civil law. Therein lies the 
problem; they have the ability to process detainees within unspecified or unclear parameters. The 
terrorists should be tried for their crimes but they do not meet the criteria set forth in the Bill of 
Rights and U.S. Constitution. Their status is unknown and indefinable to date. It was thought the 
PATRIOT Act was going to create a path to conviction and punishment of the terrorists and their 
co-conspirators, but as we have witnessed, several appeals have made their way through our 
court system. In addition, because of those appeals, President Bush, via the PATRIOT Act, lost 
several of his efforts to hold those responsible for their actions against Americans and our allies.  
An Oregon judge said this act gave too much power to the government when it came to 
―snooping on suspected criminals in the United States,‖ a violation of constitutional search-and-
seizure rules. That decision led to the following: ―A federal appeals court ruled that some 
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portions of the U.S. PATRIOT Act that govern dealings with foreign terrorist organizations are 
unconstitutional because the language is too vague to be understood by a person of ordinary 
intelligence‖ (Democratic Underground). The PATRIOT Act measures have good intentions and 
can sometimes get distorted.  Is there a danger that this act may be used against law abiding 
citizens as with any law or act? The answer is yes, but as anything that is created by people, it 
will not be perfect. 
 As stated by Bobby Chesney and Jack Goldsmith, Wake Forest and Harvard, 
respectively, ―Neither the criminal nor the military model of detention of terrorists can easily 
meet the central legal challenge of modern terrorism.‖ Criticism of the terrorists‘ due process is 
heard from both sides of the aisle and each has its merits whether we agree with them or not. 
Civil courts maintain the civil liberty protection of all within the United States and the military 
court-martial system serves the uniformed personnel. So how does law define the terrorists? 
Most are not citizens, they are not combatants in respect to our military definition, and the term 
―prisoner of war‖ does not apply to them either. In effect, terminology has foiled our attempts to 
try to convict them.  
  According to Matthew Purdy‘s article in the New York Post dated November 25, 2001, 
the inception of the military tribunals would ―promise to be swift and largely secret, the release 
of information likely to be limited to the barest facts, and the transcripts of the proceedings could 
be classified and kept from public view for years.‖ The tribunals would give authorities the 
ability to detain and prosecute people suspected of terrorism. It also needs to be noted when 
President Bush announced his new military law, he said he had ―strong public support‖ of the 
measure; his support has since eroded into a massive legal cluster of appeals. The erosion 
evolved because of the American dislike of what is seen as the basic human rights of law. Those 
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include the right to a jury trial and the protection of the attorney-client relationship and the 
lengthy detentions the legal hawks have called illegal. The measure of secrecy of the military 
tribunals has also added to increased questioning. 
 The Supreme Court is weighing the pluses and minuses of the tribunals. Do the terrorists 
have the right to a speedy trial without the lengthy detention as required by law or are the rules 
changed to suit the commissions? Tribunals are not required to adhere to the basic law of the US. 
Their evidentiary procedures are more lenient since hearsay and coerced testimony are 
admissible, and the defendant and his lawyers are not privy to the evidence. In addition, they are 
secretive, the jury consists of a majority of military officers, the convictions and sentences are 
meted with a ―majority-rule,‖ and the judgment cannot be appealed except by the President, who 
secured the tribunal in the first place. Those who reject the tribunal system insist the civil courts 
would provide a better trial venue for several reasons, one of which is the swiftness of a trial. 
The languishing of terrorists in a military system would be greatly diminished freeing them up 
for other duties; it is a fact that the civil courts have a better record of convictions than the 
tribunals.                  
 Perhaps one of the most startling deterioration of human rights is the right of the attorney 
general to decide who is deemed a terrorist and should be detained. Simply stating he has 
―reasonable grounds to believe‖ a person is or may be part of a terrorist group allows the U.S. to 
jail a person. This can and has raised a red flag as seen in the case of Murat Kurnaz who was 
held as an enemy combatant for five years. Both the U.S. and German investigators in the case 
found no evidence that he was involved in terrorist activities other than the claim by three 
military officers that they has supposedly confidential information claiming otherwise. After his 
files were leaked to the public, it was found there was no substantiating information and he was 
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released. Although this is one case, there since have been others released under the same 
precedent.  Does our government have the duty to ensure they are detaining the right people and 
to oversee the ―experts‖ who make the ―enemy noncombatant‖ determination?  The Global War 
on Terrorism opened numerous doors and unexplored areas that will not be answered for years.   
In 1787 the Constitution gave the president broad powers in times of war as commander-in-chief 
of the armed forces (Article II, Section 2). It also gave Congress the power to define and punish 
offenses against the law of nations (Article I, Section 8, Clause 10). ―The Congress shall have 
Power to…provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the United States…To 
constitute Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court.‖   Although there has been no formal 
declaration of war, this is the closest we have to making a determination on detainees.                   
 The result of the question of military tribunals versus civil liberties is that the United 
States must make sure the rules of engagement are the same for all concerned. Providing one 
government agency as the sole decision-maker is unwise.  Further, the concept of terrorism must 
be identify and quantified. There is not one definition for a terrorist.  The military, judicial 
system, the American public and others define it differently according to circumstances. One 
such definition is: ―A terrorist activity has been broadened to include any foreigner who uses 
‗dangerous devices‘ or raises money for a terrorist group, whether or not he or she knows the 
group is engaged in terrorism.‖ If true, then we need to use this to prosecute those under that 
definition. However, the Attorney General‘s office has added, for his use, ―If he, the attorney 
general, simply has ‗reasonable grounds to believe‘ that the person may be a threat, that person 
can be held indefinitely.‖ Given that, the definition of terrorist has changed significantly.  
  Whichever side one chooses to sit on, the rights of a terrorist is necessary if only to 
prevent those like Kurnaz from being mistreated and wrongly held. For those who fall into the 
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category of terrorist, let us prosecute them quickly and with a trial. The American public is not 
ignorant of what is going on in the world. They will make the correct choice in convicting those 
accused of the atrocities and it will take less time than the military tribunal. The choice is not an 
easy one, but it would alleviate the necessity of legal appeals and waiting for the Supreme Court 
to make a ruling.  
  Our country has not given many of our captured suspected terrorists a status to define 
how to deal with them. By this I mean they are not prisoners of war because the Congressional 
Resolution after 9/11 was not a declaration of war. As such they are not given protection by the 
normal conventions and laws of war. The laws governing due process do not apply to enemy 
combatants so they are not afforded constitutional protections either.    
At a minimum the terrorist should be afforded status other than "enemy combatant" so 
that either our due process or international conventions can apply to them.  Either makes them a 
prisoners of war (The War on Terror) or declares them a criminal and charges them with 
something.  To allow the government to take due process from one is the beginning of the 
proverbial "slippery slope" to taking liberties from all.  Our nation affords the same rights to 
anyone within its borders, even if they are not here legally.  If we give constitutional protection 
to people who are not citizens here, shouldn't we do so across the board? While the patriot in me 
says just let them rot, I think ultimately this is the most un-American thing we can do.  
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) 
Soon, if not already, history books and teachers will be teaching and enlightening people 
on the events that took place on that dark and dangerous day in September. But not only will the 
events of 9/11 be revealed, the acts and laws put into place in response will hopefully be 
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explained as well. One act in particular should be explained and understood by children and 
adults nationally, the USA PATRIOT Act. After 9/11 terrorist attacks, a new act was 
implemented to secure America and deter incidents alike. This act is referred to as the USA 
PATRIOT Act, but is defined as ―The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001‖ (Lithwick, D). Not 
only is this act allowing the government to tap into personal cell phones and information, it is 
blindsiding society into handing over their civil liberties with no real knowledge of what this act 
entails 
The PATRIOT Act introduced an excess of legislative changes which significantly 
increased the surveillance and investigative powers of law enforcement agencies in the United 
States‖ (2).  This organization goes on to state, ―that there is nothing to verify whether these new 
powers would be controlled; nobody is watching those who are watching us (USA PATRIOT 
Act).‖  Of the many discussions that could take place based on this type of thinking, there are 
three ideas that immediately come to mind.  The first is that there is no trust in law enforcement 
personnel to use these new powers judicially and that there is no system to prosecute those who 
abuse these powers.  The second thought is that we do not have a watchdog watching the 
watchdog; at what point or layer of watchdogs do we feel our civil liberties will be protected? 
Finally, who is to decide what level or layer of people watching people will suffice and will they 
be knowledgeable in counter/anti-terrorism? 
Currently, there are several cases before the courts throughout the nation whereby law 
enforcement officials who have misused their new authority are being tried.  It is tragic when an 
official exercises poor judgment, but justice is eventually served.  Not all officials who break the 
law get caught; they never did before the PATRIOT Act was passed.  No system is perfect and 
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law enforcement officials continue to refine the best there is to offer.  Who will watch these law 
enforcement officials who, as implied by Epic.org, now have all of these new powers to watch 
every move we make?  Without being sarcastic, is this really what Americans think is 
happening?  Is half of our country now working for the government as agents?  The answer is no.  
It is rather amazing that anyone, let alone an organization that has its roots in America, could 
honestly believe that our law enforcement personnel are free to do with the law as they wish.  As 
stated, some misuse their powers and when caught are brought to serve justice.  Reading the 
newspaper and watching the news does not make a person an expert on terrorism.  The critical 
issue here is at what point those, who know very little about the capabilities and limitations of 
law enforcement and terrorism, will cease to inject themselves into the subject.  The waste of 
manpower and resources defending what is essential for the good of the people is a crime in 
itself.  There is no problem questioning what the government does; however, there are groups 
who no matter what the answer is will not accept the truth.   
Small town America does not understand that the FBI is not looking to find out what 
books a teenager checked out, unless of course the books are all about bomb making.  Why not 
question why there are books like these in the first place?  Once again we would be impinging on 
one right or another.  Law enforcement agencies are not tracking everything a person buys, 
unless a person is buying an unusual amount of manure or the components to make a pipe bomb 
and have checked out the how-to-books.  It is unlikely that cameras will line every street and the 
government will track peoples every move.  Helicopters are not flying all over the country 
snatching innocent people up because these people are committing innocent acts.  There is a 
thought throughout the land that it is nobody‘s business what one does.  Knowing that a neighbor 
is about to commit an atrocity against society is the business of law enforcement and concerned 
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citizens.  It took an attack on a very large scale to open some eyes.  The attack in 1993 was not 
enough to get all of America concerned.  There was no need to legislate any new tools for law 
enforcement because of a disgruntled Muslim cleric.  America has begun to see that Islamic 
terrorist do in fact reside in the United States of America. 
Understanding terrorism and crime is the first step for those who feel our civil liberties 
are being stripped away.  The Electronic Privacy Information Center and other groups are using 
civil liberties to scare the average American into believing the government already has or is 
seeking additional powers to watch and track their lives.  When these groups understand the 
threat and what America can and cannot do to protect itself is when they will most likely win 
more advocates.  Informing the public is quite different from scaring the public.  The 
government has an obligation to protect Americans and preempt attacks if possible.  The average 
American will have to decide if the government knowing what book they checked out is more 
important than when and where the next terrorist attack on American soil will take place. 
A majority of Americans may have gotten their first taste of terrorism on September 11, 
2001, but citizens of the world know that terrorism did not begin on that dreadful day in 
American history.  Sadly terrorism has a very well known and extensive history that has been 
documented around the world. Terrorism has been in existence longer than the Constitution of 
the United States.  The Bill of Rights has become an extremely controversial topic since 9/11. 
The government techniques of investigation, detainments, and prosecution in the name of 
national security have been challenged and will continue to be, as America continues its attempt 
to find a balance between liberty and security. The PATRIOT Act is an effective instrument of 
counterterrorism but the controversy surrounding its use, and misuse, warrants an investigation 
into alternative security measures. There are a variety of potential scenarios that could unfold 
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following the removal of the PATRIOT Act from counterterrorism‘s arsenal. Fortunately, the 
most likely future involves both the U.S. and our allies increasing their level of inter-continental 
cooperation and involvement when developing new counterterrorism security policies. Research 
has demonstrated that national security involves the following:  ―A successful global strategy 
against terrorism requires stability and the continuity of cooperative efforts that are bilateral, 
regional, and multilateral‖ (Narasimha, R). As former British Prime Minister Tony Blair said in 
response to the attacks on the U.S. on September 11, 2001, ―This is not a battle between the 
United States of America and terrorism, but between the free and democratic world and 
terrorism‖ (Blair). With global cooperation and effort, terrorism can be effectively controlled 
without violating the civil rights it threatens to destroy.  If we as Americans choose to violate our 
founding principles, we are no better than the terrorists and the methods they use.  Our founding 
fathers were considered treasonous and terrorists of their time. However, they believed in due 
process and life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.    
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Chapter 5 
Public Sector Policy Analysis 
“True genius resides in the capacity for evaluation of uncertain, hazardous, and 
conflicting information”.  
                                                                                                   Winston Churchill  
“However beautiful the strategy, you should occasionally look at the results.” 
                                                                                                   Winston Churchill 
 “A Continuity of Operations Plan is essential for any business or government agency 
trying to sustain itself in the face of what seems to be an ever-present cycle of disaster.” 
                                                                                                         Amy Fadida       
 Richard Krueger states an evaluation story is a brief narrative account of someone‘s 
experience with a program, event, or activity that is collected using sound research methods.‖  I 
was surprised not to find many stories relating to the failures during Hurricane Katrina; however 
I found one that I believe captures the importance of a COOP plan.  The following is a true 
account of man from Louisiana.  Due to the length of the original story I have determined the 
length of the story would have distracted the readers and chose to edit it while retaining the most 
significant sections that summarize the results of a lack of an effective COOP plan.  
The Experience 
 ―I was concerned for my property. I didn‘t have time to get my important personal and 
valuable possessions out of my home and there were many reports of people breaking into 
homes.  I saw no law enforcement in the 3 days I was there, or when I returned a few days later. 
I was appalled when I found out I could not re-enter the city after I had endured the storm and 
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the first 3 days. I had gas and food but had to leave to look for my mother whom I hadn't heard 
from. Since phone lines were non-existent, I needed to drive to find her. I later found that she 
was safe. I spoke with many others in Baton Rouge who felt the same way.  Luckily for me, I 
had friends who were nice enough to help, but most were not so fortunate.  Since I saw no law 
enforcement while in the city, I was wondering where the thousands of military and national 
guard were and why they were brought in. It would seem to make much more sense to let people 
in to secure their own property than to send military in. 
 The power went out during the storm, and then the water came. It would take at least a 
day before it flooded my home.  For the first few hours, the water stayed at the sidewalk area, but 
then started to rise.  Radio reports informed me that the people who manned the generators and 
pumps were evacuated.  They had to be flown back in to get to the pumps. I have never heard of 
this happening before.  Some emergency personnel had volunteered to work the pumps but were 
refused because they were not certified. 
 Thousands of military people consumed resources like food, water and electricity that 
could have been used by residents. I will refer to police and others and emergency services from 
here on.  Emergency services commandeered food, electricity, diesel, and anything they wanted, 
from wherever they wanted; there was no ability to say "NO," If they wanted it, they took it; they 
had machine guns. All emergency services took their orders from DHS (Department of 
Homeland Security). I had a police scanner during the disaster and heard state police say they 
were treated like "step-children," and that they were to provide security for FEMA, which then 
was not needed. I have gone through several large storms when local police, fire departments, 
hospitals and others have worked together on hurricanes, and these people know how to work 
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together and know the area. There is now an "extra step," Homeland Security, and FEMA whom 
local have to take their directions from‖ (Brad). 
 
Evaluating Continuity of Operations: Maintaining a National Continuity Capability at the 
State and Local Government Level 
Introduction 
This paper provides an examination into the use of a wide-ranging evaluation system in 
state and local emergency preparedness and response plans, specifically Continuity of Operations 
Plans (COOP).  This chapter of the Masters Project describes the mixed methods approach that  
should be utilized. The original proposed memorandum strategy was ―Continuity of Operations: 
planning to ensure an all hazards mission response capability and continuation of essential 
functions and services.‖    The majority of COOP plans are enormous and to attempt to evaluate 
all sections of any COOP Plan in this project would be nearly impossible.  The Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) has an abundant information about ―All Hazards‖ that the United 
States faces on a constant basis.  The intent of this Masters Project is to introduce various 
methods to evaluate a state or local government COOP plans.  Currently there is no mechanism 
or mandate in place to ensure state and local governments are prepared in the event of a natural 
disaster or a terrorist threat.  COOP plans detail essential capabilities required to support 
functional areas, address circumstances that may cause a loss of essential capabilities, and assist 
leaders and staffs to plan for contingencies to maintain recovery mission essential functions and 
capabilities (HSPD-9).  An alternative for disconnected or interrupted services begins with an 
effective Continuity of Operations (COOP) plan which includes provisions for Disaster 
Recovery.  Utilizing comprehensive evaluations greatly reduces the overall impact of a disaster 
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by reducing the risks often associated with the most exposed populations and alleviating the 
fallout after a disaster strikes. 
Stakeholders 
Performance measurement systems succeed when the organization‘s strategy and 
performance measures are in alignment and when senior managers convey the organization‘s 
mission, vision, values and strategic direction to employees and external stakeholders. The 
performance measures give life to the mission, vision, and strategy by providing a focus that lets 
employees know how they contribute to the success of the company and its stakeholders‘ 
measurable expectations. Stakeholder is defined as ―individuals, groups, or organizations that 
can affect or are affected by an evaluation process or its findings‖ (Wholey, J).   Community 
stakeholder groups can be divided into three different categories: social groups, economic 
groups, and political groups. In turn, each of these groups can be characterized by its horizontal 
and vertical associations. 
Social groups are private sector groups such as religious organizations and other 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), nonprofit organizations (NPOs), community based 
organizations (CBOs), and businesses. All of these groups vary in size, level of organizational 
complexity, and resources available.  All are potential allies in preparing emergency 
management practices and policies (FEMA -S).  
Economic groups are businesses that are the fundamental units in the hierarchy of 
economic stakeholders. Businesses are important stakeholders because they are part of the 
societal institution that organizes the flow of goods and services. Destruction, damage, and 
interruption of business activities can have significant adverse effects on the local economy and 
possibly on a larger scale in smaller counties.  An especially important type of business that is a 
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stakeholder in emergency management is the public utility provider. These include the providers 
of electricity, water, sewer services, solid waste management, and communications such as 
telephone, television, and Internet access. They are responsible for rapid restoration of basic 
services to all their customers (FEMA -S).   
Political groups are various types of governmental stakeholders.  Beginning at the base,  
the lowest level of organization is  the municipality (town or city) and just above this, the county. 
These jurisdictions have different levels of power from one state to another because states differ 
in the powers that they grant to their political subdivisions.  Different governmental levels 
perform equivalent and matching roles, but agencies within each level of government differ in 
their functions. For example, at the local level of government, the agencies most involved with 
emergency management are the fire and police departments, which are the first agencies to 
respond to most emergencies.  In many jurisdictions, the emergency management function is 
attached to one of these departments, but in larger communities it frequently is an independent 
agency. In some communities there is a separate emergency medical services agency, but often 
this function is provided by the fire department working together with local hospitals and 
ambulance companies (FEMA -S).  
The most important stakeholders are the state emergency management agencies, which 
vary widely in their levels of expertise, staffing, budgets, and other organizational resources. 
Nonetheless, these are the agencies that provide the major direction for local emergency 
managers, interact with state legislatures to provide the legal framework within which local 
emergency managers work, and serve to link local governments with FEMA regional offices 
(Chapter 2). 
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Discussion 
Evaluations determine a program's effectiveness in meeting its intended purpose and 
producing competent employees.  Evaluation is the quality assurance component of a systematic 
approach to any program. This paper provides information on evaluation instruments used to 
gather employee, supervisor, and instructor feedback to identify strengths and weaknesses of 
training programs at the state and local government levels. It should be used in conjunction with 
an organization Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP).   In 2003 Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive-8: National Preparedness called for establishing a system that would 
assess the nation‘s overall preparedness and provide an annual status report of national 
preparedness. Three years later, the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act 
(PKEMRA) included requirements to establish a ―comprehensive system to assess, on an 
ongoing basis, the nation‘s prevention capabilities and overall preparedness‖ (HSPD-8).  
The key to conducting an effective evaluation is to first identify the questions to be 
answered by the evaluation.  Should the program be modified? What performance gains are 
being realized? Is the need for training being addressed in the best way possible? The purposes 
of an evaluation include the following (Wholey, J): 
- To determine if a program is accomplishing its objectives. 
- To identify the strengths and weaknesses of a particular program. 
- To identify which programs benefitted the most, or the least, from a training 
                         program. 
- To determine if a program was appropriate for its intended purpose and target  
                         population. 
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In the event of a threat to a state or local jurisdiction, emergency management 
organizations will need to continue uninterrupted essential component functions across a wide 
range of potential emergencies including localized acts of nature, accidents and technological 
and/or attack-related emergencies. Each organization or agency will need to prepare a COOP for 
actions to be taken by all of its government employees (police, public works, emergency services 
etc.), civilian employees (secretaries, dispatchers, hospital staff etc.) and the civilian population, 
should an emergency happen which would eventually cause a governmental organization to 
declare a COOP event.  COOP spans three phases: 
Phase 1: Activation and relocation (response 0-12 hours).  This phase starts at the onset 
of an unannounced COOP event or when formal declaration is made of an impending COOP 
event. The COOP must be executable with or without prior notice and during all hours (COOP 
Training).  Actions in this phase include but are not limited to the following:  
- Activation of alert and notification procedures 
- Deployment and emergency relocation facility (ERF) activation 
- Reception, coordination, and establishment or transfer of command and control  
- Personnel accountability 
- Initiation of procedures and schedules to transfer MEFs, personnel, records, and  
equipment to an ERF or alternate office, building, space or area 
Phase 2: Alternate operating facility (recovery). This phase enables the relocating staff to 
assume and commence MEF from the ERF. Priority is given to executing MEF, continuing C3I, 
logistics support, maintenance and restoration of law and order, command, control and 
communications, damage/residual resource assessment and reporting (COOP Training). 
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Phase 3: Reconstitution (termination and return to normal operations). Reconstitution 
actions focus on restoration of command staffs, capabilities, and functions.  This includes: 
restoring essential C4I; restoring or maintaining communications with higher, lower, and other 
headquarters or agencies, as required; restoring all organizational capabilities and functions; 
reconstituting the organization (COOP Training). 
COOP plans must identify which normal non-crisis missions and functions are  
performed in an emergency and prioritize them for a specific contingency, as shown below: 
COOP Emergency Level 1: Portion of organization/agency business functions affected. 
The primary facility is operational, but normal business operations are suspended in a room, 
floor, level or section due to fire, explosion, water or other damage. 
COOP Emergency Level 2: Organization/agency business functions affected. The 
primary facility is closed for normal business activities but the cause of the disruption has not 
affected surrounding buildings, utilities, or transportation systems. 
COOP Emergency Level 3: Organization/agency business functions and surrounding area 
affected. The primary facility and surrounding buildings/area are closed to normal business 
activities. 
COOP Emergency Level 4: Installation area affected. The installation is closed to normal 
business activities as a result of a natural disaster or of an actual or threatened terrorist attack 
using weapons of mass destruction. 
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The identification and prioritization of MEFs is the foundation of a valid continuity plan.   
An accurate assessment of essential functions will allow the most efficient use of available 
personnel and equipment during a crisis. It also allows for streamlining of support services 
required by priority tasks of MEFs (FEMA).  
- Priority A - Must continue without interruption and directly support the priority 
            missions of the HHQ and the organization‘s own MEFs. 
- Priority B - An organization can defer no longer than 48 hours from ―N‖ time. 
- Priority C - An agency can defer for no longer than 7 days from ―N‖ time. 
- Priority D - May be deferred until the event is over and normal operations are  
            restored. 
It is impossible to plan properly for a disaster if the likely impacts of various disruptions 
on an organization, staff section or activity are unknown. Assessing the impact of an event 
includes estimating not only the quantitative or economic losses but also the qualitative impact 
on the organization, staff section or activities ability to operate.  Three documents can and will 
assist in preparing  plans.  
Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 (HSPD-5) is a Presidential directive issued 
February 28, 2003 on the subject of ―Management of Domestic Incidents.‖  The purpose is to 
―enhance the ability of the United States to manage domestic incidents by establishing a single, 
comprehensive national incident management system.‖
 
 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8 (HSPD-8) is a Presidential directive issued 
December 17, 2003 on the subject of ―National Preparedness.‖  The purpose is to establish 
―policies to strengthen the preparedness of the United States to prevent and respond to threatened 
or actual domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies by requiring a 
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national domestic all-hazards preparedness goal, establishing mechanisms for improved delivery 
of federal preparedness assistance to state and local governments, and outlining actions to 
strengthen preparedness capabilities of federal, state, and local entities.‖ 
Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) is a doctrine and policy 
provided by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security for exercise design, development, 
conduct and evaluation.  The terminology and descriptions related to exercises in this document 
are a homeland security industry application of emergency management concepts and principles.  
To begin the process of identifying functions within an organization, first the areas of 
responsibility need to be identified using  the mission statement, values, goals and objectives of 
the organization, and a brief review of operating procedures, rulebooks and legal authorities. 
Areas of Responsibility Worksheet 
 
Number Areas of Responsibility 
    1  
    2  
Example Processing personnel records 
 
For each area of responsibility identified, name the functions performed and provide a brief 
description of the activities typically completed in the identified function. COOP planners should 
collaborate with individuals from each division or branch of the organization to ask about the 
functions they and their coworkers perform on a day-to-day basis. 
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Functions Performed by 
Areas of Responsibility 
Worksheet Number 
Functions 
Performed 
Brief Description Essential?  
    Y/N 
    1    
Example  Update personnel 
records 
Personnel update records daily, assisting 
10-12 customers per day 
Yes 
 
Identify Mission Essential Functions (MEF). Senior management and the organization‘s COOP 
planner should determine the criteria for selecting MEFs. For example, if other organizations are 
dependent on a particular function to continue their operations, then the function is probably an 
essential function.   Based on the pre-determined criteria, the COOP planner should go back to 
the previous list and for each of the functions listed under the various areas of responsibility 
indicate which ones are considered essential (HSEEP). 
Test, Training, and Exercises. TT&E involving COOP capabilities are essential to assessing, 
demonstrating and improving the ability of an organization to execute their COOP plans and 
programs. Tests and exercises serve to validate or identify for subsequent corrective action, 
specific aspects of COOP plans, policies, procedures, systems, and facilities used in response to 
an emergency situation. Training familiarizes COOP personnel with the procedures and tasks 
they must perform in executing COOP plans. In all categories, ask a variety of questions, 
including such things as: vendor and partner agency agreements or relationships; software and 
supplies/equipment issues; workstation needs; vital records and documents required; and 
communications with organization and critical customers (COOP Training). 
Testing and Exercises  
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In order to develop an effective emergency management system, local emergency managers must 
involve the relevant stakeholders in the process which requires coordinating the various groups 
as emergency operations and recovery operations plans are drawn up and exercised, as well as 
during an event.  There are a wide variety of tools that can be used to evaluate an organization‘s 
COOP plan (COOP Training/HSEEP).    
       Assessments: In the training context, assessment is the leader‘s judgment of the 
organization‘s ability to perform its mission-essential tasks and, ultimately, its ability to 
accomplish its doctrinal or directed mission.  Leaders and managers are responsible for assessing 
the performance and the training of soldiers two echelons below their unit.  Within these 
echelons, subordinate leaders‘ evaluations are the basis for a manager‘s assessment of his/her 
organization. 
Evaluations:  
 Evaluation is the process used to measure the demonstrated ability of individuals and units to 
accomplish their commander‘s specified training objectives.  Training evaluations that are 
executed will provide senior leadership/managers with feedback on the demonstrated proficiency 
of individuals, staffs, and subordinate agencies against the mission essential functions  and 
training objective tasks, conditions, and standards.  State and local governments at this time are 
not required; however they should use the following evaluation standards to assess their units 
(Wholey, FEMA):   
- Informal Evaluations - AARs/critiques conducted quickly after training 
- Formal Evaluations - Dedicated evaluators and scheduled in training plans 
- Internal Evaluations - Conducted by the organization undergoing training 
- External Evaluations - Planned, resourced, and performed by higher agencies (SEMO,  
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            FEMA, etc.) coordinated with partners outside the normal chain of command. 
     After Action Review:  The after action review is a method of providing feedback to the 
organization by involving participants in the training diagnostic process in order to increase and 
reinforce learning.  AARs are conducted during training as well as at the end of training events 
or during recovery.  Leaders use formal or informal After Action Reviews (AAR) to provide 
feedback on all training.  Retraining activities or retraining plans are discussed in all formal 
AARs (FEMA). 
Tests are conducted to evaluate capabilities, not personnel. By testing, organizations can 
tell if the policies and procedures work, as they should, when they should. Testing results should 
be published and identified gaps should be actively tracked and managed. Testing is critical for: 
alert, notification and activation procedures; communications systems; vital records and 
databases; information technology systems; and reconstitution procedures (COOP Training). 
The primary purpose of an exercise is to identify areas that require additional training, 
planning or other resources. Exercise results should be published and identified gaps should be 
actively tracked and managed. The goals of a COOP exercise are to discover planning 
weaknesses; reveal resource gaps; improve coordination; practice using the communication 
network; clarify roles and responsibilities; improve individual performance; improve readiness 
for a real incident. After personnel are trained, the COOP plan can be tested through one of three 
types of exercises: tabletop, functional and full-scale (COOP Training). 
Tabletop exercises are a simulation activity in which a scenario is presented and 
participants in the exercise respond as if the scenario was really happening. New information is 
presented as the situation unfolds, making the participants reconsider their previous decisions 
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and plan their next actions based on the new information. Typically, a tabletop exercise takes 
about 2 hours, including the post exercise debriefing (Unit 5).  
Functional exercises test a part of COOP activation to be tested independently of other 
responders. This includes testing communications capabilities and equipment; primary and 
backup infrastructure systems and services (i.e. emergency power generators); andrRecovery of 
records, critical information systems, services, and data (Unit 6). 
             Full Scale exercises (FSE) are exercises as close to reality as possible, testing the 
organization‘s total response capability for COOP situations, with personnel being deployed and 
systems and equipment being tested (Unit 7).  Making the COOP Program an externally 
inspected program will help convey its importance to senior managers and leadership.   The best 
way to highlight program/project "importance" is to make it one that is inspected and 
REPORTED by an external agency to the organization‘s leaders.  From that perspective,  senior 
leadership needs to make it an inspection type program with a formal grading system  (GO/NO 
GO, Pass/Fail, etc.) with a similar methodology down through subordinate organizational 
structures. 
The following is an example and describes the evaluation criteria for the contingency 
plan and test methods (FEMA): 
(1) Review plans and procedures for the periodic test of the contingency plan. 
(2) Review documentation detailing with when and how the contingency plan has been executed. 
(3) Review emergency response procedures. 
(4) Verify emergency workload priorities. A list of priority work should be established so that 
important work continues to be done if possible. 
(5) Review alternate procedures for processing priority work. 
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(6) Use alternate procedures to ensure that priority workloads could be satisfied. 
(7) Conduct an emergency response drill. 
(8) Ensure that the contingency plan contains a valid and current (within 12 months) MOA with 
a contingency plan site. 
(9) Verify contingency plan site hardware/software compatibility. 
(10) Verify list of required personnel for deployment to the alternate site. 
(11) Ensure adequate facilities and services are available for personnel while operating at the 
contingency plan site. 
(12) Ensure adequate vehicles have been identified and are operational, should the need for 
deployment arise. 
(13) Verify communications arrangements for deployment to the contingency plan site. 
(14) Maintain inventory supplies. 
(15) Ensure the contingency plan describes policies and procedures to maintain supplies at the 
alternate site of operations. 
(16) Review procedures for maintenance of backup materials. 
(17) Maintain inventory backup materials. 
(18) Execute the contingency plan. 
(19) Review recovery plans. 
The charts below are one example of an evaluation process or method for evaluating an 
organization‘s COOP plan.  Each evaluation will be unique to an agency depending on what the 
goal of the assessment is designed for (HSEEP/FEMA). 
1 Establishment of a COOP  
Rating Item/Description Comments 
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Y  N Is a COOP (primary and alternate) POC designated?  
Y  N Does higher headquarters maintain a roster of their subordinate echelon 
COOP (alternate and primary) POCs? 
 
Y  N Has higher headquarters published a COOP plan?  
Y  N Does the higher headquarters maintain copies of their subordinate echelon 
COOP plan? 
 
Y  N Has the COOP plan been reviewed annually?  
Y  N Have COOP POCs received training on COOP program responsibilities?  
 
 
2. Identification and prioritization of MEFs 
Rating Item/Description Comments 
Y  N Have MEFs been identified and prioritized by the organization‘s 
leadership? 
 
Y  N Do subordinate organizations with MEFs develop and maintain their own 
supporting COOP plans? 
 
Y  N Have MEFs that are required by contract been identified?  
Y  N Are procedures established for the improvisation or emergency acquisition 
of necessary resources? 
 
Y  N Is there a roster of personnel, by position, needed to perform MEFs?  
Y  N Have MEFs been identified that can be performed from home or other 
locations, if necessary? 
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3.  Response Planning 
Rating Item/Description Comments 
Y  N Does the plan take into account all threats that personnel, the mission, and 
COOP are likely to face? 
 
Y  N Does the COOP maintain compatibility with HHQ plans?  
Y  N Does the COOP plan establish the capability to shelter-in-place essential 
personnel? 
 
Y  N Does the COOP plan establish procedures governing succession to office?  
Y  N Does the COOP plan establish emergency delegations of authority?  
Y  N Does the COOP plan establish procedures for the devolution of command 
and control? 
 
Y  N Does the COOP plan establish procedures for the safekeeping of vital 
resources, facilities, and records? 
 
Y  N Does the COOP plan address contingency procurement/contracting 
requirements and procedures during a COOP event? 
 
Y  N Are provisions for redundant communications included in the COOP plan?  
Y  N Are COOP plans reviewed, updated, and validated every 2 years and a 
copy provided to higher headquarters? 
 
 
4.  Emergency Relocation Facilities (ERF) Planning 
Rating Item/Description Comments 
Y  N Has the organization identified the capabilities that are required at the  
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ERF/AH to perform MEFs? 
Y  N Have COOP emergency files, vital records, materials, and databases 
required to execute MEFs at the ERF/AH been identified and provisions 
for transporting these items to these locations been made?  
 
Y  N Are inter-service support agreements, MOUs, MOAs, regarding COOP 
ERF requirements established? 
 
 
5.  Assessment of Plans 
Rating Item/Description Comments 
Y  N Are there annual testing, training and exercising of COOP capabilities?  
Y  N Do COOP exercises include weapons of mass destruction and mass 
casualty contingencies? 
 
Y  N Are there quarterly tests of COOP alerts, notification and activation 
procedures? 
 
Y  N Are annual COOP awareness briefings being conducted for all personnel?  
Y  N Is there a COOP training program for personnel?   
Y  N Are exercise lessons-learned/after-action reviews being used to correct 
deficiencies in COOP plans? 
 
 
6.  COOP Awareness 
Rating Item/Description Comments 
Y  N Is COOP information being disseminated through multiple means?  
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Y  N Are key leaders and personnel with COOP duties trained in their COOP 
responsibilities? 
 
Y  N Does COOP awareness training incorporate the postulated threats?  
Y  N Are there COOP training materials readily available for all personnel?  
 
Conclusion  
 The Continuity of Operations (COOP) Program insures that the capability exists to 
continue organization mission essential functions (MEFs) under all circumstances including 
crisis, attack, recovery, and reconstitution across a wide range of potential emergencies. This 
includes all planning and preparatory measures, alert and notification actions, response actions, 
and restoration activities for all hazards, including acts of nature, natural disasters, accidents, and 
technological and/or attack-related emergencies.  It‘s important to state that before any plan is 
exercised or evaluated, personnel must be trained so that they know what their responsibilities 
are and have the skills and knowledge necessary to carry out their tasks. Training encompasses a 
range of activities, each intended to provide information and refine skills. Basic orientations are 
usually the first type of training conducted for new employees. They are typically presented as 
briefings. Orientations are a good way to introduce the general concepts of the COOP plan as 
well as announcing to the staff their assignments, roles and responsibilities and describing how 
the COOP plan will be tested and exercised.  
Evaluations are conducted to evaluate capabilities, not personnel.  By testing, 
organizations we can tell if the policies and procedures work as they should, when they should. 
Testing results should be published and identified weaknesses should be aggressively tracked 
and managed. 
CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS          108 
 
References 
Brad.  Retrieved from http://911review.org/Hurricane_Katrina/.  Accessed 25 April 2011 
FEMA, Emergency Management Institute.  Retrieved from  
            http://training.fema.gov/IS/crslist.asp.  
Chapter 2. Retrieved from http://archone.tamu.edu/hrrc/Publications  
 /books/FEMA_book/FEMA_book_in_PDF/FEMACh_2EMStakeholders.pdf   
COOP Training: Course Map. Retrieved from http://www.fema.gov/government 
           /coop/index.shtm .   
FEMA –S. Stakeholders Retrieved from training.fema.gov/.../Chapter%202%20-     
            %20Emergency%20Stakeholders.doc   
(HSEEP), FEMA, Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program.  Retrieved from  
 https://hseep.dhs.gov/pages/1001_HSEEP7.aspx.  
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD–5), Retrieved from  
 http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0105.shtm.  Accessed 3 May 2011  
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD–8), National Preparedness.  Retrieved from 
 http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/laws/gc_1215444247124.shtm.   
Homeland Security and Technology Division Planning for Government Continuity November,  
2003.  Retrieved from http://www.nga.org/cda/files/1103CONTINUITY.pdf.    
Unit 5: The Tabletop Exercise.  Retrieved from http://www.acp-wa-state.org/meetingsdoc  
/october2007/03%20Tabletop%20Exercise%20 Guidelines%20-20FEMA%20Example  
.pdf.  
Unit 6: The Functional Exercise training.  Retrieved from  
 fema.gov/EMIweb/downloads/is139Unit6.doc    
CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS          109 
 
Unit 7: The Full-Scale Exercise Retrieved from  
 training.fema.gov/emiweb/downloads/is139Unit7.doc.   
Wholey, Joseph S., Harry P. Hatry, and Kathryn  E. Newcomer.  Handbook of Practical Program  
Evaluation, San Francisco, CA: John Wiley & Sons, 2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS          110 
 
Chapter 6 
Lessons Learned from Comparable Government Perspectives 
Kenya Foreign Travel Strategic Plan 
 
Foreword 
 Millions of U.S. citizens travel abroad each year and use their U.S. passports.   When you 
travel abroad, the odds are in your favor that you will have a safe and incident-free trip.   Even if 
you do come into difficulty abroad, you are unlikely to be a victim of crime or violence.  Crime 
and violence, as well as unexpected difficulties, do befall U.S. citizens in all parts of the 
world.   No one is better able to tell you this than U.S. consular officers who work in the more 
than 250 U.S. embassies and consulates around the world. Every day of the year they receive 
calls from American citizens in distress.  Problems while aboard can range from such issues as 
arrests, hospitalization and loss of passport.  In these circumstances it is in your best interest as 
well as our organization‘s interest to call the nearest U.S. Embassy or Consul for assistance. 
 The terrorist threat shows no sign of abatement.  There remain those whose single-
minded goal is to attack American interests and destroy our cherished freedoms.  This strategic 
plan will be an integral part of a larger effort whose purpose remains unchanged: to protect our 
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people, while maintaining our ability to accomplish the mission.  The threat of terrorism will 
remain and continue to evolve.  A fundamental objective and primary challenge of our protection 
program is to continuously improve and adjust to the changing environment that drives the 
terrorism.  
 This strategic plan is provided to ensure that all personnel (executive, staff, and families) 
are briefed concerning threats and informed of individual protective measures prior to initiation 
of travel outside of the continental United States or its territories or possessions while either in 
the performance of their duties or on vacation. All department heads and leadership activities 
will ensure their staff, faculty, contractors, and family members who plan to visit other countries 
either while on leave or as part of their duties must coordinate with the company‘s Security 
Division to schedule briefs for the countries they plan to visit.  As part of this coordination, 
individuals are required to complete a foreign travel form listing destinations and points of 
contact while in that country.  
Strategic Plan Overview 
1.  Purpose/mandate.  This Strategic Plan, issued in compliance with the United States 
Military Academy at West Point‘s overall Strategic Plan, will guide the foreign travel program 
by articulating the Department of  Defense goals and performance objectives, and  provide a 
structure to implement and measures to keep personnel safe (Bryson 226). 
 2.  Background.   The United States Military Academy at West Point has personnel 
deployed to all regions of the world for various reasons.  The terrorist threat shows no sign of 
abatement.  There remain those whose single-minded goal is to attack American interests and 
destroy our cherished freedoms.   This plan is a collective, proactive effort focused on the 
prevention and detection of terrorist attacks against personnel and their families, facilities, and 
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infrastructures critical to our mission accomplishment.  It focuses on the personal protective 
measures and preparation required to defend against and respond to terrorist incidents.   
3.  AT vision.  West Point accepts as a reality the intent of those that would use terrorism 
as a tool to destroy people, disrupt our mission, and distract us from our responsibilities.  West 
Point acknowledges that it is a symbol of the nation.  As such, our facilities, employees and 
family members in particular, present a target for terrorists.  West Point will protect the West 
Point family and its staff and faculty and provide training to operate in an environment where the 
potential for terrorism exists (Bryson 226). 
4.  AT mission.  West Point conducts security and education operations to protect the 
personnel, their families and facilities by deterring, denying and defending against terrorist 
attacks.  It implements contingency plans to mitigate or respond to criminal or terrorist activities 
directed against personnel or property on West Point (Bryson 113). 
5.  Intent. Prior to departure provide a comprehensive review of Nairobi, Kenya,  
information and personal protection measures. Integrate actions designed to prevent terrorist 
attacks. 
6.  Concept/mandate.  Focus on supporting goals and objectives of the West Point 
Security program to facilitate progress toward achieving the stated vision and satisfying the 
intent of reducing vulnerabilities to terrorist acts.   
Strategic Goals 
This section describes the strategic goals.  
  a. All military and DOD civilians will receive annual AT awareness training. Personnel 
traveling outside the U.S., its territories and possessions (on leave, pass or temporary duty) will 
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receive an AOR update within two months of travel and must have received annual AT 
awareness training within 12 months of travel.  
b. All military and DoD civilian family members 14 years or older must receive AT 
awareness training within 12 months of travel, on official government orders, outside the United 
States, its territories, and possessions and permanent change of station OCONUS travel. Failure 
to complete required training may result in denial of travel.  
  c. All DoD-employed contractors will be offered, under terms and conditions specified in 
the contract, annual AT awareness training and an AOR update prior to traveling outside the 
U.S., its territories and possessions (including temporary duty) within 12 months of travel. 
d. All personnel will be informed of any threat and of all appropriate security precautions 
designed to reduce their vulnerability to threat attacks prior to traveling outside the U.S., its 
territories, and possessions. 
e. Forms of training include: CJCS-approved, Web-based AT Awareness Course or a 
course conducted by a certified Level II instructor using an approved lesson plan, containing, as 
a minimum, the following subjects:  
(1) Introduction to terrorism  
(2) Terrorist operations  
(3) Individual protective measures  
(4) Terrorist surveillance techniques  
(5) Improvised explosive device (IED) attacks  
(6) Kidnapping and hostage survival 
(7) Explanation of terrorism threat levels and FPCON System  
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f. Recent AOR update for the area of travel. View AT/FP Awareness Videos on the 
 following:  
 (1) Individual protective measures.  
 (2) Terrorist surveillance detection.  
 (3) Hostage survival techniques. 
g. Complete DoD Level I web-based antiterrorism training: https://atlevel1.dtic.mil/at/ 
h. Receive AT awareness handouts:  
(1) Joint Staff Guide 5280, July 98 and Antiterrorism Individual Protective 
 Measures wallet card.  
(2) GTA 19–4–3 (Individual Protective Measures), July 97 and GTA 21–3–11,  
Army Antiterrorism Individual Protective Measures wallet card.  
Country Background: Kenya 
Official Name.  Republic of Kenya.  
Country Orientation  
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Photo‘s courtesy of US State.Gov 
Cities: Capital is Nairobi (pop. 2.9 million; 2007 est.). Other cities: Mombasa (828,500; 2006  
est.), Kisumu (650,846; 2005-6), Nakuru (1.3 million; 2005-6), Eldoret (193,830; 1999). 
Terrain: Kenya rises from a low coastal plain on the Indian Ocean in a series of mountain ridges 
and plateaus which stand above 3,000 meters (9,000 ft.) in the center of the country. The Rift 
Valley bisects the country above Nairobi, opening up to a broad arid plain in the north. 
Highlands cover the south before descending to the shores of Lake Victoria in the west. 
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 Climate: Tropical in south, west, and central regions; arid and semi-arid in the north and the 
northeast (State.gov).  
Country Description: Kenya is a developing East African country known for its wildlife and 
national parks.  The capital city is Nairobi.  The second largest city is Mombasa, located on the 
southeast coast.  Tourist facilities are widely available in Nairobi, the game parks, the reserves, 
and on the coast (State.gov).   
Government Type: Republic  
Chief of State: President Mwai Kibaki (since 30 December 2002); Vice President Stephene 
Kalonzo Musyoka (since 10 January 2008). 
Head of Government: Prime Minister Raila Amolo Odinga (since 17 April 2008)  
Safety and Security: On August 7, 1998, the names Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda came to 
international attention when suicide bombs simultaneously detonated at the U.S. embassies in 
Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. More than 300 people were killed, including 12 
Americans, and an estimated 5000 people injured (see annex).  
On November 28, 2002 Al- Qaida launched a bomb attack on an Israeli-owned hotel in 
Kikambala, Kenya (near Mombasa) in which 15 people were killed.  A near simultaneous 
attempt to shoot down an Israeli charter plane departing Mombasa was unsuccessful.  These 
incidents have highlighted the continuing threat posed by terrorism in East Africa and the 
capacity of terrorist groups to carry out attacks.  U.S. citizens should be aware of the risk of 
indiscriminate attacks on civilian targets in public places, including tourist sites and other sites 
where Westerners are known to congregate (MCIA).  
Political demonstrations can occur sporadically throughout Kenya.  Travelers should 
maintain security awareness at all times and avoid public gatherings and street 
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demonstrations.  Violence, including gunfire exchange, has occurred at demonstrations in the 
past (MCIA).  These  tend to occur near government buildings, university campuses, or gathering 
places such as public parks.  Police are generally unable to properly manage large 
demonstrations and they often resort to excessive force to break up large crowds.  Most major 
tourist attractions, particularly outside Nairobi, are not generally affected by protests.  However, 
tribal conflict in rural areas has been known to erupt into violence (MCIA).  
Cross-border violence occurs periodically.  The area near Kenya's border with Somalia 
has been the site of a number of incidents of violent criminal activity, including 
kidnappings.  U.S. citizens who decide to visit the area should be aware that they could 
encounter criminal activity. While foreigners are generally not targets of this type of violence, 
insecurity in these areas during such times usually increases, placing constraints on travel and 
threatening the safety and security of travelers in the immediate area.  A number of incidents 
have also occurred near the game parks or lodges north of Mwingi, Meru, and Isiolo, which are 
frequented by tourists.  The U.S. State Department for these reasons, urges U.S. citizens who 
plan to visit Kenya to take basic security precautions to maximize their safety.  Travel to 
northern Kenya should be undertaken with at least two vehicles to ensure a backup in the case of 
a breakdown or other emergency (State.gov).  
Travel Security  
Highway banditry is common in remote and unpopulated areas such as the northeastern 
province, significant portions of the eastern province, and the northern part of the Great Rift 
Valley province. Night travel outside major cities is not recommended because incidents 
occasionally occur on the Nairobi-Mombasa Road. The Kenya Wildlife Service and police have 
strengthened security in affected areas, but banditry still occurs, especially in and around the 
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national parks and game reserves. Travelers who do not use the services of reputable travel firms 
or knowledgeable guides/drivers are especially at risk. It is best to travel in vehicle pairs in order 
to ensure a backup is available in case of mechanical failure or emergency. When traveling along 
Kenyan roads, one also has to take into account the poor road conditions and the unpredictable 
driving habits of the local population (State.gov/MCIA).  
In addition, crime is high in all regions of Kenya, particularly Nairobi, Mombasa, 
Kisumu, and at coastal beach resorts. There are regular reports of attacks against tourists by 
groups of armed assailants.  Pickpockets and thieves carry out "snatch and run" crimes on city 
streets and near crowds. Visitors have found it safer not to carry valuables, but rather to store 
them in hotel safety deposit boxes or safe rooms. However, there have been reports of safes 
being stolen from hotel rooms and of hotel desk staff forced to open safes. Walking alone or at 
night, especially in downtown areas, public parks, along footpaths, on beaches, and in poorly lit 
areas, is dangerous and discouraged (State.gov/MCIA).  
On May 1, 2011 the U.S. Department of State released this alert: ―U.S. citizens traveling 
and residing abroad [for] the enhanced potential for anti-American violence given recent 
counter-terrorism activity in Pakistan. Given the uncertainty and volatility of the current 
situation, U.S. citizens in areas where recent events could cause anti-American violence are 
strongly urged to limit their travel outside of their homes and hotels and avoid mass gatherings 
and demonstrations. U.S. citizens should stay current with media coverage of local events and be 
aware of their surroundings at all times. This Travel Alert expires August 1, 2011.‖ This alert 
was a result of the capture and killing of the Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.  
Prior to Departure 
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1. This information can be found at State.gov. on the most recent travel advisories for any 
location of your travel.  You should visit the Department of State web site at 
http://travel.state.gov and may also want to contact the Department of State recorded messages at 
202-647-5225.  
 2. Carefully complete your visa application, as it will be scrutinized. If you are a 
naturalized U.S. citizen returning to the country of your origin, your citizenship may be 
questioned. If you encounter such a problem, please contact the State Department for guidance.  
 3. Ensure that items you carry with you are not controversial or prohibited. Political 
material or anything that could be considered pornographic should not be carried. If you carry 
prescription drugs with you, be certain that they are clearly marked and bring only necessary 
quantities.  
 4. Carrying letters, packages or gifts to individuals in other countries should be avoided 
as you may be viewed as a courier attempting to bring the material for subversive or illegal 
purposes.  
 5. Limit the amount of identification that you take. If you have several forms of ID, bring 
only one. Make a photocopy of any ID or credit card you will be bringing to leave at home. 
Write down your passport number and keep it separate from your passport. Do the same with 
your address and telephone.  
 6. Contact the American Embassy or Consulate prior to your arrival, and provide your 
local address and the probable length of your visit.  
7. Use of public transportation is recommended rather than driving yourself. Taxis are the 
preferred mode of transportation. State Department travel advisories provide updated 
information regarding public transportation concerns in the country you are visiting (State.gov).  
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8. Before your departure, it is recommended that you provide your family and/or a close 
friend with the name and phone number of your supervisor or coworker so that you can be 
reached in the event of an emergency.  If this is not possible, the 24 hour State Department 
Operations Center at 202-647-1512, may be able to assist others in reaching you.  
9. To avoid being a target, dress conservatively.  Carry the minimum amount of valuables 
necessary for your trip and plan places to conceal them.    
10.  Keep medicines in their original, labeled containers.  If a medication is unusual or 
contains narcotics, carry a letter from your doctor attesting to your need to take the drug. 
11.   Pack an extra set of passport photos along with a photocopy of your passport 
information page to make replacement of your passport easier in case it is lost or stolen. 
Personal Protection Measures, Activities and Behavior 
All travelers should learn about the customs, culture, history and geography of the area to 
which the DoD member has been assigned or is visiting.   This should include learning at least a 
few phrases in the country‘s language for use in emergencies. Know how to ask for the police or 
medical care. Consider carrying small cards with emergency phrases on them. You may even 
consider making cards with pictures or international symbols you can point out to communicate 
your needs. Make changes to vary your routine. Change your route to and from work and vary 
your departure and arrival times. Change the times and places for your daily exercise.  Enter/ exit 
buildings through different doors, if possible.  Don‘t allow yourself to be predictable (AT Level 
I).   
1. In all of your activities, show discretion and common sense. Maintain a low profile. 
Refrain from any behavior that may make you conspicuous or a potential target. Never engage in 
any illegal activity, excessive drinking or gambling. Use your best judgment to carefully avoid 
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any situation which may allow a foreign intelligence agency the opportunity to coerce or 
blackmail you, or criminals to take advantage of your situation (AT Level I).  
 2. If you locate any possible surveillance equipment, such as microphones, telephone 
taps, miniature recording devices, or cameras, do not try to neutralize or dismantle them. Assume 
the device is operable and that active monitoring is ongoing. Report what you have found to the 
U.S. Embassy or Consulate (AT Level I).   
 3. Foreign intelligence services may place you under physical surveillance or you may 
suspect that you are being watched. It is better to ignore the surveillance than attempt to lose or 
evade it. In any event your actions should be prudent and not likely to generate suspicion. Good 
precautionary measures are to use well traveled highways and avoid establishing routine 
schedules (AT Level I).   
 4. Never try to photograph military personnel, installations, or other "restricted areas."  It 
is best to also refrain from photographing police installations, industrial structures, transportation 
facilities and boarder areas (AT Level I).    
 5. Beware of overly friendly or solicitous people. Do not establish personal or intimate 
relationships with these individuals as they may be employed by the intelligence service. Do not 
share any work related information with any person who does not have a need to know (AT 
Level I).  
 6. If you will be on an extended visit and expect to be writing or receiving mail, 
remember that it may be subject to censorship. Never make references to anything you don‘t 
want read or confiscated.  
 7. Avoid any areas where there is political or ethnic unrest, demonstrations or protests.  
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 8. Should you be detained or arrested for any reason by the police or other officials, be 
cooperative and contact the U.S. Embassy or Consulate immediately. Do not make any 
statements or sign any documents you do not fully understand until you have conferred with an 
Embassy representative (State.gov).   
9. Do not leave documents in hotel safes.  
Awareness on the Street 
a. Maintain a low profile; dress and behave in public in a way that ―blends in‖ with local 
customs (AT Level I).  
b. Avoid clothing that makes you stand out as a foreigner.  Avoid clothing with U.S. 
flags, logos, etc. (AT Level I, [see photos] ).                                   
c. Don‘t flash large sums of money, expensive jewelry or luxury items. Standing out as 
an American makes you a target (AT Level I). 
d. Be sensitive to local standards of behavior; for example, in some countries a public 
display of affection is inappropriate (AT Level I).  
e. Be alert to your surroundings; stay out of areas that are hostile and unlighted streets, 
mob-type crowds; think crowd prevention (AT Level I, [see photos]).         
f. Watch for unexplained absence of local citizens. Sometimes this can be an early 
warning of possible terrorist actions (AT Level I, [see photos]).     
g. Watch for suspicious parcels, packages or objects that seem to be out of place. An 
improvised explosive device can look like almost anything: a briefcase, a lunchbox, a 
shopping bag. Trust your instincts and if it doesn‘t feel right to you, don‘t touch it. 
Report it to the nearest official. 
h. Watch for suspicious vehicles. Improvised explosive devices have been placed in 
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      automobiles, bicycles and trucks. They may be parked on the road, or driven to a   
                target location. The driver may abandon the vehicle and jump into an escape vehicle. 
                Get away quickly, sound an alarm if appropriate, notify authorities (AT Level I). 
i. Look for signs that you are being followed or watched.  Watch for subtle changes in 
people who you see repeatedly, or two different cars with the same driver.  
j. Surveillance can be confirmed by changing directions or making several turns, 
whether you are in a vehicle or on foot.  Retrace your course; use windows and mirrors 
to look behind you. Make unexpected stops.  Vary your pace and trust your instincts.  
If you confirm that you‘re being followed, or even feel strongly that you may be under 
surveillance, don‘t go home. Conceal your suspicions and go to a safe haven and 
report the incident. Do not confront the individual(s), as you do not know their 
intentions, how many there are or if they‘re armed (AT Level I, [see photos]).     
Terrorist Threat  
Terrorism is a criminal act committed for political, religious, or ideological reasons. 
Explosive bombing is the most commonly employed terrorist tactic worldwide and kidnapping is 
the second. Immediately upon notification of deployment into a high-risk area, determine the 
terrorist threat for that area.  Gather as much information as possible on terrorists and terrorist 
activity in the area from your security or intelligence officer, libraries, newspapers, magazines, 
books, people who have been or are now in that area, Department of Defense (DoD) schools that 
conduct terrorism training, or any other available sources.  Once in country, continue to obtain 
information from the U.S. Embassy, the U.S. Military Group (MILGP), your S2 and the internet.  
It is imperative that this information and changes in the threat be disseminated to the lowest level 
(AT Level I).  
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In most cases, terrorists will seek to attack a target that is unprotected and that will guarantee 
the most media coverage worldwide. Media coverage of any terrorist incident serves to inflate 
and distort the public's perception of the terrorist, making him larger-than-life rather than 
showing him for what he really is, a criminal.  To begin a general terrorist threat assessment for 
your organization, address the following questions:  
        (1)  Do violence prone groups exist in your geographic area of interest?  
        (2)  If you or your organization were attacked by terrorists, would the incident conceivably  
   receive wide media coverage?  
        (3)  Can visitors, deliverymen, mailmen, and others gain access to your facility?  
        (4) Is your existing security limited to an ID badge, a fence or a uniformed guard at the  
              building door?  
     
To begin a general terrorist threat assessment of your personal vulnerability, address the 
following questions:  
(1) Are you a publicly recognizable member of your organization's management or 
 technical team with an assigned parking space?  
(2) Do you normally drive or ride in a "prestige" automobile or display a special license  
plate?  
(3) Do you drive the same route between home and work each day, arrive at the same time  
each day or buy your gasoline at the same station?  
(4) In the past 18 months, has your name or photograph appeared in any newspaper,  
magazine, trade journal or organizational publication?  
(5) Do you, or members of your family, engage in a regularly scheduled recreation or  
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fitness program such as jogging, swimming, golf, tennis, or handball  which is usually 
conducted weekly at the same location? 
   If you answered "yes" to two or more of these questions, it is a pretty good 
indication that a terrorist would have little trouble identifying you, following you home, 
or keeping you under surveillance. You are not a "low profile" person. It might be 
prudent for you to take increased notice of your surroundings and people as you move 
through your day. Consider these observations:  
        (1)  Is someone watching your home?  
        (2)  Is your car being followed?  
        (3)  Has your office received recent inquiries about your plans?  
        (4)  Have you noticed anyone taking photographs near your home, car, or office?  
        (5)  Have you seen strangers in the parking lot?  
        (6)  Has a meter reader, building inspector, or repairman visited you recently?  
      Any of these observations could be indications of possible terrorist targeting. As preventative 
measures, try to be more conscientious about what is going on around you as this is an excellent 
self-protective action. Try to develop a new habit of self-protective curiosity. Don‗t be 
predictable in your daily activities.  
1. Eliminate routines: 
    a. First, and most important of all, honestly examine the existing patterns associated with your 
day-to-day life. Do you leave home for the office at the same time every morning? Do you drive 
the same route each day? Do you park in the same space, use the same door, or eat in the same 
restaurant?  
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    b. Routine habits can be deadly. Repetitious day-to-day routines can do more to make you a 
terrorist target than any other activity. Terrorists rarely attack people who do not have rigid daily 
habits, simply because they cannot accurately prepare their trap. Remember that same time + 
same route + same place = tempting target.  
2. Office building security:  
    a. Many security precautions are simply the application of common sense and are not costly. 
Be alert to anyone loitering near your office building. Avoid working late on a routine basis. 
Avoid routinely going into the office on weekends when nobody else is there (AT Level I).  
    b. Do not clutter building lobbies with plants, displays or art objects that could conceal the 
presence of a suspicious package or object. Do not place pictures of personnel in the lobby or put 
their names on the building directory. Avoid listing personnel by name/rank/title in telephone 
books or rosters (AT Level I).  
    c. Limit public access to your building. Ground floor offices are especially vulnerable. Do not 
place desks near the windows. Keep the window blinds closed to prevent observation from 
outside. Do not place name signs outside offices. Restrooms should be locked as should all 
maintenance closets, electrical and telephone rooms. Keys should be inventoried and issued on a 
very restricted and controlled basis (AT Level I).   
    d. Instruct secretaries not to provide any information on travel plans, dates of departure, 
airlines, hotels, and so forth to any caller. Do not convey over the phone the absence of personnel 
in the office. The secretary or receptionist should state that the requested person is in a meeting 
and obtain the caller's phone number for call back purposes (AT Level I).    
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    e. Impress upon all employees that they should be alert to unfamiliar personal deliveries. 
Particular attention should be directed at packages left behind, boxes or briefcases in lobbies, 
restrooms, stairwells, and coffee shops (AT Level I).   
    f. When hiring, have a police security background check completed on all local employees.  
    g. Develop, implement, and practice regularly scheduled drills to cope with fire, bomb threats, 
and intrusion. Establish notification instructions for emergencies such as accidents, 
kidnappings/hostage taking, or violent intrusions.  
    h. Limit normal visitor entry and exit of the building to one or two well marked, clean, lighted 
doorways. Place a security reception desk at each entrance. Equip the desk with a receptionist, 
telephones, a visitor's log, perhaps a paging system and an emergency alarm warning system. 
Require employees to escort their visitors when they are inside the building and to stop and offer 
escort assistance to anyone who is not an organization employee.  
    i. Have all packages and mail/sent to a centralized point rather than allowing messengers and 
delivery personnel to wander around the building.  
    j. Instruct janitors and maintenance personnel to keep their area doors closed and locked 
except when in use. Move dumpsters 25 feet away from outside building walls and create a 3-
foot wide clear space free of bushes, flower boxes, and debris around the outside face of the 
building.  
    k. If you have facility areas that are fenced, ensure that the fence is in good repair, gates are 
locked, and the fence line is not overgrown with brush, weeds, or grass. Inspect and improve 
nighttime fence lighting, if needed (DoD 2000.12).  
    l. Good housekeeping practices applied to your building, its entrances, grounds, and parking 
lot act as a deterrent to attack. A clean, neat, uncluttered, businesslike appearance sends the 
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terrorist a "message" that the people inside are not negligent, careless or sloppy. Your office or 
home environment tells the terrorist that you have a security program. Terrorists prefer to attack 
unprotected and unconcerned targets (AT Level I).  
3. Security en route:  
    a. Many attacks directed against personnel occur when they are transiting between their homes 
and their offices. Specifically these attacks occur while:  
        (1)  Walking to an automobile.  
        (2)  Traveling in an automobile.  
        (3)  Walking from an automobile.  
    b. The key to minimizing personal vulnerability to kidnap, hostage-taking, assassination or 
other forms of attack is simple; avoid repetition and habit patterns during these high threat 
movement periods. Vary time of departure and arrival from day to day. Do not transport 
personnel in attention attracting "prestige" vehicles. When traveling in an automobile keep the 
windows closed and the doors locked. Park vehicles off the street and under cover at night. Lock 
cars no matter how short a time they may be unattended (AT Level I).  
    c. Install an alarm system on the automobile and test it daily. Before entering the vehicle look 
underneath and all around it to be sure that no suspicious objects, strings, wires, or devices have 
been attached. If you find anything suspicious, immediately notify authorities; take no actions 
other than moving to a safe location away from the vehicle (AT Level I).  
    d. Remember that terrorists usually watch potential targets for days before they attempt an 
attack. Before leaving your home or office, spend a few minutes looking around the street. Are 
there any cars, trucks, vans, or motorcycles that look out of place or that seems to be "waiting" at 
the curb, particularly near your home. As you drive, watch your rear view mirrors and take note 
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of any vehicle that may be following you. If you think you are being followed make two right 
turns and go back where you came from or pull into a safe haven (AT Level I).  
    e. Safe haven is defined several ways (DoD 2000.12):  
        (1)  It can be any place along your route of travel where you could go and where terrorists 
probably would not follow, such as a police department, firehouse, military base, factory gate, 
etc.  
        (2)  At home or in the office it is normally a strong, secure room or closet containing 
essentials to sustain life for a limited time plus communications to call for assistance.  
    f. When driving, use main roads and avoid secondary roads as much as possible. Drive your 
vehicle in the lane closest to the centerline. This makes it more difficult for attackers to force you 
to a stop or off the road (AT Level I).  
    g. Keep at least one-half car length of empty space in front of your vehicle when stopped at 
traffic signals and stop signs. This gives you room to maneuver your car if you need to escape a 
kill zone or kidnap attempt. Keep your car in gear ready to move and keep your hand on the 
horn. Watch what is going on around you, particularly to your rear. If individuals on foot move 
toward your vehicle, rev your engine and rock or jerk your car forward and backwards in the 
space you have available. Blow the horn to attract attention. Get out of there even if it means 
hitting the attackers around your car. Notify the authorities immediately (AT Level I).  
    h. Select three to five different travel routes from home to office and use a different route each 
time you travel. Be careful not to use the same routes on particular days. Watch that you do not 
fall into the habit of using a favorite route more than others. Avoid all detours and do not stop for 
people in distress as both are commonly employed traps (AT Level I).   
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    i. Do not gas up at the neighborhood service station. Stop at different well-lighted stations 
along your various travel routes. Keep your fuel tank at least half full (AT Level I).   
    j. When you are walking to and away from your vehicle, especially between your residence 
and your vehicle, you are at the greatest period of vulnerability and risk. Be observant, alert, 
aware of your surroundings and very careful. Develop these skills into new personal protection 
habits (AT Level I).   
4.  Security at home:  
    a. Both criminals and terrorists consider the home a tempting target. Some common sense 
precautions will help to deter both (AT Level I). 
    b. Do not advertise where you live. Take your name off the mailbox and the front door. Do not 
have department stores, dry cleaners, or grocery firms deliver to your home (AT Level I). 
    c. Do not pose for newspaper photographs at social, business or sports events. Keep a very low 
public profile (AT Level I).   
    d. Park your car inside a garage, not on the street. Keep the garage locked at all times.  
    e. Install a peephole device on all entrance/exit doors so that visitors may be observed. It is 
also a good idea to install a two-way communication system at the doors. All outside doors 
should be solid wood or metal with no glass. Deadbolt locks should be installed on exterior 
doors. Doorways should be well lighted by at least two separate fixtures. Sliding glass doors and 
French doors should be secured with anti-entry bars and locks (AT Level I).  
    f. Ground floor windows and upper story windows accessible from balconies, trees, or low 
roofs should be fitted with iron grills. Keep all window curtains and blinds tightly closed after 
sundown. It is also a good idea to coat all ground floor windows with mirrored plastic film which 
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makes the glass much more difficult to break or cut and limits daytime viewing into the house. 
Mylar shatter-resistant window film is one of several choices (AT Level I).   
        g. Install a quality burglar alarm system that has an exterior horn or siren and ask your 
neighbors to call the police if it should sound. Consider running a buried private telephone or 
intercom line to a neighbor‗s house so that you can call for assistance even if the terrorist cuts 
your phone lines (AT Level I).    
    h. Home security should be discussed with all family members. Do not frighten them, but 
honestly discuss their safety and security and establish procedures for how the door is to be 
answered and what is discussed over the telephone. You should assume that someone is listening 
to all your telephone conversations and you should never discuss family travel plan, pickup 
points, or appointments on the telephone (AT Level I).   
    i. Do not let anyone into your home to make an emergency phone call. Keep them outside and 
make the call for them.  
    j. If you have children, they should be escorted to and from school and school authorities 
should never release children to any person who is not a family member. Do not permit children 
to use public transportation or taxis. Spouses should shop in groups of three or more. All family 
members should be careful not to establish fixed recreation or fitness habits such as tennis every 
Tuesday and Saturday, or jogging every day at 6:00 AM, etc (DoD, O-2000.12-H).  
    k. If your residence requires servants, have a background check made before they are hired 
and consult their references thoroughly. Instruct servants not to provide any information to 
callers about the family or its activities, and not to allow anyone (including persons in police 
uniform) to enter the house without the permission of an adult family member. If a servant calls 
in sick, do not accept the temporary services of a cousin or brother.  Plan and regularly hold 
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family drills for emergency situations such as fire, the burglar alarm sounding, or forced entry 
(AT Level I).  
        (l) While these security suggestions may sound frightening and restrictive, the lifestyle 
changes and discomfort associated with them is far less than that associated with the 
victimization, kidnap, injury or death of a family member. The person most interested in your 
continuing safety should be you (AT Level I). 
5.  Actions if involved in a kidnapping: 
 The probability of anyone becoming a hostage is very remote. However, as a member of 
the Armed Forces, you should always consider yourself a potential hostage or terrorist victim 
and reflect this in planning your affairs, both personal and professional. You should have an up-
to-date will, provide next of kin with an appropriate power-of- attorney, and take measures to 
ensure your dependents' financial security if necessary.   Experience has shown that concern for 
the welfare of family members is a source of great stress to kidnap victims.  Bomb threats, actual 
bombings, and kidnap or hostage incidents are terrorists‘ most common tactics. No one plans to 
be on the receiving end of a terrorist attack, but if you suddenly find yourself involved in an 
incident, thinking about what you would do in advance can help you to react quickly and 
correctly while avoiding foolish mistakes or panic. Consider the following example (DoD, O-
2000.12-H):  
    a. As you step out of your car, you are suddenly confronted by three armed men in ski masks.  
Don‗t struggle or attempt to run.  Physical resistance, verbal banter, or sarcastic remarks at this 
point may lead to physical abuse or death. Remember that the attackers are also scared, uptight 
and may react violently and irrationally to any provocation. Listen to their instructions and 
quietly do what you are told (AT Level I).  
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    b. After the first few moments or while you are being driven away from the scene, quietly let 
your attackers know of any medical problems you may have. It is important that you let the 
terrorist know immediately if you have a heart condition, diabetes, or allergies; they may intend 
to drug you or give you an injection to keep you quiet.  
    c. Force yourself to be calm and keep your brain alert. Make mental notes about your captors, 
their speech patterns, mannerisms, physical characteristics, those in charge, the type of vehicle, 
where you are going, landmarks, time, speed, and distance. Try to draw a mental map. Note any 
distinctive sounds such as trains, airplanes, heavy traffic, horns, bells, construction, and any 
special odors you may encounter. Use your eyes, ears, nose and brain (AT Level I).   
    d. Later on, try to establish some measure of rapport with your captors at the same time 
maintaining your dignity, poise, and honor. Listen to the questions they ask and think very 
carefully before you answer.  Do not lie, but do not volunteer any information and do not discuss 
the probable reactions of your organization, family, friends, or the authorities. Do not discuss 
your organization‗s security arrangements, emergency plans, ransom payments or your financial 
wealth. Do not discuss politics, race, religion, or ideologies (AT Level I). 
    e. Try a few legitimate complaints on your captors and note their reactions. Complaints 
relating to the quality of the food, lack of physical cleanliness, need for medication, exercise, or 
reading material are legitimate.  Keep your mind constantly occupied and establish daily routines 
so that you always have something to look forward to. Exercise daily and closely monitor your 
own physical and mental health. Many American prisoners of war in Korea and Vietnam found 
that reestablishing contact with religion sustained them through hard times and captivity and 
made solitary confinement easier to bear (AT Level I).  
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    f. Kidnap or hostage victims rarely have the opportunity to overpower their guards or to 
escape. No attempt to escape should be made unless it has been carefully planned in conjunction 
with a real, not imagined, opportunity. Escape should be attempted only by a person who has the 
physical skills and mental discipline necessary to ensure the best possible odds of success. The 
majority of kidnap or hostage victims are eventually released unharmed and resume normal lives. 
While being held captive, remember that there are many talented and courageous people working 
to obtain your release; be patient and have faith.  
6.  Actions for bomb threat incidents:  
    a. Dealing effectively and safely with bomb threat incidents and actual bombing attacks 
requires being prepared. A simple, practical, and exercised bomb threat response plan will allow 
personnel to know what to do in an emergency (DoD, O-2000.12-H).  
    b. The use of a simple form and a few minutes of instruction will permit any organization to 
effectively handle telephone bomb threats, real or hoax. A telephone bomb-threat form provides 
for the organized capture of all available threat information. A good bomb threat response plan 
and some personal training will help to allay fears and avoid dangerous mistakes in judgment 
during emergency situations (DoD, O-2000.12-H).  
    c. Normally, it takes less time to search a bomb-threatened building than it takes to totally 
evacuate it. Plan for effective searching in conjunction with bomb threats. Also plan for 
evacuation, but remember to thoroughly search all stairways and evacuation routes before they 
are employed since the  bombs may be hidden under the stairs (DoD O-2000.12-H) .  
    d. When a suspicious object or item such as a briefcase is found, notify the authorities 
immediately. Senior personnel responsible for the building should consider evacuation of 
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personnel. Do not approach or touch a suspect item unless you have been professionally trained 
in recognition techniques (DoD O-2000.12-H).  
    e. Should a bomb explode outside the building, do not rush to the window to see what 
happened. Quickly step into the hallway and remain there a few minutes. There could be a 
second explosion and if you are standing at the window you could be injured.  
    f. If you are on the street when a terrorist bomb explosion occurs, quickly get inside the 
nearest building and remain there. Shattered glass and windows popped out of the frames in 
high-rise buildings can fall and scythe through the air for blocks around the point of explosion. 
Never be curious and move toward an area where a bomb has exploded. There may be a second 
bomb nearby timed to detonate a few minutes after the first (DoD Directive 2000.12).  
    g. Unless you are qualified to do so, leave medical treatment to experts. You will probably be 
of greater assistance simply by leaving the scene and reducing the congestion and confusion 
(DoD Directive 2000.12).   
    h. Establish a policy that requires individuals who receive packages to come to the building's 
central delivery point, physically verify that the particular item is expected or ordered and that 
the sender's return address is known. Instruct family members not to accept or open any small 
packages delivered to your home unless they know the sender and expect the package. If any 
doubt exists about a book mailer, large manila envelope or fat letter, call authorities and request 
that it be examined. Be extra careful about delivered packages during holiday periods (DoD 
Directive 2000.12).  
    i. Never submerge a suspicious package in water; place it outside in a shaded area that is dry 
and free of debris, keep everyone away from it and call authorities (DoD Directive 2000.12).   
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Annex A-Photos of the American Embassy Nairobi, Kenya 
Front of old Embassy 
 
 
                                                                                        Photo courtesy of Matthew Cassidy 
Inside looking out 
                                                                                                            
Photo courtesy of Matthew Cassidy 
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Back of Embassy adjacent to vehicle bomb 
 
                                                                                                Photo courtesy of Matthew Cassidy 
Temporary Embassy after the 1998 Terrorist Attack 
 
                                                                                               Photos courtesy of Davestravelcorner 
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The U.S. Embassy subsequently relocated outside of the city-center. 
New Embassy in Nairobi Kenya 2002/03 
 
 
                               Photos courtesy of ASK.COM 
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Annex B – Personal Protection Measure Photo‘s 
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Chapter 7 
Threat Assessment 
Intelligence Gathering Strategies for Homeland Security 
 
 
November 2011 
Prepared by Matthew J. Cassidy, Installation Antiterrorism Officer, United States Military 
Academy West Point, New York.  The purpose is to identify the current assessment of a potential 
threat (Active Shooter) against the U.S. Military Academy, its personnel and the Academy‘s 
potential vulnerability to those threats.   
Identifying Subject Matter 
This assessment includes information derived from the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) (unclassified documents), Department of the Army (DA) (unclassified 
documents) and open sources. The reliability of the open sources used is assessed at medium 
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reliability: the information is realistically sourced and credible but not corroborated enough to 
warrant a higher level of confidence.  Information received from the DHS and DA is assessed as 
highly reliable since the information is credibly sourced and corroborated. Where specific source 
reporting is not available, this assessment relies upon general reporting on the most likely 
potential terrorist threats and previous specific threats to facilities.  
Identifying the Primary Intelligence Consumer 
This assessment is intended to provide outlook and understanding of the nature and scope 
of potentially emergent threats and to assist the United States Military Academy in developing 
priorities for protective measures relating to existing or emerging threats to their safety and 
security.  The information cutoff date for this assessment is 1January 2012. According to the 
CRS report titled Homeland Security Intelligence: Perceptions, Statutory Definitions, and 
Approaches dated January 14, 2009 the Homeland Security Stakeholder Community is defined 
broadly as all levels of government, the intelligence, defense, and law enforcement communities, 
private sector critical infrastructure operators, and those responsible for securing the borders, 
protecting transportation, and maritime systems, and guarding the security of the homeland 
(Randol, M). 
Identifying Known Threat  
The Department of Homeland Security  Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) and the 
FBI remain concerned over the possibility of an attack on the United States given the demonstrated 
ability by al-Qaida and al-Qaida affiliated groups to recruit, train, and deploy operatives from safe 
havens around the world (ABC). The disruptions during the past year indicate that terrorist groups 
continually seek to adapt their methods to include attack tactics to avoid detection. Neither the FBI 
nor the DHS is in possession of any credible or substantial indicators of current or near-term attacks 
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against West Point or adjacent state/federal facilities.  The installation remains at FPCON Alpha 
with additional Bravo measures (DoD I).   
The United States will continue to face threats from home grown radicals inspired by Islamic 
extremist ideology. In the past few years there has been a rise of thwarted attacks planned by groups 
of self-radicalized individuals who may not have operational connections to Al-Qaida but were 
influenced by Al-Qaida's message and shared similar grievances.  Al-Qaida is spreading this 
message at ever increasing levels through a variety of media, much of which is directly targeting 
American audiences. Online jihadist web forums and magazines now publish in American style 
English and are familiar with American customs (World Watch).  
The Mumbai attacks demonstrated how a group of trained and determined attackers with 
firearms and other portable weapons can do a great deal of damage in a short period of time. 
Terrorists are becoming more sophisticated in their methods and tactics. Dismounted assaults are 
often beyond the response capabilities of local security and law enforcement. Incident response 
operations require sophisticated coordination, real time intelligence, and effective command and 
control.  If security forces fail to neutralize such attacks quickly, they can lead to long-drawn-out 
hostage situations. The ability to end such attacks quickly depends on the rapid response of 
security forces, equipment, training, in-place response protocols, and effective communication. 
Homeland Security Intelligence (HSINT) is classified and non-classified information that 
is gathered and possessed by federal, state, or local agencies that:  relates to the threat of terrorist 
activity; relates to the ability to prevent, interdict, or disrupt terrorist activity; would improve the 
identification or investigation of a suspected terrorist or terrorist organization; or would improve 
the response to a terrorist act (Randol, M). 
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The following characteristics are commonly associated with active shooter suspects. The 
list is compiled from descriptions of past active shooters and is not meant to be a comprehensive 
list describing all active shooters. Each active shooter situation is unique. 
1.  Active shooters usually focus on assaulting persons with whom they come into contact. Their 
intention is usually an expression of hatred or rage rather than the commission of a crime. 
2.  An active shooter is likely to engage more than one target. Active shooters may be intent on 
harming a number of people as quickly as possible. 
3.  The first indication of the presence of an active shooter occurs when he or she begins to 
assault victims. 
4. Active shooters often go to locations where potential victims are plentiful, such as 
classrooms, stadiums, and theaters. Active shooters may act in the manner of a sniper, assaulting 
victims from a distance. Active shooters may also engage multiple targets while remaining 
constantly mobile. 
5. Tactics such as containment and negotiation, normally associated with standoff incidents 
may not be adequate in active shooter events. Active shooters typically continue their attacks 
despite the arrival of emergency responders. 
6. Active shooters are often better armed than the police, sometimes making use of explosives, 
booby traps and body armor.  
7.  Active shooters may have a planned attack and be prepared for a sustained confrontation with 
the police. Historically, active shooters have not attempted to hide their identity or conceal the 
commission of their attacks. Escape from the police is usually not a priority of the active shooter 
8.  Active shooters may employ some type of diversion. 
9.  Active shooters may be indiscriminate in their violence or they may seek specific victims. 
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10.  Active shooters may be suicidal, deciding to die in the course of their actions either at the 
hand of others or by self-inflicted wound. 
11.  Active shooters usually have some degree of familiarity with the building or location they 
choose to occupy. 
12.  Active shooter events are dynamic and may go in and out of an ―active‖ status; a static 
incident may turn into an active shooter event. 
Identifying the Unknowns 
Non-state armed groups are almost invisible. This makes it harder to track their 
capabilities, let alone to detect their intentions about when and where they plan to stage an 
assault. Understanding armed groups requires increased and detailed knowledge of their 
operational characteristics.  Some information is available, but much is not.  For example, had 
more been known about the group that perpetrated the Mumbai attacks, perhaps it could have 
been prevented.  Questions leaders should consider when developing an understanding of the 
threats are:  Who are the leaders of the group, their roles, styles, personalities, abilities, beliefs, 
rivalries, and their insecurities?  Who makes up the group, how are members recruited, trained, 
and retained, as well as whether they are cohesive or riddled with factional divisions? What is 
the group‘s organizational infrastructure: funding sources, communications, logistical control, 
propaganda and media resources, security, and intelligence capabilities? What are the different 
ideological, political, and cultural codes, beliefs, and cleavages? What are the group‘s 
operational doctrine, strategy, and tactics? Are there linkages with other actors?  
Threat Identification. 
There was no specific threat information concerning terrorist or criminal activity 
targeting the U.S. Military Academy at West Point.   Furthermore, there was no information 
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concerning an identified threat to any specific military activity within the U.S. at this time. 
Criminal threat intelligence for this report was collected from the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Army Counter-Intelligence 
Agency (ACIA), and the West Point Military Police (2). 
  The USMA is an institution with very high visibility. It is the symbolic center of 
development for the leadership of the U.S. Army. In the ongoing war against terrorism, the U.S. 
continues to target the training sites and development centers of terrorist organizations, 
particularly the remnants of Al Qaeda and of the former Taliban leadership in Afghanistan. 
There is considerable potential of a retaliatory attack against the U.S. as the war on terror 
continues (ABC).  
The unknown and most dangerous threat to West Point is the possibility of terrorist 
attacks from domestic or international terrorist organizations and individuals, specifically an 
active shooter scenario. Although there is no known specific threat in the immediate area, it is 
assumed that domestic radicals and cells are conducting persistent target selection, 
reconnaissance, surveillance, and operational planning. 
 An active shooter, according to the National Tactical Officers Association, is ―one or 
more subjects who participate in a random or systematic shooting spree, demonstrating their 
intent to continuously cause serious physical injury or death to others.  Their overriding objective 
appears to be that of mass murder, rather than some other criminal conduct such as robbery, 
hostage taking, etc.  In most cases some type of firearm is used; however, the hostile actor(s) 
may use any weapon that may be available.‖  A suspect is considered an active shooter if he or 
she is still actively shooting, has access to additional potential victims and has a willingness to 
harm others until stopped by authorities or his/her own suicide (DHS). 
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History of the Threat. 
St. Louis, Columbine, Virginia Tech, Northern Illinois University, and Fort Hood, Texas: 
the tragic news of late has shown with deadly clarity that no sector of society is immune to the 
possibility of an active shooter incident; the escalation both in the number of active shooter 
incidents and in the scale of their destruction is cause for concern. Communities and colleges 
alike are vulnerable. Today‘s criminals and terrorists are more determined and more heavily 
armed than ever before, and crisis situations that include active shooters are occurring with 
alarming frequency in workplaces, educational settings, shopping malls, places of worship, 
government buildings, and military installations (Rivera, L). 
West Point is vulnerable to an active shooter incident perpetrated by a civilian employee, 
retiree, family member, soldier or cadet, as well as by non-affiliated civilians.  The possible cost 
of such an act is viewed as ―major,‖ given the potential for widespread injuries and impact on 
operations; minimal warning time and unpredictability are factored into the high assessment of 
potential risk. Lastly, West Point‘s preparedness for such an incident is viewed as ―fair‖ since 
readiness and response plans, procedures and capabilities have not been fully validated. It is 
important to recognize that past hostile intruder/active shooter incidents have shown that, in 
these situations, there is no time, room or intention for negotiation on the part of perpetrators. 
The perpetrator is there to cause as much injury as possible in the least amount of time. In most 
cases, perpetrators use firearm(s) and there is no pattern or method to their selection of victims. 
These situations are dynamic and evolve rapidly, hence quick action is crucial. 
Prevent, Preempt, and Mitigate the Threat 
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Preparedness and mitigation.  Predicting or preventing violence is extremely difficult. 
Therefore, preparedness and mitigation initiatives serve as a vital part of the risk assessment/risk 
reduction equation.   Appropriate preparedness measures include: 
Reliable, redundant, installation-wide warning and communication capabilities.  West Point uses 
a variety of means to notify the installation of an emergency including Giant Voice, a high-
powered speaker array that covers the entire installation with voice, tone, and siren warnings; 
Desktop Alert, a network-centric warning and notification tool which delivers emergency 
messages via an on-screen message alert window to targeted network users, with the capability 
to discern by whom and when the message was read; Dialogic Dialer, a computer-based system 
that automates emergency communications, rapidly sending voice and text messages to all types 
of devices, including phone, email, and pagers; WKDT, broadcasting on FM 89.3 which can be 
enlisted to provide emergency information to listeners; and the Command Channel 
announcements for on-post community telecast and public information (1).  
Mutual aid agreements with local, county, and state police agencies. Should installation 
resources prove inadequate during an emergency, requests will be made for assistance from 
external emergency services, IAW existing, MOAs or MOUs and resource support contracts.   
Trained and equipped first responders and emergency management personnel.  Rapid 
deployment of active shooter response tactics must be simple by design, flexible, easy to 
implement, and effective against a fast moving and unpredictable suspect. Also, initial first 
responders should have the authority and the capability to take action without waiting for 
command directives or the arrival of specialty units (e.g., SWAT or crisis negotiators).  The goal 
of police intervention in active shooter incidents is to neutralize the threat by various means, up 
to and including the use of deadly force.  
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Validated emergency response plans. All organizations no matter what size are required 
to have a fire/bomb shelter in place, and an active shooter plan.  Each of those plans is required 
to be exercised at least once annually 
Educated, alert and prepared community.  For those individuals (military, civilian, 
cadets) directly or indirectly involved in the incident, the following protective directives may be 
employed.  Evacuation: when conditions are safer outside than inside a building, all personnel in 
the hazard zone will be directed to leave the building immediately to a designated safe area. 
Evacuation of an entire facility or area may not always be prudent, especially if evacuation may 
lead to other risks by taking the occupants out of the physically secure environment of the 
facility and onto the streets; Reverse Evacuation: when conditions are safer inside a building than 
outside, personnel may be directed to seek shelter indoors. Once all personnel are inside, the 
building exterior doors should be locked and Lock down/Shelter-in-Place procedures initiated;  
Lockdown/Shelter-in-place: when a person or situation presents an immediate threat to personnel 
in a building, the order to lock down or shelter-in-place may be given.  
Confront the attacker: because active shooter situations are often over before law enforcement 
arrives on the scene, individuals must be prepared both mentally and physically to deal with the 
assailant. When the shooter is at close range and you cannot flee, your chance of survival is 
much greater if you try to incapacitate him/her (DHS). 
           Additionally the Antiterrorism Working Group Meeting (ATWG) has a representative 
from each organization that attends.  The purpose of the ATWG is to review threats, identify 
vulnerabilities, recommend countermeasures, recommend force protection condition changes 
(FPCONs), and monitor corrective actions. 
Identifying and Describing the 2008 Mumbai Attack: Attack Summary 
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The 2008 Mumbai attacks began early in the morning of 26 November 2008 and included 
sustained operations lasting approximately 60 hours. The ten attackers, members of Lashkar-e-
Taiba (LeT), entered the coastal city from the sea by first hijacking a fishing trawler and killing 
the crew, and then transferring to small boats to minimize their deployment signature. Once 
ashore, the group divided into four assault teams. The terrorists were equipped with automatic 
weapons, grenades, improvised explosive devices (IED), satellite phones, Blackberries, and 
detailed maps and images of the targets (Wax, E). The teams conducted sequential attacks 
against a railway station, cinema, restaurant, residential complex Jewish Center, hospital, and 
multiple hotels and taxis.  The attackers made deliberate attempts to identify and kill Westerners. 
By ―pulsing‖ from target to target and by leaving IEDs in taxis, the group was able to increase 
confusion and minimize response-force effectiveness. Handlers in Pakistan provided live 
command and control to the terrorists and helped them plan responses to security forces. With 
support from pre-positioned caches of ammunition and food, the group was able to sustain their 
assaults and hostage taking operations (Roggio, B).  In 60 hours of fighting, 173 civilians were 
killed and over 300 wounded; one terrorist was captured and the other nine were killed.  
The terrorists used two distinctive tactics to carry out their attacks:  Tactic 1 Hit and Run: 
terrorists advanced quickly attacking with AK-47s and grenades, targeting large groups and then 
retreating from security and moving on to other targets. Tactic 2 Seize and Hold: terrorists 
gained entry and immediately started firing indiscriminately at groups of people and taking 
hostages (Roggio, B).  Attackers used detailed knowledge of the facility layout to their 
advantage, selecting additional targets until they established strong-points to defend against 
security. Details of the 60-hour siege suggest the attackers had planned the attack several months 
ahead of time and knew some areas well enough for the attackers to vanish and reappear after 
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security forces had left. Blood tests on the attackers indicate that they had taken illegal narcotics 
during the attacks to sustain the energy necessary for the continuous 60 hour confrontation 
(McElroy, D). Questioning of the lone surviving gunman indicated attackers had used a program 
such as Google Earth to familiarize themselves with the locations of buildings used in the attack.  
India‘s Short and Long Term Response  
The police were able to gain control of the situation at the CSP train station, cafe, and 
cinema fairly quickly, though they were unable to handle the hostage situation at the hotels, the 
hospital, and the Jewish Center.  The Sherman Kent Analytic Doctrine states: ―there needs to be 
a candid Admission of Mistakes‖ in the Mumbai incident. The police officials admitted they 
were "overwhelmed" by the attacks and unable to contain the fighting (Roggio, B). Following 
the Mumbai terrorist attack, Pakistan pledged to the Security Council that it would take action 
against LeT and its front organization Jamaat-ud-Dawa.  The Rand report titled The Lessons of 
Mumbai identified the issues in the aftermath of the attacks that were considered serious 
weaknesses with India‘s homeland security and the ability to mitigate them. These were 
intelligence failures, lack of coordination, gaps in coastal surveillance, inadequate ―Target 
Hardening,‖  inadequate counterterrorism training and equipment for local police, limitations of 
municipal fire and emergency services, incomplete execution of response protocols, a flawed 
hostage-rescue plan, and poor strategic communications and Information management. Looking 
back to September 11, 2001 India was experiencing some of the same issue that the United 
States had (Rabasa, A).    
Ideology 
 The Qur‘an is central to their ideology. LeT subscribes to the strict fundamentalist 
interpretation of Islam upheld in the Wahhabi theological tradition. Based on this radical 
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interpretation of Islam, which is closely related to that associated with Al Qaeda, LeT seeks to 
establish an Islamic caliphate and has declared the U.S., Israel and India as existential enemies of 
Islam (ADL). ―This symbol features a blue circle enclosed by a black border. The center image 
includes a black AK-47 rifle, placed against a yellow sun that extends vertically from an open, 
green Qur‘an. Above the rifle is a black, semi-circular Qur‘anic phrase that reads in Arabic ‗And 
fight them on until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in 
Allah.‘‖ The white, Arabic lettering, set against a red background, bears the group‘s original 
name: Markaz al-Dawa wa al-Irshad (the Center for Preaching and Guidance) (ADL). 
Principals   
 Co-Founder and Leader: Hafiz Muhammad Saeed:  (Global Jihad 1); Co-Founder and 
Chief of Operations and Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi a.k.a. Abdullah Azam a.k.a"Chacha"(Global 
Jihad 2). 
AQ-affiliation   
 According to the U.S. State Department, LeT has several thousand members in Pakistan 
and Kashmir, most of whom are Pakistani and Afghan veterans of the Afghan wars. LeT is also 
strengthened through collaborations with other terrorist groups comprised of non-Pakistanis and, 
after a senior Al Qaeda leader was captured in an LeT safe house in March 2002, has been linked 
to Al Qaeda (ADL).  
Modus Operandi   
 LeT has conducted terrorist operations against Indian troops and civilian targets in 
Kashmir using assault rifles, light and heavy machine guns, mortars, explosives and rocket-
propelled grenades, according to the U.S. State Department.  LeT has also carried out several 
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high-profile attacks against civilian and military targets in India, including suicide bombings and 
conventional assault tactics (ADL). 
Status on the U.S. Department of State‘s Lists of Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations and 
Ties to State Sponsors  
 Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) is listed as number 23 alphabetically not necessarily by threat 
ranking.   They have been designated by the Secretary of State as a Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations (FTOs); the list was updated in September 2011 (U.S. Department of State 2011). 
 Sponsors    
 LeT was established with the aid of Pakistan‘s intelligence agency, Inter-Service 
Intelligence (ISI), which also opposes Indian presence in Kashmir. The ISI allegedly provided 
LeT with funding, weapons, intelligence and instruction in exchange for promising to confine its 
attacks to Hindus in Kashmir. This financial and logistical support seemingly ended in January 
2002 when Pakistan banned the group and froze its assets, following the United States 
designation of LeT as a foreign terrorist organization the previous month (U.S. Department of State 
April 30, 2008, U.S. Department of State 2008). 
Identifying Pre-2008 Attacks 
2006 Mumbai train attacks; series of coordinated IED blasts on trains in city  
Dec. 2005 attack on the Indian Institute of Science  
July 2005 attack on the Ayodhya temple 
Dec. 2001 Indian Parliament ttack; targeted Indian politicians in suicide attack on location 
March 1993 Mumbai attacks; multiple coordinated VBIED attacks throughout city 
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2011 Mumbai Terrorist Attacks 
 On July 13, 2011 three coordinated explosions ripped through Mumbai, India killing 21 
and injuring 131 people. The explosions took place during rush hour at the southern Opera 
House district, in the Zaveri Bazaar jewelry market, and near a transport hub in the suburb of 
West Dadar, a few miles north of the city center. These areas often attract tourists from around 
the world and are some of the most crowded parts of the city.  Currently no group has claimed 
responsibility for the attack; however government officials suggest that likely attackers could be 
the Indian Mujahideen1. The terrorist group claimed responsibility for a series of blasts in 
various cities across the country in 2008. It is believed to be a shadow organization of the banned 
Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) and Lashkar-e- Tayyiba (English News). 
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Chapter 8 
Civil Liberties and Fundamental Human Rights: 
International Human Rights 
Adherence to our values is what distinguishes us from our enemy. This fight depends on 
securing the population, which must understand that we, not our enemies, occupy the 
moral high ground.           
       General David Petraeus 
Give to every human being every right that you claim for yourself.  
        Robert Ingersoll 
No man is above the law and no man below it.                                     
        Theodore Roosevelt 
What makes us a great nation is that this is a country that understands that people have 
God-given rights and liberties. And we cannot—in our efforts to bring justice—diminish 
those liberties.”            
Senator George Allen (R-VA) 
Introduction 
This chapter of my Masters project is designed to combine policy making, security, and 
human rights into a single dialogue regarding the meaning, policies, role, and purpose of U.S. 
Homeland Security policy as a response to the threat of global terrorism. To that end, the 
audiences will not only come away with a better understanding of what Homeland Security is 
understood to be, but see also how it fits in the wider understanding of security, civil liberties, 
and fundamental human rights. Particular emphasis will be placed on where the logic of security, 
liberties, and rights are in conflict or at least require balancing in regards to the threat posed by 
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terrorism, as well as how understanding of the threat shapes those conflicts and impacts efforts to 
create an acceptable balance.  
Overview  
In the past ten years the international community has taken on a new focus when dealing 
with human rights. Governmental and non-governmental organizations are realizing that some 
countries take precedent over other countries when it comes to human rights. Cases that violate 
human rights are being taken more seriously than ever before. International prosecution against 
individuals has been taking place more frequently than ever; however, I don‘t believe the 
conviction rate is sufficient.  Human rights are relevant to terrorism as concerns both its victims 
and its perpetrators. The concept of human rights was first expressed in the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, which established "recognition of the inherent dignity and 
inalienable rights of all members of the human family." The innocent victims of terrorism suffer 
an attack on their most basic right to live in peace and security.  Human Rights violations occur 
all over the world. From disappearances and extra-judicial executions, to the use of torture and 
police abuse, to violations of the rights to food, housing and health care, human beings are 
seldom able to enjoy the full extent of their recognized rights.  
The issue of Human Rights has occupied the international agenda for a long time, and 
naturally international relations literature has discussed this issue from different perspectives. 
Natural rights are understood to be the rights derived from nature and associated with the natural 
order of things, such as life. Closely related are human rights, which are those basic rights and 
freedoms that one is endowed with by simply being human. These rights normally include the 
right to life and liberty, freedom of thought and expression, and equality before the law.  
What are Human Rights? 
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The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) defines human rights 
as rights inherent in all human beings, whatever nationality, place of residence, sex, national or 
ethnic origin, color, religion, language, or any other status. We are all equally entitled to our 
human rights without discrimination. These rights are all interrelated, interdependent and 
indivisible. Civil rights simply means that people have the right to be treated the same regardless 
of their race, gender, or religion. These rights are law in the United States as well as many other 
nations. 
According to Encyclopedia Britannica, human rights are universal rights held to belong 
to individuals by virtue of their being human, encompassing civil, political, economic, social, 
and cultural rights and freedoms, and based on the notion of personal human dignity and worth. 
Conceptually derived from the theory of natural law and originating in Greco-Roman doctrines, 
the idea of human rights appears in some early Christian writers‘ works and is reflected in the 
Magna Carta (Encyclopedia Britannica). Human rights refer to the concept of human beings 
having universal rights, or status, regardless of legal jurisdiction or other localizing factors, such 
as ethnicity, nationality, and sex. As is evident in the United Nations Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, human rights, at least in the post-war period, are conceptualized as based on 
inherent human dignity (United Nations). As Jack Donnelly says, ―international human rights 
policies are one point of national foreign policies which all states consider to be appropriately 
driven primarily by the pursuit of national interest‖ (Donnelly, J). When dealing with human 
rights issues, sometimes the United States will want the help of both parties to a regional conflict 
and cannot reward one party at the expense of another. A good example of this is with Israel and 
Egypt. The United States cannot afford to abandon long-standing allies. Such actions will have 
their own costs and risks. But the United States must be much more disciplined in its choices, 
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and much more familiar with the views of others, if it is to maintain this coalition over the long 
term. In the years since the Cold War ended, the United States has been powerful, and relatively 
impulsive. It has often acted against the interests of others in pursuit of modest gains, as it did in 
the case of NATO expansion.  The existence and the content of human rights continue to be the 
subject of debate.  Legally, human rights are defined in international law and covenants, and 
further, in the domestic laws of many states. However, for many people the doctrine of human 
rights goes beyond law and forms a fundamental moral basis for regulating the contemporary 
geo-political order (Donnelly, J). They see them as democratic ideals. 
United States Policy on Human Rights 
The protection of fundamental human rights was a foundation stone in the establishment 
of the United States over 200 years ago. Since then, a central goal of U.S. foreign policy has 
been the promotion of respect for human rights as embodied in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (US Department of State). The United States understands that the existence of 
human rights helps secure the peace, deter aggression, promote the rule of law, combat crime and 
corruption, strengthen democracies, and prevent humanitarian crises(United Nations). The U.S. 
State Department believes strongly that the promotion of human rights is an important national 
interest; the United States seeks to ―hold governments accountable for their obligations under 
universal human rights norms and international human rights instruments; promote greater 
respect for human rights, including freedom from torture, freedom of expression, press freedom, 
women's rights, children's rights, and the protection of minorities; promote the rule of law, seek 
accountability, and change cultures with impunity; assist efforts to reform and strengthen the 
institutional capacity of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the UN 
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Commission on Human Rights; and coordinate human rights activities with important allies, 
including the EU and regional organizations‖ (US Dept. of State). 
On September 21, 2004 President George Bush spoke to the United Nations General 
Assembly:   
“The United Nations and my country share the deepest commitments. Both the American 
Declaration of Independence and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaim the equal 
value and dignity of every human life. That dignity is honored by the rule of law, limits on the 
power of the state, respect for women, protection of private property, free speech, equal justice, 
and religious tolerance. That dignity is dishonored by oppression, corruption, tyranny, bigotry, 
terrorism and all violence against the innocent. And both of our founding documents affirm that 
this bright line between justice and injustice -- between right and wrong -- is the same in every 
age, and every culture, and every nation” (White House) 
United Nations Declaration of Human Rights 
In the aftermath of World War II, many political scientists, social theorists, and notable 
individuals and diplomats saw the need for a directive type of approach to prevent a repeat of the 
horrors that occurred in the 1930s and 1940s. From this the United Nations and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights were born.  The Declaration attempted to codify rights and 
freedoms that belong to each human being in the global community. 
On December 10, 1948 the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted and 
proclaimed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations-CT), a thirty article 
declaration that lays out, unequivocally, the fundamental rights of mankind. The second main 
function was to develop new and effective ways on finding offenders and stopping them. The 
main focus in this treaty pertains to abolishing slavery and the slave trade. All of the non-
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governmental organizations (NGO‘s) the United Nations, Amnesty, and the Human Rights 
Watch defend human rights to their fullest extent (Amnesty International). Though most 
countries have signed the United Nations Universal Declarations of Human Rights, many human 
rights issues remain unaddressed and unresolved. The enforcement of international humanitarian 
law is critical not only for the protection of civilians living under occupation, but also in 
preserving prospects for peace and security. Human rights are frequently held to be universal in 
the sense that all people have and should enjoy them, and to be independent in the sense that they 
exist and are available as standards of justification and criticism whether or not they are 
recognized and implemented by the legal system or officials of a country. Human rights rest 
upon moral universalism and the belief in the existence of a truly universal moral community 
comprising all human beings. Moral universalism posits the existence of rationally identifiable 
trans-cultural and trans-historical moral truths. There is much disagreement about when and to 
what extent outside countries can engage in human intervention (Donnelly, J). 
The purpose of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), a 
department of the United Nations, is to promote and protect the enjoyment and full realization, 
by all people, of all rights established in the Charter of the United Nations and in international 
human rights laws and treaties (High Commissioner).  The mandate includes preventing human 
rights violations, securing respect for all human rights, promoting international cooperation to 
protect human rights, coordinating related activities throughout the United Nations, and 
strengthening and streamlining the United Nations system in the field of human rights (High 
Commissioner).  In addition to its mandated responsibilities, the Office leads efforts to integrate 
a human rights approach within all work carried out by United Nations agencies.  
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What is Homeland Security 
Terrorists and other violent extremists, particularly those inspired by al-Qaida‘s violent, 
extremist ideology, remain focused on attacking U.S. critical infrastructure. Al-Qaida, in 
particular, has demonstrated an enduring interest in attacking the critical infrastructure of major 
cities.  According to the National Strategy for Homeland Security, homeland security is ―a 
concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America‘s 
vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.‖ But 
I think they forgot some of the definition.  If you read deeper into the document, it further 
discusses that Homeland Security is a shared responsibility; it states, ―Under the President‘s 
proposal, the Department of Homeland Security will consolidate federal response plans and build 
a national system for incident management in cooperation with state and local governments‖ (US 
Government). 
The PATRIOT Act 
The PATRIOT Act, which allows for the free flow of information between the CIA and 
the FBI, was passed on October 25, 2001 by a Senate vote of 98 to 1 and a House vote of 357 to 
66 (16). In May 2011 the most recent extension of the Patriot Act passed the Senate 72 to 23 and 
the House 250 to 153 (United Nations-CT) .  We no longer feel as threatened, so the level of 
support is not as high as it was six weeks after the attacks. But it is still, relatively speaking, 
overwhelming (Davis). The PATRIOT Act (United and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism) was enacted following the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Its purpose was to expand the authority of U.S. law 
enforcement agencies to fight and counter terroristic acts. The American Civil Liberties Union 
has attempted to reverse some of these laws that have been enacted (USA PATRIOT Act).  I feel 
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that current laws that the United States has in place are not sufficient to effectively combat 
terrorism. In theory, punishment is handed out as a deterrent to prevent future criminal acts. Our 
laws and the guidelines for punishment were not designed to address national or international 
acts of terrorism, such as is the case with illegal immigration. With the fact that society and its 
moral beliefs are always changing and oftentimes quite different, a common ground must be 
defined that allows our country to fight an enemy that wishes to destroy the foundations of this 
country, while at the same time providing checks and balances on the government that will 
provide the necessary protections and prosecutions. Terrorists who are not U.S. citizens that are 
apprehended on United States soil should not be treated as normal criminals until the laws are 
changed to deal appropriately with people that wish to cause death and major disruptions to the 
United States economy. United States citizens that are involved in terrorist acts should be 
allowed the same constitutional rights as every other citizen until a determination can be reached 
that they have or were planning terrorist acts. Therefore modification of current law to address 
terrorism and establishment of better checks and balances on government agencies are needed 
(USA PATRIOT ACT). 
September 11 Detainees 
More than 1,200 people were detained in the two months following the September 11 
attacks (Office of the Inspector General). The Justice Department classified 762 of them as 
September 11 detainees, defined as those detained on immigration violations allegedly in 
connection with the investigation of the attacks (Office of the Inspector General).  A 198-page 
report issued by the OIG in June 2003 makes clear, however, that many of the detainees did not 
receive core due process protections, and the decision to detain them was at times extremely 
attenuated. From the focus of the September 11 investigation (Office of the Inspector General) 
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the OIG finding was that the vast majority of the detainees were accused not of terrorism-related 
offenses, but of civil violations of federal immigration law. This calls into serious question a 
recent decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia to uphold the Justice 
Department‘s decision to withhold the names of the September 11 detainees. The court‘s opinion 
relied explicitly on its conclusion that many of the detainees had links to terrorism, and therefore 
that public access to any of their names could interfere with the government‘s ongoing efforts to 
fight terrorism (Office of the Inspector General). The OIG conclusion that the designation of the 
detainees as of interest to the September 11 investigation was made in an indiscriminate and 
haphazard manner, catching many aliens who had no connection to terrorism in their net, 
seriously undermines the basis of the Court of Appeals holding (Office of the Inspector General).   
Beyond this, the September 11 detainees were subject to a set of Justice Department policies that 
resulted in serious violations of their due process rights. First, the Justice Department 
implemented a ―hold until cleared‖ policy under which all non-citizens in whom the FBI had an 
interest required clearance by the FBI of any connection to terrorism before they could be 
released.  The Inspector General concluded that the clearance process was not conducted in a 
timely manner:  it was understaffed and was not accorded sufficient priority.  The OIG reported 
that the average time from arrest to clearance was 80 days and less than 3 percent of the 
detainees were cleared within 3 weeks of arrest (Office of the Inspector General). 
Second, the Justice Department issued a regulation that increased from 24 to 48 hours the 
time that the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) could detain someone in custody 
without charge (Office of the Inspector General). Detention without charge could continue 
beyond this for a reasonable period of time in the event of an emergency or other extraordinary 
circumstance (Office of the Inspector General). The terms ―reasonable period of time,‖ 
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―emergency‖ and ―extraordinary circumstance‖ were not defined.  The expanded authority 
applied even to detainees who were not charged with a crime or suspected of presenting a risk to 
the community. With the new regulations in place, many detainees did not receive notice of the 
charges against them for weeks, and some for more than a month after being arrested (Office of 
the Inspector General). Consistent with early data, the OIG reports that 192 detainees waited 
longer than 72 hours to be served with charges; 24 were held between 25-31 days before being 
served; 24 were held more than 31 days before being served; and five were held an average of 
168 days before being served (Office of the Inspector General). Further, because INS did not 
record when a charging decision was made, the OIG concluded that it was impossible to 
determine how often the INS took advantage of the reasonable time exception to the charging 
rule (Office of the Inspector General).  
Third, the lack of timely notice of the charges against them undermined the detainees‘ 
ability to obtain legal representation, to request bond, and to understand why they were being 
detained.  In addition, the Inspector General found that detainees had been prevented from 
contacting lawyers during a communications blackout at the Metropolitan Detention Center 
(MDC) in Brooklyn, New York, and detainees‘ families and attorneys were unable to receive any 
information about them, including where they were held (Office of the Inspector General). In 
some cases, attorneys were told that their clients were not detained at MDC when in fact they 
were. According to the OIG report, the first legal call made by any September 11 detainee held at 
MDC was not until October 15, 2001. This blackout, in conjunction with access-to-counsel 
problems created by the charging delays and restrictive legal access policies like that at MDC, 
seriously impaired detainees‘ ability to obtain counsel‘s advice precisely when they needed it 
most (Office of the Inspector General). 
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According to the Military Commissions Act of 2006, the term ―alien‖ means an 
individual who is not a citizen of the United States. The term ―unlawful enemy combatant‖ 
means an individual determined by or under the authority of the President or the Secretary of 
Defense: a) ―to be part of or affiliated with a force or organization; including but not limited to al 
Qaeda, the Taliban, any international terrorist organization, or associated forces—engaged in 
hostilities against the United States or its co-belligerents in violation of the law of war; b) to have 
committed a hostile act in aid of such a force or organization so engaged; or c) to have supported 
hostilities in aid of such a force or organization so engaged. ―Alien unlawful enemy combatants, 
as defined in 16, section 948a of this title, shall be subject to trial by military commissions as set 
forth in this chapter (10). The United States was once considered to be a world leader for 
democracy and we need to utilize the existing, established law accordingly. Laws already exist 
for prisoners of war, spies, those committing espionage and domestic criminals. Creating new 
laws that, when examined by the Supreme Court, are unconstitutional, and/or circumvent 
existing laws, in an automatic response to fear, is not the answer. Perhaps trial by the 
International Court of Justice is the answer. It would certainly go a long way to reestablishing the 
United States as a world leader in human rights. 
There is a clear delineation between prisoners of war (POW), enemy prisoners of war 
(EPW), and other detainees. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 
(GPW) and the United States Army define the following: enemy prisoner of war (EPW) is a 
detained person, as defined in Articles 4 and 5 of the GPW, in particular, one who, while 
engaged in combat under orders of his or her government, is captured by the armed forces of the 
enemy. As such, he or she is entitled to the combatant‘s privilege of immunity from the 
municipal law of the capturing state for warlike acts that do not amount to breaches of the law of 
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armed conflict. For example, an EPW may be, but is not limited to, any person belonging to one 
of the following categories of personnel who have fallen into the power of the enemy: a member 
of the armed forces, organized militia or volunteer corps, a person who accompanies the armed 
forces without actually being a member thereof, a member of a merchant marine or civilian 
aircraft crew not qualifying for more favorable treatment, or individuals who, on the approach of 
the enemy, spontaneously take up arms to resist invading forces (Department of the Army).  
Other detainees are  persons in the custody of the U.S. Armed Forces who have not been 
classified as an EPW (Article 4, GPW), retained personnel (Article 33, GPW), and civilian 
internees (Articles 27, 41, 48, and 78, GC) shall be treated as EPWs until a legal status is 
ascertained by competent authority, for example, by Article 5 Tribunal (Department of the 
Army).  
Torture  
As Americans we should not advocate torture as a means to extract information. From a 
legal standpoint the repercussions that would descend on America for conducting torture can be 
severe, as the soldiers who participated in the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal are now 
finding out. The simple answer, "I was following orders," does not hold in today‘s military (FOX 
News). The My Lai massacre in Vietnam was atrocious but it has had a sweeping effect upon 
how the military views and reacts to torture. Although many other countries use torture to extract 
information, if the US starts to extract information through torture, we are opening up the doors 
to our enemies who use it, that we now condone torture (Fox News).  
 I offer the following: torture is not as reliable as other methods (psychological) of 
gathering information. I am fully aware of the mental and physical aspects of torture and 
understand that terrorists do not abide by the same rules. If you beat an individual and ask 
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questions, he will provide answers and tell you what you want to hear. Is the information 
reliable? Is the source considered credible?  
 Political scientist Harold William Rood, who for ten years taught field interrogation of 
prisoners of war in military intelligence schools, explained the institutionalization challenge as 
follows: many agencies must coordinate in a counterterrorist operation. Reliability and 
accountability are therefore essential. Outlaws and madmen cannot be hired as torturers by an 
otherwise orderly agency. The torturers have to be well trained and professional: "To 
deliberately torture a person over a period of six weeks is asking a lot of human beings. And 
therefore you have to recruit them very carefully." This is the work of a highly trained team of 
interrogators (Arrigo, J).  
 Congress has introduced legislation to limit the rights of enemy combatants to challenge 
their detention in federal court while other measures, led by Senator McCain, seek to close 
loopholes in current anti-torture laws.  Senator McCain served as a naval aviator seeing combat 
in the Vietnam War and was held as a prisoner of war for five and a half years, from 1967 to 
1973. He understands torture and the implications of utilizing these methods. Furthermore, as 
Colin Powell and others have argued, if the United States unilaterally reinterprets Common 
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to permit torture, potential adversaries in future conflicts 
will feel justified in doing the same thing (Arrigo, J).  
Preemption and Foreign Policy 
 When it comes to fighting terrorism the option of preemptive action is necessary in 
foreign policy because successful terrorism does not warn its victims of impending danger. It is 
by nature covert and depends on evading detection until the attack is complete. Defending 
against terrorism requires advanced knowledge of the identities of the terrorists and their 
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intentions whenever possible. Obtaining that information and neutralizing terrorists before they 
can strike involves preemptive thinking on our part. It is this mode of thinking that is part of the 
preemption debate. This policy is somewhat foreign to both the popular and legal thinking in the 
United States and abroad. But this is primarily because we and the international community are 
at ease using surveillance, detection, and apprehension methods to find, arrest, and try criminals 
who have committed crimes, but not those who have yet to commit them. For this reason and 
others, serious concerns about preemption abound as a legitimate foreign policy strategy (US 
Department of State). 
But in meeting the threats we face, we need to think differently about the world we live in 
and the foreign policy decisions we make to defeat terrorism.  For decades the United States has 
addressed these threats as a criminal problem. But according to some terrorism experts we need 
to go beyond the legal system and treat terrorism as a political issue, which can affect foreign 
policy. Such policies demand the collaborative efforts of the executive and legislative branches 
to provide an objective and measured response in the face of danger. 
For example, the US PATRIOT Act enacted after 9/11 enabled the United States ―to 
begin improved information sharing between the intelligence communities and law enforcement 
domestically and internationally. This resulted in the State Department designating 39 entities as 
terrorist organizations pursuant to the Patriot Act; 110 individuals were brought up on criminal 
charges, 60 of whom are in federal custody. The INS has detained 563 individuals on 
immigration violations alone…‖ (Ashcroft), all resulting from the collaborative efforts of the 
legislative and executive branches. 
In cooperation through the UN many countries have signed international agreements to 
deal with terrorism. There are eighteen such agreements covering such topics as sending accused 
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terrorists to other countries to face trial and returning hijacked airplanes. Not all countries have 
signed these agreements, and some countries do not abide by their terms, so they are not always 
effective.  Some of the detainees being held in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba have been questioned and 
interrogated and were due to be sent back to their homelands, who don‘t want them.  The 
international conventions do not always work, and they are not always followed by countries that 
harbor, or provide a safe place, for terrorists. But they provide justification for countries that do 
sign the conventions to enforce the rules or to punish countries that do not. Such punishment can 
include seizing financial assets or banning international trade with such countries (United 
Nations-CT). 
Immediately following September 11, the federal government started to use the 
immigration system as one of its primary tools in their investigation into the attacks on the World 
Trade Center and the Pentagon. Attorney General John Ashcroft made clear that he intended to 
use the immigration system's lax standards of protection to circumvent individual rights that are 
protected in our criminal justice system. On October 25, 2001 Ashcroft told a meeting of the 
United States Conference of Mayors that "taking suspected terrorists in violation of the law off 
the streets and keeping them locked up is our clear strategy to prevent terrorism within our 
borders" (Ashcroft, J). To Ashcroft this policy meant that ―if you overstay your visa, even by one 
day, we will arrest you. If you violate a local law, you will be put in jail and kept in custody as 
long as possible‖ (Ashcroft, J). The government has chosen to assume that individuals with 
immigration violations, particularly Muslim, Middle Eastern, or South Asian men, are terrorists 
until proven otherwise (Ashcroft).  American policies and actions have kept the homeland safe 
from attack for a decade.  Over the course of the 10 years, American authorities foiled more than 
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two dozen al-Qaeda plots.  U.S. authorities have managed to keep America safe from al-Qaeda 
for a decade; by the time he was killed, Osama bin Laden was barely a leader (Ashcroft, J). 
There is debate about the use of military force to protect the human rights of individuals 
in other nations. This kind of debate stems largely from a tension between state sovereignty and 
the rights of individuals. Some defend the principles of state sovereignty and nonintervention and 
argue that other states must be permitted to determine their own course. It is thought that states 
have diverse conceptions of justice, and international coexistence depends on an ethic where 
each state can uphold its own conception of the good. States that presume to judge what counts 
as a violation of human rights in another nation interfere with that nation's right to self-
determination.  
In addition, requiring some country to respect human rights is liable to cause friction and 
can lead to far-reaching disagreements. Therefore, acts of intervention may disrupt interstate 
order and lead to further conflict. Past experience has demonstrated that the protection of human 
rights is not simply a matter of building consensus and will, but rather is intertwined on a larger 
scale with issues of development, freedom, and justice. In turn, development and justice depend 
inherently on sharing, at both the individual as well as the international level (Donnelly, J).  The 
success of sharing resources to secure human rights has been demonstrated many times by a 
multitude of human rights programs and occasionally on a larger scale by programs such as the 
International Red Cross, the Marshall Plan, and various United Nations programs.  
The threat posed by terrorists should not obscure the importance of human rights. How 
far should we go with this? Extra precautions have to be put in place to insure that the United 
States is doing everything possible to save and preserve human life against terrorist attacks in the 
future. Historically, the United States has been expansive in its compliance with the requirements 
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of international humanitarian law (the laws of war) with regard to belligerents captured in the 
course of an armed conflict. For example, the United States afforded prisoner-of-war status to 
Chinese soldiers captured during the Korean War even though the Peoples Republic of China 
was not a party to the 1949 Geneva Convention. It provided POW status to many captured 
guerrillas during the Vietnam War. During the 1991 Gulf War, the U.S. military convened 
special tribunals to determine the legal status of more than one thousand captured Iraqis, as the 
Geneva Convention required (Roth). The Bush administration broke with this long tradition in its 
treatment of terrorist suspects and others detained in the war against terrorism. The Bush 
administration also breached the rule of law to take custody of some detainees. In October 2001 
it sought the surrender in Bosnia of six Algerian men who were suspected of planning attacks on 
Americans. After a three-month investigation, Bosnia Supreme Court ordered the men‘s release 
from custody for lack of evidence. When rumors spread of U.S. efforts to seize the suspects 
anyway, the Bosnia Human Rights Chamber, which was established under the US-sponsored 
Dayton Peace Accord and includes six local and eight international members, issued an 
injunction against their removal. Yet in January 2002 under U.S. pressure, the Bosnian 
government ignored this legal ruling and delivered the men to U.S. forces, who whisked them 
out of the country, reportedly to Guantanamo (Roth, K).  
United Nations Universal Declarations of Human Rights 
Though most countries have signed the United Nations Universal Declarations of Human 
Rights, many human rights issues remain unaddressed and unresolved. The enforcement of 
international humanitarian law is critical not only for the protection of civilians living under 
occupation, but also in preserving prospects for peace and security. Human rights are frequently 
held to be universal in the sense that all people have and should enjoy them. They are 
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independent in the sense that they exist and are available as standards of justification and 
criticism whether or not they are recognized and implemented by the legal system or officials of 
a country. Human rights rest upon moral universalism and the belief in the existence of a truly 
universal moral community comprising all human beings (United Nations).  
Moral universalism posits the existence of rationally identifiable trans-cultural and trans-
historical moral truths. There is much disagreement about when and to what extent outside 
countries can engage in human intervention. More specifically, there is debate about the use of 
military force to protect the human rights of individuals in other nations. This sort of debate 
stems largely from a tension between state sovereignty and the rights of individuals (Donnelly, 
J). Some defend the principles of state sovereignty and nonintervention and argue that other 
states must be permitted to determine their own course. It is thought that states have diverse 
conceptions of justice, and that international coexistence depends on an ethic where each state 
can uphold its own conception of the good. States that presume to judge what counts as a 
violation of human rights in another nation interfere with that nation's right to self-determination. 
In addition, requiring some country to respect human rights is liable to cause friction and can 
lead to far-reaching disagreements (Donnelly, J).  
Therefore, acts of intervention may disrupt interstate order and lead to further conflict. 
Past experience has demonstrated that the protection of human rights is not simply a matter of 
building consensus and will, but is intertwined on a larger scale with issues of development, 
freedom, and justice. In turn, development and justice depend inherently on sharing, at both the 
individual as well as the international level. The success of sharing resources to secure human 
rights has been demonstrated many times by a multitude of human rights programs and 
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occasionally on a larger scale by programs such as the International Red Cross, the Marshall 
Plan, and various United Nations programs.  
Conclusion  
The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights is a thirty article declaration that lays 
out, explicitly, the fundamental rights inherent in mankind. Despite the important progress made 
in the discussion of collective rights in the last decades, a great deal remains to be done to 
resolve outstanding issues regarding those rights. To achieve a comprehensive understanding and 
united approach among governments and indigenous peoples on their rights will take a long time 
(United Nations). 
I believe it is necessary to give up some civil liberties in order to make the country safe 
from terrorism. I don‘t believe that we have lost many, if any, of them. I made the comment that 
we Americans are spoiled and believe we are entitled to everything. It may become necessary to 
give up certain rights that we cherish those same rights that some people of the world have never 
even had the pleasure to enjoy. As wrong as it may seem, I don‘t think that terrorists should 
enjoy the freedoms of the rest of the free world.  
The bottom line is that human beings, regardless of differences in circumstance, 
nationality, religion, physical condition, race, gender or age possess a basic and unconditional 
dignity that must be respected by governments and other people. Will there ever be true equality? 
Unfortunately I think the answer is no. The various and different cultures and mindsets around 
the world will affect total equality for all. The rest of the world looks at the United States for 
more than just aid or money. Because we are a world leader, others look to us for guidance. 
What they see are the strange turns that a great nation that holds its Constitution and laws sacred 
has taken.  
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The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides a designed goal for humanity, but 
we are far from achieving universal implementation. The protection of human rights has complex 
issues and problems that span the entire range of human experience. The simple first step in 
reaching a workable and lasting solution is to implement the principle of sharing on as wide a 
scale as possible. Not only are there sound arguments and historical evidence to support this 
approach, but it also remains a fact that essentially everything else has already been tried. 
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Chapter 9 
National Preparedness through Public, Private and Federal Partnerships 
Multidisciplinary approaches to homeland security   
“Homeland Security cannot begin and end at the doors of our federal department 
building in Washington, D.C. Washington can be expected to lead, but we cannot, nor 
should not, micro-manage the protection of our country. Instead, it must be a priority in 
every city, every neighborhood, and every home across America.” 
                                                                                                                         Secretary Tom Ridge  
“May I stress the need for courageous, intelligent, and dedicated leadership… Leaders of 
sound integrity. Leaders not in love with publicity, but in love with justice. Leaders not in 
love with money, but in love with humanity. Leaders who can subject their particular 
egos to the greatness of the cause.”  
 
                                                                                                              Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. 
There can be no question that emergency management has the moral and ethical 
responsibility to plan and provide for all citizens equally, to prepare for and respond to critical 
needs during and after an emergency or disaster, and to ensure that the vulnerable people in the 
surrounding communities are included in the process.  Terrorism and natural disasters have 
occupied the minds and awareness of Americans in recent years.  However, there are still 
unknowns about the thought process behind resilience and preparedness. Whatever 
improvements have been made to our capacity to respond to natural or man-made disasters ten 
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and half years after 9/11, we are still not fully prepared; there are many theories and perspectives 
that are often conflicting and confusing. 
In an ideal world every individual, agency, and local jurisdiction would be fully prepared 
for all hazards and disasters. Unfortunately, research indicates that only 35% of the U.S. 
population reports having taken any preparedness measures (Citizen Corps).  Instead, 37% of the 
populations expects first respondents (i.e., fire and police) to arrive on their doorsteps within one 
hour of a disaster onset; and a full 2/3 of the American population think help will arrive within a 
few hours (Redlener, I). 
This comes at a time when the resources of local jurisdictions are shrinking, and many 
are struggling to meet routine operational costs.  A major disaster will overwhelm local 
capabilities, and it may easily take three days or more for outside assistance to arrive.  Adding to 
the difficulty, the proliferation of lawsuits tells local governments and emergency management 
professionals that current planning efforts are often inadequate when it comes to reaching 
beyond the mainstream populations. They argue that all planning and response activities must be 
fully ―inclusive‖ and capable of dealing with all the potential needs for all populations, including 
those with physical or cognitive disabilities and other barriers. This requires additional, focused 
effort when personnel and resources are stretched thin already; and even emergency managers 
may not be entirely sure what is expected of them. The fact that public expectations may be 
unreasonable only adds to the challenge. 
In 2003 President Bush directed the development and implementation of the National 
Incident Management System (NIMS) through the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 
(HSPD-5).  NIMS is designed to provide a common, consistent approach for emergency 
management officials to respond to and recover from hazards.   
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On August 23, 2005 Hurricane Katrina formed as a tropical storm off the coast of the 
Bahamas. Over the next seven days the tropical storm grew into a catastrophic hurricane that 
made landfall first in Florida and then along the Gulf Coast in Mississippi, Louisiana, and 
Alabama, leaving a trail of heartbreaking devastation and human suffering. Katrina wreaked 
staggering physical destruction along its path, flooded the historic city of New Orleans, 
ultimately killed over 1,300 people and became the most destructive natural disaster in American 
history. The fear of the sheer ferocity of nature was soon matched with disappointment and 
frustration at the seeming inability of local, state and federal governments to respond effectively 
to the crisis. Hurricane Katrina and the subsequent sustained flooding of New Orleans exposed 
significant flaws in preparedness for catastrophic events and our capacity to respond to them 
(Townsend, F). 
Effectively organizing government structures for homeland security activities is still a 
work in progress. Following the deadly terrorist attack on September 11, 2001 and Hurricane 
Katrina in August and September of 2005, questions still generate with respect to the most 
effective organizational structure for federal and state governments in responding to natural and 
terrorist-related disasters.  The potential consequences of not having answered these questions, 
however, are much easier to identify. The negative consequences of ineffective organizational 
structures include sporadic and unreliable information-sharing, fragmented preparedness and 
response strategies, inefficient use of scarce resources and, potentially and most importantly, the 
needless loss of lives and property. 
No organization has the capability to deal singlehandedly with the preparation for, 
prevention of, response to, or recovery from a multi-jurisdictional natural or man-made disaster.  
Natural disasters such as hurricanes, wildfires and terrorist attacks do not recognize geographical 
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or jurisdictional boundaries, thus increasing challenges to both preparation and response.  
Coordination, collaboration, communication and cooperation are all necessary to achieve unity 
of effort in preparedness, prevention, response, and recovery.  It is important to engage and 
educate the public and media on homeland security issues because they play very large roles in 
the response to a disaster. Educating them on predicted actions, and actions they can take to 
protect themselves, are keys to efficient and productive disaster responses (Gerencser, M).    
The Preparedness Cycle 
 The preparedness cycle is comprised of seven essential phases; no matter the size of a 
sector or organization, all plans should follow the same construct.  Mastery of these tasks will 
improve the ability of any community to address a full range of hazards. A key way to determine 
how prepared a county, region, or state should be are three questions: how prepared do we need 
to be, how prepared are we, and how do we prioritize efforts to close the gap.  
DHS has provided a vast amount of material to assist communities at all levels. One of 
those tools is the Emergency Support Function (ESF), basically lists of capabilities in 
organizational structure to provide the support, resources, program implementation and services 
that are most likely to be needed to save lives, protect property and the environment, restore 
essential services and critical infrastructure and help victims and the community to return to 
normal (NRF). 
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Figure 1 
Planning makes it possible to manage the entire life cycle of an emergency, determine 
capability requirements, and help stakeholders learn their roles and respond to an incident 
capably and efficiently. It includes the collection and analysis of intelligence and information, as 
well as the development of policies, procedures, plans, mutual aid/assistance agreements, 
strategies and other arrangements necessary to perform the EM mission.  The planning process is 
dynamic and involves an ongoing system of updating plans based on results of drills, exercises, 
responses, changes in local, state, and federal rulings, updated knowledge about hazards and 
changes based on best practices of other jurisdictions (FEMA). 
Organizing to execute response activities includes developing an overall 
organizational structure, strengthening leadership at all levels and assembling well-qualified 
individuals and teams for essential readiness, response, and recovery tasks. The National 
Incident Management System (NIMS) provides standard command and management structures 
which apply to incident response (FEMA). 
Training to build essential readiness, response, and recovery capabilities requires a 
systematic program to meet a common baseline of performance standards (FEMA). 
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Equipping personnel with the necessary resources to perform assigned EM missions 
is an essential component of preparedness. Effective preparedness requires the identification, 
acquisition, deployment and sustainment strategies needed to conduct response and recovery 
missions; this includes the capability to communicate with the public, first responders/receivers 
and mutual aid partners, and higher headquarters (FEMA). 
Exercises provide opportunities to assess plans and capabilities and improve 
proficiency in a risk-free environment. Exercises are also a valuable tool for assessing and 
improving performance while demonstrating community resolve to prepare for major incidents 
(FEMA).  
Evaluating is a systematic assessment process that leads to judgments and decisions 
about plans, programs or policies (FEMA).   
Taking Corrective Action ensures a continual process of EM program improvement. 
A functional corrective action program will provide a method and define roles and 
responsibilities for prioritization, assignment, monitoring and reporting of corrective actions 
arising from training, exercises and actual emergencies (FEMA).    
Disciplines Associated with Needed Resources 
It is impossible to plan properly for a disaster if it causes unexpected disruptions on an 
organization.  Assessing the impact of an event includes not only estimating the quantitative or 
economic losses but also the collective impact on the organization‘s ability to operate, i.e. effects 
on personnel and the effect on the reputation of the organization.  Homeland security is an 
ongoing and shared responsibility across the nation. There are numerous public and private 
sector stakeholders who influence the direction of homeland security; all must work together to 
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develop and implement the homeland security strategy by building and maintaining necessary 
capabilities (NRF). 
FEMA has provided the emergency management community with some extremely 
useful tools, specifically lists of Mission Essential Functions (MEFs), which refers to those 
functions of such importance that they must be performed during, and in the immediate 
aftermath, of an emergency and which cannot be postponed longer than 24 hours.  MEFs that 
cannot be executed may be transferred to another organization. There are a total of fifteen FEMA 
Emergency Support Functions (ESF) which provide the structure for coordinating federal 
interagency support for a federal response to an incident (FEMA).  
The National Response Framework (NRF) details 15 ESFs in place to coordinate 
operations during federal involvement in an emergency: transportation, communications, public 
works, engineering, firefighting, information and planning, mass care, resource support, health 
and medical services, urban search and rescue, hazardous materials, food and energy. Emergency 
management provides the means for coordinating resources and assets necessary to alleviate the 
impact of an emergency or disaster on residents and public entities.  Coordination occurs 
between emergency management entities and federal, state, county and local jurisdictions as well 
as with volunteer agencies and private business.  
Differences between Emergency Management and Homeland Security 
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), a federal agency established in 
response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, has three primary responsibilities: to 
prevent terrorist attacks inside the United States; to reduce the nation's vulnerability to terrorist 
attacks and the damage caused by them; and to coordinate quick and effective recovery if 
terrorist attacks occur (History). 
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The Department of Homeland Security, according to its assigned response mission, is to 
lead, manage and coordinate the national response to acts of terrorism, natural disasters, or other 
emergencies.  The challenge for public safety and security is that the federal government only 
provides assistance when local agencies are overwhelmed or are depleted. The fundamental 
responsibility of public safety falls with local and state governments.  DHS coordinates its 
activities with other federal entities devoted to national security, particularly intelligence 
agencies, such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the U.S. military, and the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI).  In addition DHS works with state and local agencies that provide 
the first government assistance following a terrorist attack (History). 
The Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) is an agency within DHS 
and the federal government that is responsible for emergency planning and preparedness, as well 
as recovery assistance and coordination following natural or human-caused disasters.  Depending 
on the situation, FEMA either provides direct assistance to those in need or works with various 
federal, state, local, and nonprofit agencies to coordinate responses to emergency situations.  The 
goal in response to disasters is to lead, manage and coordinate the national response, not the local 
response. This response is crucial to ensuring the health and welfare of the survivors of the 
disaster. They are responsible for reducing the loss of life and property and protecting the nation 
from all hazards. FEMA is divided into 10 regions; its job it is to work with the Emergency 
Managers from the states to procure the appropriate response from the federal government 
(FEMA 3). 
Emergencies that warrant either a local, state, or federal effort can include a variety of 
situations. Natural disasters include earthquakes, floods, tornados, hurricanes, blizzards, mud-
slides, and volcanoes; fires can be set accidentally (by lightning storms or by careless campers) 
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or they can be set deliberately by arsonists; transportation disasters include airline crashes, train 
crashes and derailments, boat accidents, highway pileups and accidents, and anything that 
disrupts the ability of people to move from one place to another; hazardous materials 
emergencies include oil spills, hazardous waste spills, and nuclear accidents; invasions and 
attacks could come from military or terrorist sources.  Depending on the size and location of the 
emergency, local municipalities may take the primary charge, with state and federal agencies 
providing backup. Emergency management can also come from the private or corporate sector; 
mining accidents, for example, are usually handled primarily by the mining company whose on-
site miners are most familiar with the safest and most efficient rescue procedures. 
Civilian agencies can offer a great deal of aid during emergencies, in part because,  
thanks to large networks, they are able to mobilize supplies and volunteers quickly. Two of the 
oldest and best known are the American Red Cross and the Salvation Army.  The private sector 
can play a vital role in emergency management, both during and after the emergency event. 
Businesses that have specialized skills, in transportation, for example, can provide trained 
volunteers and equipment to assist in emergency management efforts. A food services business 
can provide meals for emergency personnel. Companies with excess space can house equipment 
or people. 
“State and local levels of governments have primary responsibility for funding, preparing, and 
operating the emergency services that would respond in the event of a terrorist attack.”  
National Strategy for Homeland Security, July 2002 
Megacommunity and Whole Community Concepts 
A megacommunity is a new approach to solving problems which cover business, 
government and the communities in which we live. A megacommunity is a region in which 
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multifaceted problems exist and are addressed in a collaborative environment. Here leaders 
interact according to their common interests, while maintaining their unique priorities; simply 
put it is a tool which can examine complex problems in new ways. The five critical elements of a 
megacommunity are tri-sector engagement, overlap in vital interests, convergence, structure and 
adaptability. ―The objective for each organization operating in a megacommunity is achieved by 
optimizing its interests instead of maximizing; all participants gain. Best of all, operating in a 
megacommunity is not a zero-sum game‖ (Gerencser, M). 
Multidisciplinary relationships are groups of teams or people from different disciplines 
who come together for a common purpose.  The approach is used in a variety of settings 
including fires, natural disasters, sewage spills, HAZMAT issues, and terrorism. The concept is 
that it is best to address an issue or problem from all angles.  For an emergency management 
setting this means a holistic approach focusing on a variety of mission essential functions (NRF).  
The multidisciplinary relationship is typically used in difficult and complicated situations where 
a comprehensive response has the best chance of accomplishing the goals.  Emergencies and 
natural disasters come in many forms such as oil spills, earthquakes, tornados, floods, blizzards, 
fires, and volcanic eruptions. A particular disaster may be limited to one specific region, 
meaning that people in certain areas have only to prepare for those disasters which are likely to 
happen in their region.  
 I pose the common sense approach.  First and foremost, there needs to be a good 
relationship between stakeholders: if the surrounding communities can‘t get along, then there 
won‘t be any partnerships created.  If the leaders of the community get along, this helps create a 
non-hostile environment, and if the leaders support a program or process, their subordinates will 
do the same.  
CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS          193 
 
 Once the community comes together a charter needs to be established.  A vision and 
mission statement needs to be developed from the beginning.  In my opinion the one in charge 
during the forming of the relationship depends on who has the most to provide and 
lose.  Additionally resources shouldn‘t be just doled out arbitrarily.  All stakeholders should 
provide their time, although sometimes this will be burdensome; they will need to be part of a 
team to help mitigate and respond to incidents that may occur in their jurisdiction.  ―Involvement 
in a megacommunity allows any participating [member] that is part of any sector to use the 
abilities, the understanding, and even the prejudices of the other sectors‖ (Gerencser, M). 
 According to the FEMA web site, ―many states and big cities are actively entering into 
public-private partnerships to improve their capabilities in emergency management.‖  Every 
jurisdiction is in a resource crunch and we will see, as resources dwindle more rapidly than 
expected, the relationships will only get stronger.  FEMA also states: ―We can share successful 
models and best practices‖ (FEMA 2).   Many of the military branches currently utilize best 
practices web sites.  More often than not, one organization‘s best practice can save thousands of 
dollars and man hours simply by sharing the information.   
The Community and Regional Resilience Initiative is a very well thought out and 
prepared document.  It does not answer all the questions everyone will have, but it is a great 
starting point for agencies that have nothing in place; the most important aspect of this document 
is that it encourages agencies, organizations, and communities to start thinking (CARRI).  The 
majority of the documents on the FEMA site (FEMA 2) were prepared by non-profit 
organizations and for the most part outline what communities need to practice or do. A 
continuous flow of critical information needs to be maintained among multi-jurisdictional and 
multi-disciplinary emergency responders, command posts, agencies, and officials, for the 
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duration of the emergency response operation, in compliance with the NIMS. There needs to be 
structure and a process for ongoing collaboration between organization stakeholders at all levels; 
volunteers and nongovernmental resources need to be incorporated in plans and exercises; the 
public needs to be educated, trained, and aware; external partners need to be included in 
education, training, and exercise initiatives.  
Multi-disciplinary Approaches to Homeland Security through Dialogue  
There is no one-size-fits-all solution on how to plot a course for organizational change 
when the boss believes in holding to the status quo. But some idea of basic direction needs to be 
kept in mind when attempting to convince top management to support a multi jurisdictional 
partnership.  To get an organization to communicate well internally, members must first want to 
be part of whatever the goal; they must take ownership or buy in.  Once that occurs, the rest 
should come more easily.   
According to DHS, metrics or benchmarks for achieving collaboration include 
―formalizing mutual aid agreements with surrounding communities and states to share 
equipment, personnel, and facilities during emergencies; conducting exercises of the execution 
of mutual aid agreements to identify the challenges and familiarize officials with resources that 
are available in the region; and coordinating homeland security preparedness assistance 
expenditures and planning efforts on a regional basis to avoid duplicative or inconsistent 
investments.‖ Pre-planning at a regional level can also reduce stress during an actual event by the 
knowledge of available assets in a defined region, the knowledge and trust of those who will be 
responding to provide aid and assistance, and a defined set of roles and responsibilities according 
to National Incident Management System (NIMS) standards (FEMA 3). 
            The National Strategy for Homeland Security calls upon state governments to manage the 
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interface and inter-jurisdictional relationships of all the agencies, as well as the private sector, 
which have a role in homeland security. A major challenge is that, as in all other government 
programs, the expectations of all the stakeholders far outweigh any reasonable availability of 
resources. Additionally, there is no clear information or assessment concerning what metrics or 
characteristics would determine a successful state homeland security from one that is not. 
Leveraging Existing Strengths in a Community 
There is a need to encourage organizations providing community services to collaborate 
and work together instead of competing.  It is recommended that the capacity of these 
organizations be promoted and strengthened, and that it include training in monitoring and 
evaluation. Coalitions of civil society organizations should be established to implement a 
coordinated response through a participatory and transparent process so that ordinary people can 
participate in a meaningful manner.  Programs should ensure that the synergy and energy of 
community members as well as their experience and resources are enhanced.  It is necessary to 
build on existing programs to provide the community a sense of ownership and to enhance their 
role in a community programs implementation (Gerencser, M).  
How to Lead a Multi-disciplinary Approach to Homeland Security 
Leaders must be able to interpret and focus on the big picture, plan and prioritize, 
improve performance influence, and manage resources. They must be able to lead and manage 
organizational environments that are responsive to change.  They need to facilitate strategies to 
manage tensions between long-term program goals and the short-term organizational pressures.  
Leaders must be clever enough to apply leadership and management skills to effectively set a 
clear vision and guide entire community programs toward greater performance.  The ability to 
formulate short and long-term goals for the megacommunity by selecting effective objectives 
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and determining priorities consistent with local goals is important; Anticipating and 
implementing innovative strategies to link strategic vision to core program capabilities are just a 
few requirements to lead in a multi-jurisdictional environment (Gerencser, M).   
Federal Initiatives  
The National Response Framework (NRF) is a 2008 iteration of the National Response 
Plan (NRP) which addressed the limitations contained within that document, the least not being 
the fact that the name itself was misleading as that document did not satisfy the requirements of a 
plan (NRF).  The NRF recognizes that all disasters are different, and the conditions and 
resources available to respond will be different across communities. Essentially, the NRF can be 
adapted to any size and type event in any environment. The Framework commits the federal 
government to work as a partner with all governmental jurisdictions and the private sector, to 
develop appropriate response strategies, to address the broad range of emergency types for a 
range of emergency incidents outlined in the National Preparedness Guidelines.  The NRF 
consists of several core documents which include the Emergency Support Function (ESF), 
support, incident annexes, and the Partner Guides. The main documents essentially provide 
national guidelines for response to all type emergencies by outlining the roles and 
responsibilities of responders, identifying responsible organizations, and listing other 
requirements to realize an effective and coordinated nationwide response to any emergency 
situation or event (NRF).  
The ideals of the NRF are contained in five principles which constitute the ―national 
response doctrine‖ (NRF).  The national response doctrine outlines the roles, responsibilities and 
operational concepts of responders across all the relevant response agencies, NGOs and 
jurisdictions. Fundamentally, the objectives of all response activities are centered upon saving 
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lives, relieving human sufferings, quickly restarting economic activity and returning the natural 
and built environment to its pre-impact state. The key principles constituting the national 
response doctrine are: engaged partnership, tiered response, scalable, flexible, and adaptable 
operational capabilities, unity of effort through unified command, and readiness to act (NRF). 
The Incident Command System (ICS) is a hierarchal command and control model 
designed to manage major events that involve a multijurisdictional and coordinated response 
among functional agencies, both public and private. It has a modular structure which allows for 
deployment and upgrade in an increasing complex situation and the integration of facilities, 
equipment and communications within an established command and control framework.  The 
adoptability and flexibility in the ICS has facilitated its employment for varied events across 
diverse organizations. The utility of the ICS is that it not only provides a structure for command 
and control but also facilitates planning and other post event activities.  
National Incident Management System (NIMS) is a system mandated by HSPD-5 that 
provides a consistent, nationwide approach for federal, state, local, and tribal governments, the 
private sector and non-governmental agencies to work effectively and efficiently together to 
prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or 
complexity. To provide for interoperability and compatibility among federal, state, local, and 
tribal capabilities, the NIMS includes a core set of concepts, principles, and terminology. HSPD-
5 identifies these as the Incident Command System, multi-agency coordination systems, training, 
identification and management of resources (including systems for classifying types of 
resources), qualification and certification, and the collection, tracking, and reporting of incident 
information and incident resources (NIMS). 
CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS          198 
 
Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 8 was developed in the wake of several natural and 
anthropogenic events (such as the 9/11 terrorist attack, hurricanes Katrina and Rita, BP 
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and H1N1 influenza) which caused significant environmental, 
physical and physiological damage to the United States, and which stand as threats to the future 
safety and security of its citizens. Several approaches were taken to strengthen the resilience of 
the U.S. through what was described as ―systematic preparation for the threats that pose the 
greatest risk to the security of the nation, including acts of terrorism, cyber-attacks, pandemics, 
and natural disasters‖ (PPD 8).  
In addition to the four capability-specific national priorities listed throughout this project, 
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security has issued three overarching priorities and one 
additional capability-specific priority, for a total of eight national priorities. These priorities are:  
1. Overarching priorities to implement the National Incident Management System and 
National Response Plan; expand regional collaboration; implement the National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan.   
2. Capability-Specific priorities to strengthen information-sharing and collaboration 
capabilities; strengthen interoperable communications capabilities; strengthen 
CBRNE detection, response and decontamination capabilities; strengthen medical 
surge and mass prophylaxis capabilities; strengthen emergency operations planning 
and citizen protection capabilities  
The national priorities are outlined in detail in the National Preparedness Goal, which 
was established under the direction of Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8). 
The vision of the goal is:  
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―To engage Federal, State, local, and tribal entities, their private and non-governmental 
partners, and the general public to achieve and sustain risk-based target levels of capability to 
prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from major events in order to minimize the 
impact on lives, property, and the economy‖.  (DHS)   
The goal is designed in conjunction with other federal initiatives, including the National 
Planning Scenarios, the Universal Task List, and the Target Capabilities List. These initiatives 
are designed to provide capabilities-based planning tools to the states, locals, and tribal entities. 
The results are intended to provide a common approach to national incident management (FEMA 
3).  
Where Do We Want to Go  
Presidents Bush and Obama have issued HSPD-5, HSPD-8, PPD-8, the NRF, and NIMS, 
among other directives and guidelines in order to effect necessary changes to the nation‘s 
readiness. The ultimate goal according to the collective documents appears to be to maximize 
collaboration amongst all levels of government and across as many jurisdictional lines as 
reasonably possible. Municipalities are to attempt to sustain their capabilities to manage disasters 
and engage all means at their disposal to include the private sector.  Businesses often have 
unique processes and procedures as well as items that could be of great value to response 
agencies and government officials. Organizations such as Wal-Mart operate on a global scale and 
have thousands of single stores that make over a million dollars in sales per day in some cases. 
Therefore, they are well qualified to provide logistical support to a disaster operation.  
A serious attempt has been made to integrate civilians into the national system for 
emergency management known as the National Incident Management System (NIMS) through 
volunteerism.  There are teams across America in local communities called Community 
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Emergency Response Teams (CERT) (FEMA 3).  A CERT program ―educates people about 
disaster preparedness for hazards that may impact their area and trains them in basic disaster 
response skills, such as fire safety, light search and rescue, team organization, and disaster 
medical operations‖ (Citizens Corps). Utilizing the knowledge and skills attained in the 
classroom and exercises, CERT members may assist their neighbors and fellow employees 
following an incident until the arrival of emergency professionals. CERT members also are 
encouraged to take a more active role in emergency preparedness projects in their community.  
Private sector partnerships, volunteer recruitment, and CERT training are all effective 
strategies being undertaken, yet there is currently little more than passive involvement of 
individuals through other networks. Most of the education is through internet websites which 
citizens must search to find. Unlike the days of civil defense, organizations are not being 
leveraged to handle the immediate needs of communities and neighborhoods to sustain them for 
the first 72 hours after a disaster strike. It is during this time that the stage is set for success or 
failure; this can be greatly impacted by civilians on the ground as seen in past disaster cases.  
Disaster response within the United States has an established and structured system 
which if properly utilized can significantly reduce the impact of natural and manmade events on 
the natural and built environment. Within this frame work is the National Incident Management 
System (NIMS) which is a template to enable multi-jurisdictional and multi-sector cooperation to 
prepare, prevent, respond, recover from and mitigate the effects of all hazards regardless of 
cause, size, location, or complexity. This is achieved through the command and control 
structures within the Incident Command System (ICS) which integrates operational systems in a 
common organizational structure and facilitates multi-sector and multi-jurisdictional disaster 
response. 
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Chapter 10 
Cyber Threats to Critical Infrastructure 
Technology and Critical Infrastructure Protection  
“Cyber terrorism could also become more attractive as the real and virtual worlds become more 
closely coupled, with automobiles, appliances, and other devices attached to the Internet.” 
                                                                                                     Dorothy Denning  
Prepared by Matthew J. Cassidy, Installation Antiterrorism Officer, United States Military 
Academy West Point, New York.  The purpose is to identify the current assessment of potential 
threats (Cyber threats) against the U.S. Military Academy, its personnel and the Academy‘s 
potential vulnerability to those threats.   
The purpose of this Masters Project is to analyze the national security threats that the 
United States, Department of Defense, Department of the Army and more specifically the United 
States Military Academy at West Point, must face with cyber-attacks from individual actors and 
enemy nations. Cyber-attacks are a severe threat to US national security that must not be 
underestimated. Cyber-attacks can not only threaten information security but could also cause 
physical harm to the country. The reason this sector is important to homeland security is the DoD 
is connected via various communication nodes. At West Point there is a non-secure internet 
Protocol Router Network (NIPRNet) and Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet).  In 
addition to these two systems there is the worldwide web and numerous other web based sites. 
The cyber sector was chosen for this Masters project in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for Technology and Critical Infrastructure Protection course, but more importantly 
it is to provide valuable information to the senior leaders of the Military Academy in anticipation 
that some countermeasures or mitigation techniques will be used to combat cyber terrorism.  
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There are ways that the Military Academy can combat this growing threat.  With a proactive 
approach and better coordination between various parts of the DoD, the threat of cyber-attacks 
can be met and the impact minimized.  As Presidential Decision Directive 63 states, critical 
infrastructures are those physical and cyber-based systems essential to the minimum operations 
of the economy and government. West Point is a very different military facility; the installation 
has a combination of federal and civilian assets.  Critical infrastructure includes 
telecommunications, energy, banking and finance, transportation, water systems and emergency 
services, both governmental and private (PDD-63).  Cyber-attacks vary in methods, severity and 
impact and have been used against many parts of the US infrastructure, including commercial 
and military targets.  The source of these attacks is both domestic and foreign, and it is often 
difficult to discern the motives or the perpetrators of these attacks (FBI). 
West Point is susceptible to many natural and terrorism (human-caused) 
hazards.  Knowledge of these hazards, the installation‘s vulnerability to them, and the 
capabilities in place to prevent them allows community stakeholders (e.g., leaders, emergency 
planners and responders, employees and residents) to better assess and mitigate their risks, and to 
manage their consequences (NIPP).  From an extended power outage to a terrorist incident, the 
potential for disruption of operations to the loss of life or damage to property is unprecedented. 
These dangers pose significant challenges for those involved in emergency planning, response 
and recovery operations because of resource limitations that may constrain the availability of 
emergency management personnel, equipment, and training (Lewis, T). 
Survey of the Infrastructure Sector’s Threats 
 There have already been numerous cyber-attacks against the U.S. government, U.S. interests 
and US allies. While attacks are often harmless, some have been successful in gaining access to 
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classified information or disrupting services.  Many of these attacks are believed to have 
originated in China (Fox).  West Point is susceptible to many natural and human-caused hazards.  
Knowledge of these hazards, their frequency, the installation‘s vulnerability to them, and the 
capabilities in place to stop them allows community stakeholders (e.g., leaders, emergency 
planners and responders, employees and residents) to better assess and mitigate their risks, and to 
manage their consequences (NIPP).  The risk assessment is a crucial step and the basis for 
developing a multiyear strategic plan that defines the mission, goals, objectives and milestones 
for the West Point (Lewis, T).   
      West Point has experienced significant impacts from natural hazards including floods, 
storms, and wildfires.  Beyond natural hazards, there are technological or human-caused hazards 
such as power failures, hazardous material (HazMat) spills, civil disturbances (i.e. protests, 
unauthorized demonstrations), and, terrorism (as well as cyber-terrorism) that may also pose a 
threat.  Each of these dangers requires a risk assessment in order to understand and to mitigate 
against its impact potential.  West Point can never be completely safe; total security is an 
unachievable goal.  Therefore, the issue becomes what is an acceptable level of risk to guide 
installation strategies and investments?  A key outcome of this process is defining an acceptable 
level of risk given this reality (Lewis, T).  West Point, due to its location and mission, is 
vulnerable to the damaging effects of significant, and potentially devastating natural and human-
caused hazards.  Events may occur at any time and may create varying degrees of harm and 
hardship to individuals and damage to the installation facilities (Lewis, T).  
For each vulnerability assessed, a hazard risk profile of high, moderately high, 
moderately low, and low was constructed utilizing the following criteria: scope or how 
widespread the hazard may be; cascade effects or the likelihood that secondary hazards may be 
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generated; frequency or historical rate of occurrence; hazard duration and recovery time; speed 
of onset or the potential warning time available, and impact or the consequences the hazard may 
have on West Point.  Although there is no single, universally accepted definition of terrorism, the 
US Justice Department defines it as the use of force or violence against persons or property 
violating the criminal laws of the United States for purposes of intimidation, coercion, or 
ransom. Terrorists often use threats to create fear among the public, to convince citizens that 
their government is powerless to prevent terrorism and to get publicity for their causes (FBI).  
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) categorizes terrorism in the United States as one of 
two types—domestic terrorism or international terrorism. Domestic terrorism involves groups or 
individuals whose terrorist activities are directed at elements of our government or population 
without foreign direction.  International terrorism involves groups or individuals whose terrorist 
activities are foreign-based and/or directed by countries or groups outside the United States, or 
whose activities transcend national boundaries (FBI).   A terrorist attack can take several forms, 
depending on the technological means available to the terrorist, the nature of the political issue 
motivating the attack, and the points of weakness of the terrorist‘s target. Based on the risk 
assessments contained here, the following hazards were viewed as significant for West Point: 
Moderately High Hazards. 
Terrorism, since 9/11, has been viewed as a significant threat to the United States. 
Terrorists continue to aggressively recruit, train, and plan against high-value US targets with the 
aim of producing mass casualties, visually dramatic destruction, and fear. Given its symbolism, 
West Point represents a high-value target for extremist groups and individuals.               
Cyber threats or cyber attacks on West Point‘s infrastructure or communications systems 
pose a rapidly growing but little understood threat to installation security and could become a 
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decisive weapon of choice for those seeking to do harm.  Information infrastructures, including 
the internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and 
controllers, are increasingly being targeted for exploitation and potentially for disruption or 
destruction, by a growing array of adversaries (NIPP). 
Moderately Low Hazard 
                  Spring and summer storms, a common hazard in the Hudson Valley, usually 
characterized by strong winds, are frequently combined with heavy rain and dangerous lightning. 
Excluding winter weather events, this category of storms includes thunderstorms, hailstorms, 
hurricanes, and tornados (NWS).  
 Winter storms can range from a moderate snow over a few hours to a blizzard with 
blinding, wind-driven snow that lasts for several days. Many winter storms are accompanied by 
dangerously low temperatures and sometimes by strong winds, icing, sleet, and freezing rain 
(NWS). 
Low Hazard 
Power outages represent the most likely yet least dangerous hazard to affect West Point. 
Backup power sources and restoration history suggest high system reliability and low 
vulnerability to a widespread power failure.   
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PROBAILITY CONSEQUENCES WARNING RISK
HIGH MED LOW MAJOR MODERATE MINOR MINIMAL MODERATE ADEQUATE VALUE
Score 3 2 1 3 2 1 3 2 1
NATURAL
Severe Storm 3 1 1 5
Power Outage 2 1 2 5
HUMAN-CAUSED
Power Outage 2 1 2 5
Cyber-Threat 3 3 2 8
Insider-Threat 2 3 3 8
Terrorism (General) 1 3 3 7
 
History of the Hazard (Terrorism). 
Although there have not been acts of terrorism at West Point, the potential for this type of 
incident is present. West Point, as a symbol of America‘s ideals and military might, is vulnerable 
to terrorist acts from global and local groups and individuals.  There is concern that radical 
groups associated with the environment, animal rights, anti-war or anti-US causes could create 
problems at West Point, although they are not present in any number or groups of significant size 
and there have been no overt threats to date.  
Vulnerability Analysis. 
The type of terrorist act determines vulnerability.  Depending upon the individual or 
group cause, almost any facility, activity or person(s) on the installation could be a potential 
target for terrorist activity.  Likely targets at West Point may be senior military leaders, high 
profile guests or event venues, cadets, and elements of the installation infrastructure (e.g. 
buildings and utilities).  Critical facilities and special events may become more appealing during 
visits by high profile personalities and dignitaries.  Sporting events such as football games and 
graduation may increase the probability of terrorist targeting.  Additionally, high-level meetings 
and conferences provide terrorists an excellent environment in which to articulate their cause 
through violence.  Terrorism comes in many forms including explosive detonation, chemical, 
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biological or radiological release, nuclear detonation, hijacking/kidnappings, arson, shootings 
and computer-generated attacks.  One of the special considerations in dealing with the terrorist 
threat is that it is difficult to predict.  One must know the minds and capabilities of various 
terrorists and terrorist groups. These are characteristics that terrorist organizations strive to 
conceal.  Because all terrorists are not the same, the calculation is even more difficult.  
West Point should use the existing processes and methodologies developed for the 
successful management of other hazards. Usually the plans and systems developed for other 
problems can serve as templates for developing a comprehensive counter-terrorism program.  
Any mitigation strategy should focus on creating an infrastructure that is difficult to attack, 
resilient to the consequences of an attack, and protective of its occupants should an incident 
occur. Examples of mitigation measures include providing community outreach and education to 
departments and individuals concerning actions they can take in preparation for possible terrorist 
events, disseminating real-time information on alert levels from the Homeland Security Advisory 
System, making individuals, families, and installations aware of steps they should be taking at 
each alert level, providing guidance on personal protective measures and what to do in situations 
involving chemical agents, biological agents, explosives, and radiological agents, providing 
information to installation activities on techniques to ―harden‖ their facilities against possible 
attack.  
These actions can help ensure that West Point personnel are aware of the simple steps 
they can take to be better prepared for the potential consequences of any terrorist attack and to 
anticipate and prevent such attacks. The goal is to help individuals learn how to make 
preparedness a part of their daily lives and improve their work and living places in the process. 
First responders must remember they are targets and that proactive steps need to be taken to 
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protect the crime scene and the evidence. Just like preparedness issues with all potential sources 
of disaster, public education is needed to help the citizens of our county recognize the threat. 
This Masters project will focus specifically on cyber terrorism and threats.  Cyber–
terrorism is ―the premeditated politically motivated attack against information, computer 
systems, computer programs, and data which results in violence against noncombatant targets by 
sub-national groups or clandestine agents.‖ Terrorist groups are using computers and the internet 
to further goals associated with spreading terrorism, although the proportion of cybercrime that 
can be directly or indirectly attributed to terrorists is difficult to determine.  
Hazard Identification: Cyber Threat  
Just as the U.S. has capitalized on the use of computer technology, our adversaries have 
not overlooked the fact that they must also operate in the computer age. The sophisticated threat 
to our Global Information Grid, of which DoD and West Point are a part, is extensive and 
presents a real danger to national security.  This threat includes nation-states that have openly 
declared their intent to develop cyber warfare capabilities. Further, it includes transnational and 
domestic criminal organizations, hacker groups, and terrorist organizations.  The effects of a 
cyber attack align generally into four areas:  
Loss of Integrity. System and data integrity refers to the requirement that information be  
protected from improper modification. Integrity is lost if unauthorized changes are made to the 
data or IT system by either intentional or accidental acts. If the loss of system or data integrity is 
not corrected, continued use of the contaminated system or corrupted data could result in 
inaccuracy, fraud, or erroneous decisions. Also, violation of integrity may be the first step in a 
successful attack against system availability or confidentiality (AR-25-2).  
Loss of Availability. If a mission-critical IT system is attacked and rendered unavailable  
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to its end users, the organization‘s mission will most likely be affected. Loss of system 
functionality and operational effectiveness, for example, may result in loss of productive time, 
thus impeding the end users‘ performance of their functions in supporting the organization‘s 
mission (AR-25-2).  
Loss of Confidentiality. System and data confidentiality refers to the protection of  
information from unauthorized disclosure. The impact of unauthorized disclosure of confidential 
information can range from the jeopardizing of national security to the disclosure of Privacy Act 
data (AR-25-2).  
Physical Destruction. Physical destruction refers to the ability to create actual physical  
harm or destruction through the use of IT systems. Much of our critical infrastructure, such as 
power and water, is operated with computer-controlled devices known as supervisory control and 
data acquisition (SCADA) systems. These systems can be attacked and used to cause operations 
to malfunction, such as the release of water from a dam or waste water facility or the disruption 
of the electrical power supply to the hospital. Any operation (e.g., academic records, supply 
records, office computer files) that make extensive use of computers are vulnerable to physical 
destruction through a cyber attack (NIPP).  
History of the Hazard 
Cyber-attacks vary in methods, severity and impact and have been used against many 
parts of the U.S. infrastructure, including commercial and military targets.  The source of these 
attacks is both domestic and foreign, and it is often difficult to discern the motives or the 
perpetrators of these attacks (NIPP). 
The U.S. Department of Defense has reportedly suffered an explosion in the number of 
cyber attacks conducted against its infrastructure since 2008.  The number of cyber attacks 
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against the DoD has substantially increased over the past few years and a majority of them have 
originated from China (Harris).  West Point has and will continue to be a target for cyber 
criminals due to its national profile and military background. DoD and DA computer networks 
are constantly being targeted by domestic and international organizations. The NEC West Point 
and the Army recognize the threat posed by cyber criminals and have implemented appropriate 
technical and procedural countermeasures aimed at detecting, preventing, reporting and 
responding to attempted network intrusions. 
In November 2008 the Department of Defense (DoD), the Pentagon, and U.S. Central 
Command‘s (CENTCOM) computer networks were attacked. The cyber attack strike on those 
key facilities was/is thought to be from inside Russia. The DoD has traced the origins of the 
cyber-attack to an unauthorized flash drive that was inserted into a military laptop somewhere in 
the Middle East. A malicious code which was placed on the flash drive by an unspecified foreign 
intelligence agency uploaded onto a network run by CENTCOM. One report indicated that last 
year there were 71,000 incidents, and during the first half of this year 30,000 occurred.  Not all 
incidents were able to penetrate the system. Although still high, approximately 2000 infiltrations 
occurred during this same time and some information was compromised (Lynn).  
Vulnerability Analysis  
This section lists vulnerabilities that may be found in typical IT systems. The order of 
these vulnerabilities does not necessarily reflect any priority in terms of likelihood of occurrence 
or severity of impact. Risk is a function of the likelihood (probability) that a defined threat agent 
(adversary) can exploit a specific vulnerability and create an impact (consequence). The risk 
induced by any given vulnerability is influenced by a number of related indicators, including: 
Policy and Procedure Vulnerabilities. 
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Vulnerabilities are often introduced into IT systems because of incomplete, inappropriate, 
or nonexistent security documentation, including policy and procedures. Security documentation, 
along with management support, is the cornerstone of any security program. Installation IT 
security policy can reduce vulnerabilities by mandating conduct such as password usage, CAT-
card protection, and internet usage. The following table describes potential policy and procedure 
vulnerabilities for IT systems.  
 
Policy and Procedure 
Vulnerabilities 
Description 
Inadequate security policy Vulnerabilities are often introduced into the system due to inadequate policies 
or the lack of policies specifically for system security 
No formal IT security 
training and awareness 
program 
A documented formal security training and awareness program is designed to 
keep staff up to date on organizational security policies and procedures as well 
as cyber security standards and best practices. Without training on specific 
policies and procedures, staff cannot be expected to maintain a secure 
communications environment 
Inadequate security 
architecture and design 
IT engineers have historically had no training in security and until relatively 
recently vendors have not included security features in their products 
Absent or deficient IT 
equipment implementation 
guidelines 
Equipment implementation guidelines should be kept up to date and readily 
available. These are an integral part of security procedures in the event of a 
system malfunction 
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Lack of administrative 
mechanisms for security 
enforcement 
Staff should be held accountable for administering documented security 
policies and procedures 
Few or no system security 
audits 
Independent security audits should review and examine system records and 
activities to determine the adequacy of system controls and ensure compliance 
with established security policy and procedures. Audits should also be used to 
detect breaches in security services and recommend changes as 
countermeasures, which may include making existing security controls more 
robust and/or adding new security controls 
No IT specific continuity of 
operations (COOP) or 
disaster recovery plan (DRP) 
A COOP or DRP is needed in the event of a major hardware or software failure 
or destruction of facilities. Lack of a plan could lead to extended downtimes. 
Lack of configuration change 
management 
A process for controlling modifications to hardware, firmware, software, and 
documentation should be implemented to ensure the system is protected against 
inadequate or improper modifications before, during, and after system 
implementation. A lack of configuration change management procedures can 
lead to security oversights, exposures, and risks 
Table 1 IT Policy and Procedures Vulnerabilities 
 
Because every organization has a limited set of resources, organizations should perform a 
risk assessment for the IT systems and use its results to prioritize system components based on 
the potential impact to each system. The organization should then perform a detailed 
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vulnerability assessment for the highest-priority systems and assessments for lower-priority 
systems as deemed prudent/as resources allow (Lewis, T).  The vulnerability assessment will 
help identify any weaknesses that may be present in the systems that could allow the 
confidentiality, integrity, or availability of systems and data to be adversely affected, along with 
the related cyber security risks and mitigation approaches to reduce the risks. 
Platform Capabilities 
IT system vulnerabilities can occur due to flaws, mis-configurations, or poor maintenance 
of platforms, including hardware, operating systems, and applications. These vulnerabilities can 
be mitigated through various security controls, such as OS and application patching, physical 
access control, and security software (e.g., antivirus software). Several platform vulnerabilities 
are depicted in the table below. The table below lists possible threats to West Point‘s information 
technology (IT) architecture. This list is in alphabetical order and not by greatest threat. 
 
 Adversarial Threats to Information Technology Systems 
Attackers Attackers break into networks for the thrill of the challenge or for bragging 
rights in the attacker community. While remote cracking once required a fair 
amount of skill or computer knowledge, attackers can now download attack 
scripts and protocols from the internet and launch them against victim sites. 
Thus, while attack tools have become more sophisticated, they have also 
become easier to use. Many attackers do not have the requisite expertise to 
threaten difficult targets such as critical U.S. networks. Nevertheless, the 
worldwide population of attackers poses a relatively high threat of an isolated 
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or brief disruption causing serious damage 
Bot-network operators Bot-network operators are attackers; however, instead of breaking into systems 
for the challenge or bragging rights, they take over multiple systems to 
coordinate attacks and to distribute phishing schemes, spam, and malware 
Criminal groups Criminal groups seek to attack systems for monetary gain. Specifically, 
organized crime groups are using spam, phishing, and spyware/malware to 
commit identity theft and online fraud. International corporate spies and 
organized crime organizations also pose a threat to the US through their ability 
to conduct industrial espionage and large-scale monetary theft 
Foreign intelligence services Foreign intelligence services use cyber tools as part of their information 
gathering and espionage activities. In addition, several nations are aggressively 
working to develop information warfare capabilities 
Phishers Spammers are individuals or organizations that distribute unsolicited e-mail 
with hidden or false information to sell products, conduct phishing schemes, 
distribute spyware/malware, or attack organizations 
Spammers Individuals or organizations with malicious intent carry out attacks against 
users by producing and distributing spyware and malware 
Table 2. Adversarial Threats to IT Systems. 
Network vulnerabilities can be eliminated or mitigated through various security controls, 
such as defense-in-depth network design, encrypting network communications, restricting 
network traffic flows, and providing physical access control for network components. 
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Mitigation Measures 
 West Point IT administrators should conduct and analyze the results of a comprehensive risk 
assessment, identify the cost of mitigation for each risk, compare the cost with the risk of 
occurrence, and select those mitigation controls where cost is less than the potential risk. 
Because it is usually impractical or impossible to eliminate all risks, the focus should be on 
mitigating risk with the greatest potential impact to the system. Additional mitigation measures 
include: 
a) Developing a Comprehensive Security Program. Effectively integrating security into 
an IT system requires defining and executing a comprehensive program that 
addresses all aspects of security, ranging from identifying objectives to day-to-day 
operation and ongoing auditing for compliance and improvement. 
b) Senior Leadership Buy-in. It is critical for the success of the IT security program that  
senior leaders buy into and participate in the IT security program. 
c) Provide Training and Raise Security Awareness. Security awareness is a critical part 
of IT incident prevention. All organizations with access to the network should design 
effective training programs and communication vehicles to help personnel understand 
why control methods are required, ideas they can use to reduce risks, and the impact 
on the organization if control methods are not incorporated. Training programs also 
demonstrate leader‘s commitment to, and the value of, a cyber security program. 
Feedback from staff exposed to this type of training can be a valuable source of input 
for refining the charter and scope of the security program.  
d) Define Specific IT Policies and Procedures. Policies and procedures are at the root of 
every successful IT security program. The more transparent these policies are with all 
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other procedures, the more likely they will be implemented at all levels. Policies and 
procedures help to ensure that security protection is both consistent and current to 
protect against evolving threats and also help to educate. After the risks for the 
various systems are clearly understood, the cyber security team should examine 
existing security policies to see if they adequately address the risks. Few 
organizations have the resources to harden the IT infrastructure against all possible 
threats; management should guide the development of the security policies that will 
set the security priorities and goals for the organization so that the risks posed by the 
threats are mitigated sufficiently. Security procedures should be documented, tested, 
and updated periodically in response to policy and technology changes.  
Budget Proposal  
Optimal Risk Reduction - Funding is allocated to reduce the mathematical risk - reducing 
vulnerability (probability of a fault) and risk (financial damages) (Lewis, T).  Cyber crimes are 
costly and can do serious harm to an organization‘s bottom line; I have found during research 
that the median annualized cost of risk reduction is $3.8 million per year, but can range from $1 
million to $52 million per year per company. Therefore the funding I am requesting will focus 
primarily on the external threat and the defense against cyber attacks.  In order to properly 
protect the Information Technology sector at West Point the following budget would be 
submitted: 
McAfee Total Protection for Secure Business $685,300.00. This program protects 
endpoints, encrypts data, scan and secure email, block spam, viruses, phishing attacks, and 
inappropriate content from entering your network. It has multiple layers of technology include IP 
reputation, domain name reputation, sender authentication, and grey listing; it has three layers of 
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protection include URL filtering, which can monitor and control web usage and enforce 
acceptable use policies; active malware scanning, which blocks malware trying to enter a 
network via the web (MacAfee). 
 One (01) Supervisory Information Technology Specialist (INFOSEC) GS -12 - $77,585.  
This position is to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of systems, networks, and 
data through the planning, analysis, development, implementation, maintenance, and 
enhancement of information systems security programs, policies, procedures, and tools. It will 
maintain the stability and currency of security software as applications and software change 
during the normal course of business, identify and evaluate future and emerging technologies in 
information security, disseminate information about the latest technology developments available 
in the marketplace through such activities as the preparation of briefings, various paper formats, 
and the arrangement of vendor presentations (CPOL). 
 Two (02) - Information Technology (IT) Specialists (INFOSEC) GS-11 $64,729 x2 = 
$129,458.00. These personnel provide advice and guidance in implementing IT security policies 
and procedures in the development and operation of network systems; they conduct risk and 
vulnerability assessments of planned and installed systems to identify vulnerabilities, risks, and 
protection needs, conduct system security evaluations, audits, and reviews, develop and 
implement training on system security policies and procedures for users and establish and 
maintain a comprehensive quality assurance program to cover file back and recovery, equipment 
maintenance, and quality control of systems processing and outputs (CPOL). 
One (01) - Engineering Technician (Electrical)GS-09/11- $53,500 This individual is 
responsible for troubleshooting, maintenance, and repair on all makes of generators, and 
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diagnoses, repairs, adjusts, and modifies all components of the generator, engine and switch gear 
(CPOL). 
Embed Information Technology/Information Assurance (IT/IA) concepts throughout 
West Point by developing, implementing, and sustaining training and doctrine for West Point 
cadets, military and civilian‘s employees. There is no additional cost to West Point to implement 
this goal since the costs associated with this mitigation strategy are absorbed by the Department 
of the Army and the Department of Defense (AR-25-2).  Software $685,300.00 + Personnel 
$260,543.00 + Training (No Cost) + Maintenance $20,000.00 = Total   $965,843.00. 
The US and West Point must continue to improve both its defensive and offensive cyber 
capabilities. Aggressors both on US soil and from around the world will continue to conduct 
cyber-attacks against the US and some or many of these attacks will be successful. The US must 
constantly improve its defense and reassess cyber warfare strategies to counteract these attacks.  
By continuing to develop cyber capabilities, the US will be able to neutralize or at least minimize 
the damage of cyber-attacks from those wishing to harm the country and its infrastructure. This 
will help maintain and hopefully improve the high standard of national security that the US 
enjoys. 
West Point has been and will continue to be a target for cyber criminals due to its 
national profile and military background. Computer networks are constantly being targeted by 
domestic and international organizations. The NEC West Point and the Army recognize the 
threat posed by cyber criminals and have implemented appropriate technical and procedural 
countermeasures aimed at detecting, preventing, reporting and responding to attempted network 
intrusions.  Providing training and raising security awareness is a critical part of IT incident 
prevention.  All organizations with access to the network should design effective training 
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programs and communication vehicles to help personnel understand why control methods are 
required, ideas they can use to reduce risks, and the impact on the organization if control 
methods are not incorporated.  
In order to produce analysis that is credible to those who must use its results, a 
methodology must adhere to the recognized methods of the professional disciplines that are 
relevant to the method of analysis (e.g., Information Technology, engineering etc.), and it must 
reasonably and adequately address the concerns raised by the three groups who may be directly 
affected by the decisions based on its results: governments at all levels, the Critical Infrastructure 
and Key Structures (CI/KR) workforce, and the West Point community at large (NIPP). 
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Chapter 11 
Planning and Preparing for Surge during special events: 
Special Topics in Homeland Security 
 
“Americans rightly asked, if this is the way our government responds to a natural  
disaster it knew about days in advance, how would it respond to a surprise terrorist  
attack? How would it respond to an earthquake?”  
                                                                                          Russ Carnahan  
 
“If we had a terrorist attack, the way the people respond 
is going to determine whether that attack is just a 
tragedy or whether that attack becomes an all-out 
disaster”.  
                                                                               Patrick J. Kennedy 
 
Introduction  
Over the past two decades, our nation has been faced with some of the worst disasters in 
our history. These have ranged from natural disasters, terrorist events, and biological attacks. In 
order to respond to and recover from these events our nation has seen the need for vast 
improvements in our emergency preparedness and response capabilities. In striving to achieve 
these improvements there has been a large amount of education and training provided to the 
emergency services field. Much of this education, funding and training was aimed at the fields of 
Fire, Emergency Medical Service (EMS), and Police. In addition to the training, new technology 
is being created in order to meet the needs and prevention of another potential disaster.  
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This master‘s project identifies the potential threat of an attack during special events 
hosted by the United States Military Academy at West Point; specifically Graduation 
Ceremonies and Home Football Games, and why it is considered popular a target. This project is 
designed to help emergency managers realize the true potential of an attack; the potential is there 
as well as the threat.  Since this is a relatively new topic of concern much more research must be 
done to fully understand how an attack of this magnitude would affect our daily operations.  
Emergency response and evacuation of spectator sport venues present complex, multi-
faceted problems that requiring intense preparation and coordination between emergency 
services, event staff, local government, and transportation or logistical departments.  Additional 
dimensions further complicate the problem at the United States Military Academy at West Point. 
These include restrictive terrain, military installations, and protection measures for the Corps of 
Cadets and other high risk targets (DHS 2009).   
Disasters Defined  
A disaster is a sudden, calamitous event that seriously disrupts the functioning of a 
community or society and causes human, material, and economic or environmental losses that 
exceed the community‘s or society‘s ability to cope using its own resources. Though often 
caused by nature, disasters can have human origins (IFRC). According to Mr. Frederick C. Cuny; 
a disaster is "A situation resulting from an environmental phenomenon or armed conflict that 
produced stress, personal injury, physical damage, and economic disruption of great magnitude." 
Disaster management is the actions taken by an organization in response to unexpected 
events that are adversely affecting people or resources and threatening the continued operation of 
the organization. Disaster management includes the development of disaster recovery plans, for 
minimizing the risk of disasters and for handling them when they do occur, and the 
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implementation of such plans (). Mitigation is the cumulative efforts taken to reduce the risk and 
vulnerability which a society faces. It can reduce the severity or frequency of the emergency or 
disaster and be implemented prior to a disaster or after a disaster (). Disaster is not necessarily 
defined as a destructive force in a community. If communities had mitigated the risk and were 
better adapted, some natural phenomena would not be so damaging or disastrous. Actively 
engaging in risk mitigation is an underutilized yet extremely potent means to preventing disaster, 
enhancing response, and saving money. An extremely important strategy to mitigating risk to 
disaster is the development and maintenance of Incident Command Systems (ICSs) because 
optimizing the efficiency and effectiveness of response efforts is a strong form of mitigation. 
Proper implementation of ICSs has and will save lives.  
Medical Disaster  
A medical disaster is one in which the destructive effects of natural or manmade forces 
overwhelm a community‘s ability to properly allocate existing resources.  Disasters have the 
potential to cause human death and suffering, permanently transforming the character of the 
affected community (MEDCOM).  With the media providing continual live coverage of a 
disaster, the rest of society is brought into closer contact with the event.  Natural disasters 
(floods, earthquakes, hurricanes, and tornadoes) still occur with striking regularity.  More 
frightening, however, is the growing destructive character of manmade disasters, such as 
chemical explosions, nuclear meltdowns, and acts of terrorism.  Terrorists in particular are now 
more willing and able to use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against civilian targets.  These 
deliberate attacks of aggression are likely to produce mass casualties that will stress and 
potentially overwhelm a community‘s medical infrastructure.   Examples include the bombings 
of the World Trade Center in New York and the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, and 
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the sarin nerve agent attack in Tokyo.  In all of these instances, healthcare personnel were 
depended upon to alleviate suffering, allocate ―limited‖ medical resources, and bring order to a 
potentially chaotic environment.   
When you talk about emergency response, Fire, EMS and Police are the areas that most 
people think of. Although, when you focus on only these agencies you are missing an important 
aspect of the emergency response process. The important part which is missing in that thought 
process is the end point of the patient, which is the hospital. After the responding agencies work 
to rescue, and stabilize the patients who were involved in the event they need to take them to the 
hospital for further treatment. Hospitals and especially the emergency departments are as much a 
part of the emergency response as the other agencies mentioned above.  
 
 
                                                                                                                               (Photo 1) 
 
Graduation Week activities provide West Point with the opportunity to showcase its 
mission to our Nation.  Annually during Memorial Day weekend; traditionally brings a large 
number of visitors to West Point which has the potential to strain resources (both at West Point 
and in Highland Falls).  In addition, security precautions for the guest speaker or unknown VIP 
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guests may require steps that cause temporary inconvenience to guests and our neighbors in the 
surrounding communities.  Graduation Week is the culmination of the 47-month experience by 
which West Point produces new junior officers for the United States Army.  It is also another 
primary opportunity to showcase West Point and the U.S. Army not only to the US National and 
DoD senior leaders, but also to the American public as a whole.   
 
 
                                                                                                         (Photo 2) 
 
 Additionally Army football games showcase West Point; its football team, the installation, 
the community, and the United States Army. Army home Football (FB) games are high-profile 
events that occur on West Point each year that bring thousands of fans and distinguished visitors 
onto the Installation to experience a day of Army Football. Thus, the safety and security of the 
West Point community, our facilities, visitors, and fans is paramount. All necessary force 
protection, traffic and parking control measures and activities prior to, during and subsequent to 
each home FB game and various events that occur throughout the week leading up to a home 
game are carefully planned, coordinated, executed and then assessed. 
Threat assessment 
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West Point is exposed to many hazards, all of which have the potential to disrupt the 
West point community, cause damage, and create casualties.  Knowledge of these hazards, their 
frequency, and the Installation‘s vulnerability to them, and the capabilities in place to address 
them allows the community, emergency managers, and installation activities to better assess and 
mitigate their risks and, should an incident occur, to respond and recover from their 
consequences.  Repeatedly the Department of Homeland Security has issued warnings on Sports 
Arenas.  The Department of Homeland Security and the FBI issued an assessment, called 
"Potential Threats to Popular Sports and Entertainment Venues," that said arenas and stadiums 
are attractive "potential targets during events" (MSNBC). International terrorist organizations, 
particularly those subscribing to al-Qaida‘s ideology, view sports and entertainment venues and 
large crowds in the surrounding area as potential targets, but Intelligence agencies lack 
indications of current attack planning involving these locations and events. The attack methods 
terrorists are most likely to use against these locations and events are improvised explosive 
devices (IEDs) and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs). Domestic terrorist 
groups do not present a significant threat to U.S. college sports and entertainment venues and 
surrounding areas. Domestic terrorists have attacked soft targets in the past, however, and some 
probably continue to view major sporting events in large stadiums and associated events in 
surrounding areas as possible targets (MSNBC). 
 A risk and vulnerability assessment is a crucial step and the basis for developing a plan 
that defines the mission, goals, and objectives (Lewis).  Based on the individual hazard profiles 
and the risk assessments contained below, the following hazards were assessed as most 
significant for West Point during special events (Lewis): 
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PROBAILITY CONSEQUENCES PREPAREDNESS WARNING RISK
HIGH MED LOW MAJOR MODERATE MINOR POOR FAIR GOOD MINIMAL MODERATE ADEQUATE VALUE
Score 3 2 1 3 2 1 3 2 1 3 2 1
NATURAL STORMS
Winter storms 3 1 1 1 6
Spring and summer 2 1 1 2 6
HUMAN-CAUSED
Aircraft crashes 
Active shooter  1 3 1 2 7
Insider-Threat 2 3 1 3 9
Terrorism (General) 1 3 1 3 8
Hazardous Materials  1 2 1 2 6
NATURAL or HUMAN
Epidemic/Pandemic 
influenza
1 3 1 2 7
Radiological 
emergencies 
1 2 1 1 5
 
Moderately High Hazard 
Terrorism in general since 9/11, has been viewed as a significant threat to the United 
States. Terrorists continue to aggressively recruit, train, and plan against high-value US targets 
with the aim of producing mass casualties, visually dramatic destruction, and fear. Given its 
symbolism, West Point represents a high-value target for extremist groups and individuals.   
Aircraft crashes – although assessed as a low probability—represent a potentially high 
consequence event. The most obvious hazard is of course the loss of lives, both on board the 
aircraft and on the ground. Additionally, there is the potential of significant property damage 
from the impact and the potential fire and explosion hazard associated with unspent jet fuel. 
There also exists the possibility that West Point‘s emergency response capabilities could become 
quickly exhausted.  
Active shooter incidents pose unique concerns for all facets of a community. A number 
of tragic shooting incidents in public spaces, campuses, and now at a military Installation have 
heightened the concern and need for preparedness for this potentially high consequence event. 
Moreover, there are a multitude of issues and emerging threat scenarios that make preparing for, 
responding to and recovering from an active shooter incident more challenging than other 
incidents.  
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Hazardous Materials (HAZMAT) incidents of varying proportions could happen anytime 
and at any place on or nearby the Installation and result in a fire, explosion, toxic cloud, or direct 
contamination of people and property. Health problems may be immediate, as from corrosive 
effects on skin and lungs, or be delayed, such as cancer from a carcinogen. Damage to property 
could range from immediate destruction through explosion to long-term contamination by a 
persistent hazardous substance.  
Moderately Low Hazard 
Spring and summer storms, a common hazard in the Hudson Valley, are usually 
characterized by strong winds, are frequently combined with heavy rain and dangerous lightning. 
Excluding winter weather events, this category of storms includes thunderstorms, hailstorms, 
hurricanes, and tornados.  
Winter storms can range from a moderate snow over a few hours to a blizzard with 
blinding, wind-driven snow that lasts for several days. Many winter storms are accompanied by 
dangerously low temperatures and sometimes by strong winds, icing, sleet, and freezing rain.  
Epidemic/Pandemic influenza represents a dangerous threat and formidable response challenge 
to West Point. Given the unpredictable behavior of viruses, neither the timing nor the severity of 
the next pandemic and its impact on West Point can be predicted with any certainty.   
Radiological emergencies at the nearby Indian Point nuclear power plant may place West 
Point at risk for exposure to or ingestion of radiological contaminants. While the probability of a 
catastrophic hazardous material release occurring is very small, the consequences from 
radiological materials could be significant. Equally significant with potential devastation 
consequences could be a chemical or biological incident. 
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It is important to note that hazards occur in varying degrees, and seldom is there a boiler-
plate response to an incident. With a unified response from West Point authorities and mutual aid 
partners, the strategies outlined in this project should facilitate an appropriate and timely all-
hazards response. The West Point community will be best served by a program that emphasizes 
risk assessment and mitigation, and that maintains the authority and versatility to make prompt 
and appropriate decisions in times of crisis that will minimize not only the potential for injury or 
death, property damage or destruction, but uphold the reputation and integrity of West Point.  In 
order to create and maintain a viable emergency readiness, response and recovery posture there 
must be a high level of understanding and consistency of thought among all participants.  
Existing Plans and Framework  
―The National Response Framework (NRF) is the overarching guide to how the nation 
conducts all hazards response. It is built on scalable, flexible, and capital coordinating structures 
to align key roles and responsibilities across the nation (NRF, 2008).‖ In short, the NRF is 
somewhat of a playbook for elected officials and emergency managers other practitioners and 
policymakers at all levels. It also has applicability to 1st responders and their leadership as a 
guide to help them effectively integrates with other levels of response within the government. 
NIMS provides a systematic, proactive approach to guide departments and agencies at all levels 
of government, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sectors to work seamlessly to 
prevent, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate the effects of incidents, 
regardless of calls, size, location, or complexity, in order to reduce the loss of life and property 
and harm to the environment. (Chertoff, 2008) the foundation of all of those plans is the West 
Point Emergency Management Plan (WPEMP), it has been developed to provide a basic 
procedural outline for hazard mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery at West Point. 
CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS          233 
 
West Point has a variety of Emergency management plans that have been authored but 
have not all been exercised and evaluated. The West Point Emergency Management Plan 
(WPEMP) is a basic source of reference considered necessary to accomplish the various types of 
emergency missions.  It is designed to bring the user to the point of knowing what is to be done, 
and who is to do it.  It may include information relative to when and where the response will be 
effective, and even why it will be done.  However, each participating organization must depend 
upon its own expertise to develop the procedures for carrying out its assignments in support of 
this plan.  
The West Point Emergency Management Plan (WPEMP).  Is an all-discipline, all-
hazards document establishes a comprehensive framework for the management of installation-
wide incidents. Incident Annex A (Antiterrorism Plan) to the WPEMP.  This plan establishes 
security measures to protect the Corps of Cadets; safeguard personnel and property and control 
access to the installation and mission essential vulnerable areas on West Point.  This plan also 
provides phased security upgrades and antiterrorism measures to meet terrorist, criminal, 
dissident, and sabotage threats. However there is no plan or Annex that addresses medical surge. 
Inherent to all plans are:  
Mitigation measures and practices to reduce the risks and vulnerabilities associated with a 
potential hazardous situation impacting the stadium. These preventative measures include hazard 
identification and vulnerability analyses, situational awareness (e.g., intelligence analysis and 
dissemination), public education, and security and safety assessments. 
Preparedness plans, procedures, and capabilities to enable a satisfactory level of readiness 
to respond professionally to all hazards. These measures include evacuation training and 
exercises for decision-makers, first responders, stadium staff, command and control elements, 
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and mutual aid partners; implementation and testing of warning and notification systems; 
confirmation of resource inventories and plans for their sustainment and deployment; formalized 
and tested mutual aid agreements; and a public information and education campaign plan (DHS 
2007). 
Response capabilities - as soon as a threat is detected it involves mobilizing and 
positioning emergency equipment; getting people out of danger; providing needed food, water, 
sanitation, shelter and medical services; and bringing affected services and systems back on line. 
Keeping mutual aid partners and higher headquarters informed and initiating long-term planning 
are included within this phase. When the incident exceeds West Point‘s capabilities local, 
regional, State and Federal assets would need to be requested (DHS 2007). 
Recovery activities that seek to restore normal operations after the immediate needs of 
the response phase have been met. Recovery efforts are concerned with issues and decisions that 
must be made after immediate needs are addressed and serve to inform the next phase of 
mitigation planning (DHS 2007).     
Special Considerations 
Preparing to respond to CBRNE incidents is very similar to contingency planning 
undertaken for other types of manmade or natural disasters, as long as the unique characteristics 
of a attack are considered (as discussed earlier).  Pro-active and integrated planning, 
coordination, training, and realistic drills will allow each community to respond to these events 
in an organized, efficient manner, using available Federal, state, and local resources.  Successful 
disaster planning requires hospital personnel to be familiar with the local incident management 
system, standard operating procedures (SOPs), triage, and personal protective equipment (PPE) 
(HSEEP).  A disaster plan, however, is only as effective as the assumptions on which it is based.  
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Unfortunately, many medical disaster planning initiatives are based on misconceptions.  As a 
result, many disaster plans prove to be ineffective in actual use (MEDCOM). 
In the hospital, disaster planning has traditionally been compartmentalized depending on 
the type of disaster.  For example, one plan is created for external disasters, another for 
HAZMAT accidents, and a completely different plan for natural disasters (AR 40-61).  The end 
result is often a confusing and cumbersome disaster-planning document that is unfamiliar to 
hospital personnel.  Proficient disaster planning requires a unified, ―all-hazards approach‖ to 
disasters that are likely to occur in the community.  This standardized plan can be expanded or 
contracted depending on the situation. 
Readiness Phase - In preparing to respond effectively to a CBRNE disaster, hospitals 
must take an inventory of their current capabilities.  Hospital personnel must be made aware of 
the overall disaster plan, which must be acted out realistically in disaster drills (DHS 2007).   
The plan must address how increased numbers of patients will be triaged, decontaminated, and 
treated.  If training, equipment, or supplies are lacking in specific areas (such as, antidotes, 
decontamination, PPE, data tracking, etc.), these deficiencies must be rectified (AR 40-61).   
Planning Phase - Incorporate all responsible individuals and departments into the 
planning process.  Keep the plan simple and cost effective, and assign tasks to individuals that 
parallel their normal daily activities.  Plan for problems that are most likely to occur in any 
disaster, and develop policies and procedures to address them.  Examples include: 
Communication problems between the triage area, the ED, and the command center; 
Coordination and sharing of information; Triage, victim tracking, and decontamination; and Staff 
rotation to minimize fatigue and stress (USAMRICD/DHS 2007).  
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Participate in joint planning.  EMS, law enforcement, and hospital disaster planners need 
to work together to develop an organized approach to disasters and mass casualty events.  To be 
successful, pre-hospital and hospital disaster plans need to be effectively integrated into the 
community disaster plan.  This planning may be best accomplished through existing committees, 
such as the Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC), or in association with the local fire 
chief and local emergency management officials (MEDCOM). 
Develop mutual aid agreements.  Hospitals and EMS providers should jointly develop 
mutual aid agreements concerning patient transport, hospital transfers, and sheltering during a 
mass casualty situation.  Anticipating that the closest hospitals to the incident will see the 
majority of casualties, EMS should transport the less severely injured patients to outlying 
medical facilities to help ensure adequate medical care to all disaster victims Army Pamphlet).  
Develop policies and procedures.  Formulate policies and procedures that address staff 
safety and personal protection, and standardize the hospital‘s approach to identifying, 
decontaminating, and treating contaminated victims (MEDCOM/AR 40-61).  
 Acquire necessary equipment.  Obtain PPE and decontamination equipment and train 
frequently utilizing this equipment to protect the safety of hospital providers (AR 40-61)..  All 
training and materials used must conform to OSHA regulations (OSHA).  Routine protective 
gear (such as goggles, surgical facemask, gloves, and gown) may not offer sufficient protection 
in all circumstances (such as in the case of a nerve agent attack).  Levels of PPE will be 
determined by the local jurisdiction in concert with OSHA regulations (OSHA). 
Stockpile antidotes.  Develop adequate caches of antidotes that are readily available to 
quickly and accurately treat victims of a chemical attack.  EDs should maintain basic treatment 
guidelines for the types of CBRNE events likely to be seen.  Summarizing this information on 
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treatment cards or posters helps to regularly reinforce the information while streamlining the 
delivery of medical care (Hunt). 
 Recovery phase - During recovery, the focus of disaster response shifts away from the 
acute injuries and illnesses caused by the disaster to the everyday needs of the general 
population.  The impacted population may have increased needs for medication, shelter, food, 
water, clothing, and emotional support that must be addressed.  Hospitals must also contend with 
the emotional needs and fatigue of their own personnel (Army Pamphlet).  
Training 
All hospital emergency departments should have the capability to treat contaminated 
patients from everyday hazardous materials accidents.  Preparedness begins with OSHA 
hazardous materials Awareness and Operations training that is specific to the hospital 
environment.  Training needs to include respiratory fit testing, donning and doffing of personal 
protective equipment, proper decontamination procedures, incident management, triage, and 
mass casualty patient care after a hazardous materials incident.  Once this foundation of training 
is established it should be expanded to include CBRNE agents (USAMRICD).   
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)  
 
Personal Protective Equipment refers to the use of protective clothing (suits, boots, 
gloves,) eye protection, and respiratory equipment that is designed to protect the eyes, lungs, and 
skin of the responder. During a HAZMAT accident or incident involving CBRNE agents, 
hospital personnel must be protected from the risk of personal injury (OSHA/.  These individuals 
must be provided PPE and trained in its use after first receiving medical clearance from a 
physician or licensed health care professional, and provided appropriate fit testing of the 
respirator they will use.  Retraining in the use of PPE needs to be provided at least annually to 
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ensure staff proficiency.  The level of PPE required for healthcare providers and support staff 
will vary depending upon their risk of exposure and assigned responsibilities during a CBRNE 
incident.  Many hospital personnel directly involved in the decontamination of victims will find 
Level B protective gear (including an atmosphere-supplying respirator) sufficient for such tasks, 
but the proper level of protection must be tailored to the hazard involved (OSHA). If the 
hazardous material has been identified, and its air concentration measured and determined to be 
below an immediately dangerous to life and health toxic level, PPE levels may be adjusted by the 
incident commander to level C or lower (OSHA).  Standard universal precautions should be 
followed by all other personnel when interacting with patients who have already completed the 
decontamination process.  In addition to following Federal guidelines for protective equipment 
use, responders must comply with any applicable state and local regulations. 
Biological Self Protection 
The best safeguard to prevent the spread of a biological agent is self-protection.  The first 
responder and medical caregiver must treat every patient with respiratory complaints (fever, 
cough, and shortness of breath) and open wounds as a possible infectious source.  All health care 
providers should wear eye protection and follow standard universal precautions when treating 
these patients (FM 284).  Special protective garments are generally not required since hospital 
isolation clothing or disposable gowns provide reasonable protection against skin absorption.  In 
areas where a biological agent aerosol could be generated, a higher level of respiratory protection 
may be required (MEDCOM). 
PPE – Self Protection from Radiological Materials  
The proper method of self-protection from radiological hazards depends on the specific 
hazard encountered.  If the primary danger is from contamination by radioactive particles or dust, 
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proper patient handling will prevent re-suspension and possible health effects.  Radioactive 
debris can be harmlessly washed from the surface of the body, but inhalation of the same 
material can lead to internal contamination and incorporation. Irradiation presents a different 
hazard to responders.  The protection principles of time distance, shielding, and amount of 
radioactive material should be considered.  While standard PPE will provide protection against 
external alpha and most beta radiation sources, normal protective clothing is ineffective for 
radioactive sources emitting gamma or neutron radiation.  Dense shielding is not likely to be 
available for emergency treatment of casualties at the average hospital.  Decisions to commit 
individual facility resources to radiological hazards must be based on local protocols and the 
hospital‘s emergency response plan.  It is important to note that the wear of a dosimeter will not 
protect you from the effects of radiation, but will document your exposure to penetrating 
radiation (AFRRI). 
Decontamination  
Decontamination is the physical process of removing harmful substances from personnel, 
equipment, and supplies.  It should be performed whenever there is known or suspected 
contamination with a hazardous substance.  Limiting the spread of contamination into the 
hospital is accomplished by preventing the contaminated individuals from entering the medical 
facility (USAMRICD).  In addition, hospitals must ensure that healthcare personnel wear 
personal protective equipment, and that the institution has the capacity to perform 
decontamination, with a plan for managing the resulting wastes and runoff. Caregivers who do 
not have PPE should not attempt to treat un-decontaminated casualties.  Before working on the 
next potentially contaminated casualty, caregivers should perform a quick wash-down of areas 
that were in contact with the previous victim.  This will prevent ―cross contamination,‖ the 
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transfer of hazardous substances from one casualty to another. Merely removing the victim‘s 
clothing will eliminate about 80% - 90% of the contamination. Gently scrubbing the body 
surface with soap and a soft brush helps to remove fat-soluble chemicals and solid materials 
remaining on the skin (MEDCOM). 
Victims of a CBRNE incident who have been fully decontaminated at the scene (clothing 
removal and showering) do not require additional decontamination at the hospital.  These 
patients can be brought directly into the hospital for further evaluation and treatment.  
Individuals, who only had their clothing removed at the scene, were exposed to an aerosol or 
vapor, and their symptoms are minimal or improving, may also be brought directly into the 
hospital without the need for further decontamination.  Victims arriving at the hospital with an 
unclear exposure history who are symptomatic from a CBRNE agent (or hazardous materials) 
should be fully decontaminated with soap and water before entering treatment areas.  Victims in 
extremis require rapid decontamination which includes quickly removing the patient‘s clothing 
(using scissors) and flushing the skin with copious amounts of water (Medical Management).   
Staff Preparedness 
The medical needs of the unaffected community must be considered since these 
requirements will not diminish in the event of an MCI or CBRNE event.  Plans must include 
provisions for diverting the normal number of trauma and medical emergency patients to other 
facilities, possibly in neighboring communities (MEDCOM).  These surrounding hospitals must 
be consulted during the planning phase, so they in turn can make realistic plans regarding the 
most efficient use of resources after a major terrorist event. In addition to planning and training, 
hospital staff will need to be ―mentally‖ prepared to deal with the ramifications of a large scale 
terrorist incident.  If a disaster does occur in the community, staff members will want to remain 
CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS          241 
 
at the hospital for the duration of the crisis to offer assistance.  Although their desires are 
admirable, some of these individuals will need to return home so personnel can be rotated 
effectively to prevent staffing congestion and help minimize fatigue (MEDCOM).   
Logistics/Supplies  
 
A major challenge of any disaster response is gathering, organizing and moving supplies 
to the appropriate area.  Within a hospital environment, the same condition applies.  Asset 
management, both, within the hospital and through mutual assistance with other facilities or 
agencies, may prove to be the decisive factor in whether a hospital conquers a mass casualty 
event or is overwhelmed by it. During a mass casualty event, hospitals generally require 
increased access to several components of care and response, including: Personal protective 
equipment; Medications, antidotes and vaccines; and Ventilators (AR 40-61) 
Maximal Utilization of Hospital Space  
Alternative medical treatment areas could be identified to help prevent overwhelming the 
hospital‘s resources, especially those in the emergency department.  These alternative sites may 
be internal (the cafeteria, auditorium, outpatients clinics, etc.) or external (schools, sporting 
facilities, other athletic facilities, etc.) to the hospital (Hunt).  In addition, an MOA could be 
established with the local Department of Transportation or busing company to help assist in 
victim transport.  Plan to use all available space.  An important way to maximize the existing 
resources at your hospital is to make space usage a part of the overall disaster planning process.  
Because response to CBRNE could thrust extraordinary demands on a healthcare institution, the 
timely response to a wave of victims could hinge partly on pre-designating suitable areas of the 
hospital for specialized functions.  Large exterior open areas might be perfect for external 
decontamination, while large indoor areas could serve as patient holding and re-triage centers.  
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Isolated areas with controlled access could function in additional specialized roles, such as 
overflow treatment areas for biological casualties; and for security and efficiency reasons, the 
hospital‘s command and control functions could also be overseen in a secure area (Hunt).  An 
additional space planning issue already addressed in many disaster plans is designation of 
temporary morgue facilities to serve as a secure holding site for the least fortunate victims.  
Conclusion  
West Point like any other small community is susceptible to incidents that can produce 
mass casualties that include, but are not limited to: Multiple vehicle, passenger bus, or troop 
carrying vehicle incident; Building collapse; Aircraft accident; Hazardous Materials (HAZMAT) 
incident; Pandemic/epidemic, CBRNE; or criminal/terrorist act. Mutual aid agreements need to 
be an organized, coordinated, reciprocal agreement in which all emergency medical providers 
plan for and effectively carry out emergency response where needed.  Personnel and equipment 
of all participating emergency medical service providers, regardless of type and size, are 
employed for the purpose of providing emergency medical assistance.  In times of need, due to 
excessive EMS call volume, vehicle break down, lack of available proper local manpower, 
advanced life support intervention, or mass casualty incident.   
The National Training Program (NTP) provides a planned approach to training for 
emergency managers and emergency response providers across the nation that supports the 
National Preparedness Guidelines.  FEMA has several training organizations that are heavily 
engaged in preparing the nation‘s responders and emergency management personnel. The 
organizations are the Center for Domestic Preparedness (CDP), Emergency Management 
Institute (EMI), National Training and Education Division (NTED), and the National Fire 
Academy (NFA). There are numerous types of training that the government receives, such as 
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CBRNE that has all kinds of individual types within it. Anniston, AL is home to several different 
CBRNE and WMD live agent training courses. Also, Ft Leonard Wood, MO is home to the 
Army and Marine Corps‘ training for their Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 
Defense personnel. The site in MO has a Chemical Defense Training Facility (CDTF) where live 
agent training occurs.  
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Conclusion 
The evolving threat environment has enhanced our awareness for the need for Continuity 
of Operations (COOP) capabilities that would enable West Point organizations to continue their 
essential functions across a broad spectrum of potential hazards. We remain at war with 
adversaries who are committed to harming our people, our facilities, and our way of life. In the 
midst of this conflict, West Point and the Hudson Valley region are vulnerable to emergencies 
that may impact life, property, and operations.  
Through its force protection-related programs, the Department of Defense (DoD), 
Department of the Army (DA), and Installation Management Command (IMCOM) are working 
jointly to enhance the ability of installations to prepare for, prevent, respond to, and recover from 
all-hazards. An element of that improvement effort is the Homeland Security Exercise and 
Evaluation Program (HSEEP) that includes the Target Capabilities List, a framework to guide 
operational readiness planning and assessment.    
The overall purpose of a COOP is to ensure the continuity of essential functions under all 
circumstances that may disrupt normal operations. As a baseline of preparedness for the full 
range of potential hazards, all USAG-West Point organizations should have in place viable 
COOP capabilities.  Over the past several years, organizations have become increasingly aware 
of the extent to which emergencies can interrupt, paralyze, disrupt, and/or destroy their 
capabilities to perform essential functions effectively under emergency conditions. 
Continuity of Operations (COOP) is the capability of an organization to continue 
mission-essential functions without unacceptable interruption. COOP planning includes 
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preparatory measures, response actions, and restoration activities planned or taken to ensure 
continuation of these functions to maintain military effectiveness, readiness, and survivability. 
Leaders have a moral responsibility to ensure the safety of their community. They also have a 
legal obligation to operate in a practical and efficient manner, even during an impending threat or 
following a crisis. To have a successful COOP plan, each agency must determine what its 
essential functions are by considering its mission and its personnel. Assigning priorities helps to 
distinguish between essential and nonessential functions. 
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ABBREVIATIONS 
ACSIM:  Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management 
AOR:  Area of Responsibility 
ARNG:  Army National Guard 
ASCC:  Army Service Component Command 
AT:  Antiterrorism 
ATEP:  Antiterrorism Enterprise Portal 
ATO:  Antiterrorism Officer 
CA:  Criticality Assessment 
CBRNE:  Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, high-yield Explosive 
CIDC:  Criminal Investigations Directorate Command 
Cbt RIF:  Combating Terrorism-Readiness Initiative Fund 
COM:  Chief of Mission 
CVAMP:  Core Vulnerability Assessment Management Program 
DoD:  Department of Defense 
FPEC:  Force Protection Executive Committee 
FPWG:  Force Protection Working Group 
FORSCOM:  US Army Forces Command 
FPCON:  Force Protection Condition 
FY:  Fiscal Year 
GCC:  Geographic Combatant Commander 
HHA:  Higher Headquarters Assessment 
ARNORTH:  Headquarters, Department of the Army 
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HRB:  High Risk Billet 
HRP:  High Risk Personnel 
IMCOM:  Installation Management Agency 
INSCOM:  US Army Intelligence Command 
JCIDS:  Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 
JSIVA:  Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment 
MAA:  Mutual Aid Agreement 
MACOM:  Major Army Command 
MOA:  Memorandum of Agreement 
MOU:  Memorandum of Understanding 
OEF:  Operation Enduring Freedom 
OIF:  Operation Iraqi Freedom 
POM:  Program Objective Memorandum 
PPBE:  Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution 
PSVA:  Personal Security Vulnerability Assessment 
RA:  Risk Assessment 
RDT&E:  Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation 
OSD:  Office of the Secretary of Defense 
RAM:  Random Antiterrorism Measure 
RMO: Resource Management Office 
SIPRNET:  SECRET Internet Protocol Network 
TA:  Threat Assessment 
GUARDIAN:  Threat and Local Observation Notice Reporting 
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TTP:  Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 
TWG:  Threat Working Group 
UFC:  Unified Facilities Criteria 
USARC:  US Army Reserve Command 
WMD:  Weapons of Mass Destruction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
